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 1 
Introduction 
1 Advances and setbacks  
Ukrainian agriculture is showing clear signs of recovery from its ‘transition crisis’. It 
is well known that agriculture went through such a crisis in all Central and Eastern 
European countries following the onset of transition. It is also well known that the depth and 
duration of this crisis – marked by declining production and productivity – differed 
considerably from country to country in the region, and that Ukraine’s record is 
comparatively poor in this regard. What is increasingly clear is that these differences in the 
depth and duration of crisis can be linked to differences in the resolve with which policy 
makers have introduced and implemented reforms. ROZELLE & SWINNEN (2004, p. 448), in a 
comparative survey of failures and successes in agricultural transition, conclude that: “All 
countries that are growing steadily a decade or more after their initial reforms have 
managed (a) to create macroeconomic stability, (b) to reform property rights, (c) to harden 
budget constraints, and (d) to create institutions that facilitate exchange and develop an 
environment within which contracts can be enforced and new firms can enter.”  
In all of these areas, and especially in the first two, Ukraine has achieved notable 
success since late 1999, and agriculture has benefited along with the rest of the economy. 
What we see, therefore, are signs of a certain ‘normalisation’ in the Ukrainian farm sector. 
Signs of this normalisation include the emergence of land markets, and the fact that 
production decisions are increasingly being made by private firms on a commercial basis 
subject to the usual rewards and sanctions that are provided by the market mechanism. As a 
result of this normalisation, productivity is increasing, albeit slowly and unevenly across 
farms, regions and types of production. 
These signs of normalisation and recovery are no grounds for complacency, however. 
Agriculture’s capital base in Ukraine continues to decline overall, despite the significant 
progress made by a subset of the country’s farms. Management skills and know-how 
continue to lag far behind the levels that will be necessary to tap Ukraine’s great potential in 
agricultural productivity and to compete on world markets.  
Policy has not responded to all of these concerns, and where it has, it has sometimes 
responded with inappropriate tools. As regards the policy response to lagging management 
skills and know-how, for example, investment in research, education and extension 
continues to be grossly insufficient. As regards the declining capital base, some policy 
responses such as interest rates subsidies for commercial loans to agriculture have provided 
assistance that is compatible with market incentives. Other responses, however – such as the 
long list of attempts to support the production and use of domestic farm machinery – have 
instead been a burden to agriculture and the taxpayer, and have slowed recovery. As the 
policy responses to the poor harvest in 2003 demonstrate, many reflexes and urges of central 
planning continue to lurk below a thin surface of market rhetoric in policy-making circles. 
Another problem is that policies directed at the farm sector and rural areas lack overall 
coherence. On the one hand, farmers are supported through tax breaks, minimum prices, and 
import tariffs. On the other hand, farmers are implicitly taxed by bureaucratic interference 
and insufficient liberalisation and investment in marketing and transport infrastructure. They 
must also bear explicit taxes such as the oilseed export tax that cost producers millions of 
Hryvnia every year. 
2  
The overall picture, therefore, is one of a positive trend and clear progress in 
important areas of Ukrainian agricultural policy. The future success of agriculture in 
Ukraine will depend on whether policy makers succeed in making progress in the areas that 
continue to lag, and in avoiding backsliding in the others.  
2 The structure of this book  
This is the third book that the German Advisory Group has produced on agricultural 
policy in Ukraine, and the second that has been produced in conjunction with the Institute 
for Economic Research and Policy Consulting (IER) in Kiev1. This book, therefore, picks 
up on what has become a tradition of periodically taking stock of both developments in 
Ukrainian agriculture and the analysis of these developments that we have produced in 
recent years.  
Over the years, the analytical capacity especially of our Ukrainian colleagues in the 
IER has grown remarkably. This is reflected in a series of empirical analyses in this book 
based on up-to-date econometric techniques and quantitative policy simulation models. We 
have maintained in this book the tradition of inviting outside experts to contribute to our 
book in areas that we have not been able to cover ourselves, thus increasing the scope of the 
analysis and ensuring that not all topics are seen from the same perspective. As in the past, 
we have endeavoured to update all of the chapters to a certain extent, since some were 
originally written as much as two years ago. However, such updating is not always entirely 
possible. It is our conviction that many basic economic relationships and policy messages 
remain the same even as numbers change from year to year. 
The structure of this book is simple. In Part I we study several broad topics that relate 
agriculture to overall economic development in Ukraine such as the implications of WTO 
membership for Ukrainian agriculture, the mix of different agricultural policy tools 
employed in the country, the system of agricultural taxation and the links between 
agricultural productivity and poverty. In Part II we adopt a farm enterprise perspective, 
focussing on competition for land as well as farm efficiency, organisation and management. 
In Part III we concentrate on policy in several specific markets such as grain and oilseeds, 
and on futures markets as a potential risk management tool for agriculture in Ukraine. While 
agriculture in Ukraine is too vast a topic to be covered comprehensively in any single 
volume, we hope that this selection of chapters and topics provides food for thought and 
conveys some of the excitement and interest that we have felt working in and on agriculture 
in Ukraine. 
3 Outlook and acknowledgements  
This book would not exist if we had not received a great deal of support and 
encouragement. As members of the German Advisory Group on Economic Reform with the 
Government of Ukraine we would like to thank the other members of this group and its 
                                              
1  The other two books are Die Transformation der Landwirtschaft in der Ukraine: Ein weites Feld 
(1999, in German and Ukrainian), and Policies and Agricultural Development in Ukraine (2001, 
in English and Ukrainian). See the references at the end of this introduction. Both books are 
available on the website of the Institute for Economic Reform and Policy Consulting at 
www.ier.kiev.ua. 
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leaders – Prof. Dr. Lutz Hoffmann and Dr. Lorenz Schomerus – for their support and for 
their interest in our work on agriculture. The Director of the Institute for Economic 
Research and Policy Consulting (IER) in Kiev, Prof. Igor Burakovsky, and the staff of the 
IER have also helped us in many ways. We are also grateful for support from the 
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) and the German Government’s TRANSFORM-
Program for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that has made our work in Ukraine 
possible in the first place. This work has also benefited greatly from continuing cooperation 
with the German Ministry of Consumer Protection, Food and Agriculture. Of course, the 
opinions expressed in this book are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect those 
of the KfW, the German Government or any other institution.  
Our most sincere thanks go to the Ukrainian policy makers and analysts who have 
shared their valuable time with us over the years, meeting with us, reading our papers, 
asking questions, debating and disagreeing. We appreciate that our task as ‘abstract’ 
economists is much easier than that of the policy maker who must weigh a great variety of 
factors in each decision. Regardless of any differences of opinion, our exchanges were 
always open, fair and fruitful. The genuine interest and respect that we have always sensed 
have been a continued source of motivation. 
In closing, three individuals who have helped us with the ‘logistics’ of producing this 
book deserve mention. We would like to thank Tamara von Bernard in Göttingen, who put 
all the pieces together and co-ordinated the day-to-day work professionally and with great 
patience. Dr. Sergiy Zorya was a major contributor to several chapters and an invaluable co-
ordinator in Göttingen, and together with Oleg Nivyevskiy in Kiev provided vital input into 
editing the Ukrainian version. All remaining errors are our own, but far more would remain 
if not for their help.  
 
November 2004 
 
Stephan v. Cramon-Taubadel, Göttingen 
Serhiy Demyanenko, Kiev 
Arnim Kuhn, Bonn 
 
4 References 
ROZELLE, S. & J. SWINNEN (2004): Success and Failure of Reform: Insights from the 
transition of agriculture. Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLII, p. 404-456. 
VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL, S. & L. STRIEWE (1999): Die Transformation der Landwirtschaft in 
der Ukraine: Ein weites Feld. Wissenschaftsverlag Vauk, Kiel, Germany. 
VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL, S.; S. ZORYA & L. STRIEWE (2001): Policies and Agricultural 
Development in Ukraine. Shaker Verlag, Aachen, Germany. 
4  
 
Part I: 
Agriculture and Economic Development in 
Ukraine 
 
 5 
1 The Implications of WTO-Accession for Agricultural Policy 
in Ukraine1 
STEPHAN VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL & SERGIY ZORYA 
1 Introduction 
Ukraine's stated intention to join the WTO, the ongoing negotiations with its 
Working Party, and the resulting conditions under which Ukraine could be accepted as a 
member have attracted attention for several years. In this chapter we deal with the 
agricultural dimension of these questions. However, the Doha Round of WTO negotiations 
that is currently proceeding without Ukraine will also have important implications for 
agriculture in Ukraine. Ukraine is currently negotiating with the WTO on the basis of 
agricultural provisions established under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
(URAA) in 1993. It may be that the result of the Doha Round shifts some of the URAA 
parameters, creating the need for further adjustment in Ukraine beyond whatever adjustment 
results from a successful completion of Ukraine's membership negotiations. Both processes 
– Ukraine's membership negotiations and the Doha Round – are uncertain as regards both 
outcome and timing. Hence, at the moment, it is only possible to engage in more or less 
informed speculation. 
The discussion of membership implications in the body of this paper centre largely 
on the disciplines and commitments that are likely to result for agriculture and agricultural 
policy makers in Ukraine. These disciplines and commitments will clearly reduce some of 
the freedom enjoyed by Ukrainian agricultural policy makers. For example, WTO members 
are generally not permitted to use certain policy instruments such as export subsidies. So 
WTO membership would reduce the ‘feasible set’ of instruments from which agricultural 
policy makers in Ukraine can choose. However, Ukraine would also gain a great deal from 
WTO membership, in agriculture as in other sectors. The benefits of membership include 
the following: 
• WTO membership would add impetus and urgency to Ukraine's agricultural policy 
reform agenda, and would also commit Ukraine to a more stable and transparent 
agricultural policy than has been implemented so far. This would have positive 
effects on both domestic and foreign investment, something which is of particular 
importance for a sector that is capital and know-how intensive such as agriculture. As 
a result, Ukraine, as a WTO member, could tap its agricultural potential faster, to the 
benefit of the entire economy. 
• WTO membership would also give Ukraine a voice in future debates on the 
international rules governing agricultural trade and policy making. With its 
comparative advantage in agriculture and its status as a 'small' country exporter of 
                                              
1  An earlier version of this chapter, also entitled “The Implications of WTO-Accession for 
Agricultural Policy in Ukraine”, was published in the volume Ukraine's WTO Accession, 
Heidelberg, Physica-Verlag, 2004, p. 229-241. Permission to publish this revised version here is 
gratefully acknowledged. 
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major temperate agricultural products such as grains and oilseeds (and potentially 
livestock products), Ukraine appears predestined to become a member of the Cairns 
group. Like other Cairns group members, Ukraine desperately needs a level playing 
field in international agricultural trade. It was the Cairns group's insistence in the 
Uruguay Round that led to the first substantive agricultural agreement in the history 
of the (GATT-) WTO, and many are pinning their hopes on similar advocacy by the 
Cairns group in the Doha Round2. 
• Finally, as a WTO member, Ukraine would enjoy access to the WTO's dispute 
settlement mechanism and protection from arbitrary treatment by its trading partners. 
That this can be of great importance has been demonstrated recently in connection 
with the EU's decision to introduce grain import quotas. While the EU had to consult 
with other WTO members such as Canada and the US on this matter, it did not have 
to consult with Ukraine3. As a result, Canada and the US were able to secure fixed 
tranches of the EU’s import quota, while Ukraine has to compete with other countries 
for the rest of this quota on a first-come, first served basis. 
In the following we begin by briefly outlining the relationship between agriculture 
and the WTO (section 2), before proceeding to consider the likely impact of WTO 
membership on agriculture and agricultural policy making in Ukraine (section 3). We close 
in section 4 with conclusions and a brief look forward.  
2 The WTO and agriculture 
Agriculture has a special place within the WTO largely because it is spent most of 
the history of this organisation – and its predecessor, the GATT – outside. As mentioned 
above, the Uruguay Round marked a turning point in that, largely as result of the insistence 
of the Cairns group, agriculture was for the first time subjected to meaningful disciplines. 
While the subjection of agriculture to international rules governing trade without doubt 
represented a major breakthrough, in retrospect the concrete impact of the URAA on 
domestic agricultural policies in the member countries has been rather disappointing. As 
illustrated in figure 1.1, for example, there has been some reduction in overall agricultural 
                                              
2  As it is, the Doha-Round has been influenced by a new so-called G-20 group of 20 developing 
countries that has, to some extent, eclipsed the Cairns Group. The G-20 is spearheaded by Brazil 
and, like the Cairns Group, is insisting on farther reaching changes in agricultural policies in the 
industrialised countries, primarily the EU and the US. This insistence was a major factor leading 
to the collapse of the Doha-Round negotiations in Cancún in September 2003. The prospects for a 
successful completion of the Doha Round are discussed below. 
3  The EU's decision to impose grain import quotas is unfortunate and not in the spirit of a 
progressive liberalisation of world agricultural trade. Indeed, it borders on hypocritical when 
firms in the EU lobby for the opening of Ukraine's markets for agricultural machinery and other 
farm inputs, while the EU simultaneously restricts its own markets for the grains that these inputs 
are used to produce. Most recently, the EU has signalled that it is willing to discuss the possibility 
of granting Ukraine (and Russia) their own fixed tranches of its grain import quota. 
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support in the OECD since the mid-1980s4. Since the mid-1990s, however, no clear trend is 
apparent. As a matter of fact, in the US agricultural support is on the rise.  
Figure 1.1: Agricultural support in the OECD (1986-2001, % PSE)  
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Source: Tangermann (2002). 
With high insight it is clear that the URAA contained too many loopholes. These 
include base period definitions that were designed to leave as much leeway as possible, and 
commitments to reduce support or import protection that could be applied on average, 
leaving considerable discretion to maintain 'peaks'5. As a result, agricultural support in the 
OECD as a whole in 2001 amounted to a staggering 258 bill. € or roughly 1% of total 
OECD GDP. As is apparent in figure 1.2, the EU and the US are responsible for the lion's 
share of this support. 
In view of these agricultural policies elsewhere, it is easy to empathise with the 
position of Ukraine's negotiators with the WTO, who must at times feel as if they are being 
subjected to a double standard: “Don’t do as we do; do as we say”. Nevertheless, it is 
important not to draw the wrong conclusions from a Ukrainian perspective regarding the 
desirability of agricultural protection and support. First, as the numbers in figure 1.2 
illustrate, agricultural support is very expensive. While it might benefit farmers, it places a 
                                              
4  Agricultural support is measured in figure 1.1 using the Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE) 
concept developed by the OECD. The PSE measures support to farmers from consumers through 
higher commodity prices and from taxpayers through budgetary transfers. The PSE is defined as 
the annual value of the total monetary transfers from consumers and taxpayers to agricultural 
producers as a percentage of gross farm receipts (OECD, 2000). 
5  Many of these aspects of the URAA are discussed in detail in GAISFORD & KERR (2004). 
8  
significant burden on taxpayers and/or consumers. When support takes the form of 
protection (for example price support or production quota systems) it leads to economic 
waste, reducing economic growth and destroying jobs. Even if ‘rich’ countries such as the 
EU feel that they can afford these costs, it is abundantly clear that Ukraine cannot.  
Figure 1.2: Agricultural support in OECD countries (2001, bill. €)  
Other OECD
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 103.9
USA
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Source: TANGERMANN (2002). 
Second, note that while agricultural support in the OECD countries has not fallen 
much on average since the end of the Uruguay Round, the structure of agricultural support 
has been changing. As illustrated in figure 1.3, the importance of price support has fallen 
progressively in the EU since the early 1990s, while the importance of various forms of 
direct payment has increased.  
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Figure 1.3: The structure of agricultural support in the EU (1986-2001) 
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This is important because, again, different types of agricultural support are associated 
with different degrees of efficiency. As illustrated in figure 1.4a, only roughly 40% of price 
support payments end up in farmers' or land owners' pockets – the remaining 60% end up 
either wasted or in the hands of input suppliers. Decoupled payments are considerably more 
efficient as roughly 90% end up benefiting farmers (figure 1.4b). Hence, while agricultural 
support remains prevalent, there is a clear trend to more efficient forms of support. The so-
called Mid-Term Review (MTR) reform proposals tabled by EU agricultural Commissioner 
FISCHLER and adopted by the EU Council of Ministers in 2004 – with their emphasis on 
further reduction in price support and a move to decoupled income transfers – are 
symptomatic of this trend. Ukraine would be well advised to anticipate the results of this 
trend and design an agricultural policy that is forward looking and does not force Ukraine to 
repeat the costly mistakes that have created so much domestic and international friction 
elsewhere. 
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Figure 1.4: Who benefits from agricultural policy? Price support versus ‘decoupled’ 
payments 
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Source: TANGERMANN (2002). 
Third, the results of the ongoing Doha Round of WTO negotiations can be expected 
to continue and perhaps accelerate the trend toward progressive liberalisation of agricultural 
policies and the implementation of less distortive policy tools world-wide. The outcome of 
the Doha Round became uncertain after the Cancún Ministerial meetings collapsed in 
September 2003 due primarily to a lack of progress on agriculture (see footnote 2). 
However, on August 1, 2004, the 147 members of the WTO, after protracted and difficult 
negotiations, succeeded in agreeing on a so-called ‘framework’ for continued negotiations 
on agriculture. Most experts now expect that after the US presidential election and the 
installation of the EU Commission in late 2004, the intensity of the Doha Round 
negotiations will pick up again. In what may be a major breakthrough, the EU has finally 
agreed that it is willing to consider the possibility of eliminating all its agricultural export 
subsidies, as long as export subsidies and other tools such as export credits that have a 
similar impact are eliminated by all other WTO members as well.  
Whatever the exact outcome of the Doha Round, a return to the policies of the 1960s 
and 1980s with their emphasis on price support is out of the question. So, again, Ukrainian 
policy makers should look forward and not back in their search for ‘Leitbilder’. Any 
progress in the area of agriculture as a result of the Doha Round would benefit Ukraine. In 
particular, a reduction in the use of export subsidies as proposed by the EU would make it 
easier for Ukraine to compete on world markets. 
3 The implications of WTO membership for Ukrainian 
agriculture 
The URAA contained provisions in four major areas related to agriculture. These are: 
market access; domestic support; export subsidies; and sanitary and phytosanitary measures. 
These categories are also framing the current Doha Round negotiations on agriculture, so it 
makes sense to structure the following discussion along these lines as well. 
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3.1 Market access 
As the outcome of the negotiations between Ukraine and the member countries of 
Ukraine's WTO working party are ongoing, it is not yet clear exactly what concessions 
Ukraine will have to make in the area of market access. Ukraine has offered to reduce its 
tariffs on major agricultural products from the current levels illustrated in figure 1.5 to the 
bound levels also presented in this figure. This would reduce Ukrainian agricultural tariffs 
from roughly 30% to 13% on average, and there are indications that the members of the 
working party are more or less in agreement with this proposal.  
Figure 1.5: Current and committed bound MFN tariffs for selected agricultural 
commodities in Ukraine in 2001  
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Note: Most favoured nation tariffs are shown in ad valorem terms. Since most agricultural commodities in 
Ukraine are subject to ‘combined tariffs’ (ad valorem and specific tariffs), and specific components 
are often higher than the announced ad valorem rates, the ad valorem equivalents of specific tariffs 
are included in figure 1.5. The ad valorem equivalent is defined as the specific tariff divided by the 
border reference price and multiplied by 100. For details see WORLD BANK & OECD (2004). 
Source:  WORLD BANK & OECD (2004).  
 
Membership in the WTO would also entail that the frequent use of specific 
agricultural tariffs in Ukraine would have to be curtailed in favour of ad valorem tariffs. 
Furthermore, it appears that Ukraine would not be permitted to make use of special 
safeguard provisions. Special safeguard provisions were introduced at the end of the 
Uruguay Round as a means of providing countries such as the EU – that were required to 
transform variable import levies and other non-tariff barriers to trade into bound tariffs – 
with a means of dealing with the import surges that might result. Since Ukraine makes no 
use of such measures, it will not be required to subject them to ‘tariffication’ as a result of 
WTO membership and will therefore be in no greater danger of import surges after the fact 
than it was before. 
A contentious area with regard to market access is sugar. As can be seen in 
figure 1.5, sugar is the one important agricultural product for which Ukraine has offered no 
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tariff concessions. Ukraine is a net importer of sugar, so controlling imports is, together 
with the domestic production quotas that have been implemented, a means of controlling 
domestic prices6. The size of Ukraine's tariff rate quota for imports of raw sugar has been an 
issue of contention with some members of the working party; amounts of 200 thd. tonnes 
and 260 thd. tonnes have been discussed. As the Ukrainian authorities have discovered, and 
as was predicted several years ago by the German Advisory Group (VON CRAMON-
TAUBADEL, 1999), Ukraine's sugar policy has generated considerable incentives for 
smuggling. Hence, the size of the tariff rate quota may be at least partly academic. 
Unfortunately, sugar would appear to be one area of agricultural policy in which Ukrainian 
policy makers are insisting on repeating the costly errors committed elsewhere. In 2004, the 
EU has finally tabled extensive reform proposals for its sugar market policy. 
3.2 Domestic support 
The area of domestic support is perhaps one of the most controversial areas in the 
negotiations between Ukraine and the members of its WTO working party. Ukraine has 
proposed that a 1994 to 1996 base period be employed to define Ukraine’s bound level of 
domestic support. The use of this base period leads to an aggregate measurement of support 
(AMS) of 1.38 bUS$. Some members of the working party are, however, insisting on the 
use of a 1997 to 1999 base period that would leave Ukraine with an AMS of 61 mUS$. 
Ukrainian officials argue that 1.38 bUS$ is already a very small amount compared with the 
support that other countries – in particular the EU and the US – provide to their agricultural 
sectors (recall figure 1.2 above). They also argue that the use of 1997 to 1999 – the depth of 
Ukraine's agricultural crisis – is not at all representative and would limit Ukraine to a level 
of support that is not in keeping with the agricultural policy needs of such a large and 
important sector of the Ukrainian economy. Some working party members are insisting, 
however, that any amount of agricultural support is simply too much, and that Ukrainian 
agriculture should not be permitted to become addicted to subsidies in the first place. These 
countries – for example Australia7 – are concerned that without strict WTO disciplines 
Ukraine would end up joining the ranks of those competitors that use subsidies to compete 
unfairly on world agricultural markets.  
Ukrainian negotiators might be forgiven for suspecting that the strict demands on 
Ukraine's AMS level that some members of the working party are making are at least partly 
the result of frustration born from their inability to apply meaningful pressure to the much 
larger and much more trade distorting domestic support provided by the US and the EU. On 
the other hand, Ukraine provides the majority of its domestic support (roughly 80%) in the 
form of tax exemptions that are not included in AMS calculations8. Hence, the debate over 
1.38 versus 0.06 bUS$ of domestic support is to some extent artificial. Regardless of the 
amount that is finally bound, tax exemptions will continue to provide a means of delivering 
                                              
6  As a result of production quotas and import barriers, domestic prices for white sugar in Ukraine 
have ranged between 2000 and 2200 UAH/tonne in recent months, the equivalent of 375 to 
410 US$/tonne or roughly twice the world market price. 
7 Note that Australia's agricultural policy is very liberal in comparison with other OECD members. 
Its PSE currently amounts to 4% or 1 bUS$ (TANGERMANN, 2002). 
8 See VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL & ZORYA (2001). 
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more support. For these reasons Ukraine would be ill advised to allow the success of its 
WTO negotiations to hinge on the domestic support issue. Ukrainian policy makers should 
ensure that whatever agricultural support they provide consists of Green Box measures – 
such as support for education and research in agriculture and the development of 
agricultural marketing infrastructure – that would not be subject to domestic support 
disciplines in the first place. 
3.3 Export subsidisation 
As Ukraine has not employed export subsidies in the past it follows – and would 
appear to have been accepted by all parties to the negotiations – that Ukraine should receive 
no allowance for the use of export subsidies in the future. Since it is likely that the Doha 
Round will lead to a major curtailment and perhaps even the elimination of the use of export 
subsidies in agriculture, it would probably not make much sense for Ukraine to insist – as 
Russia currently is – on receiving an export subsidisation allowance; the 'bargaining chips' 
that would be required to gain concessions in this area can be better employed elsewhere.  
An important implication of the fact that Ukraine would not be permitted to use 
export subsidies as a future WTO member is that as a net exporter of most important 
agricultural products, Ukraine would not be able to employ domestic price support 
measures. This is because domestic price support in an export situation necessarily leads to 
the accumulation of surpluses that can only be exported with the use of some form of export 
subsidy, either implicit or explicit. This means, for example, that the intervention system for 
grain that Ukraine introduced in the summer of 2002 is fundamentally incompatible with the 
likely conditions of Ukraine's WTO membership. WTO membership would therefore result 
in a considerable reduction in the range of policy tools available to agricultural policy 
makers in Ukraine. From an economic efficiency perspective this would be a positive 
development as it would preclude the use of inefficient and distortive price support policies 
(recall the discussion surrounding figure 1.4a above). By joining the WTO, agricultural 
policy makers in Ukraine would in effect be committing themselves to resist the temptation 
to use these tools in the future.  
3.4 Sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
The agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures reached at the end of 
the Uruguay Round aims to reduce trade tensions by limiting the use of health and safety 
measures that are disguised protection. The SPS agreement aims to harmonise the SPS 
measures applied by WTO member countries and ensure that they are both transparent and 
based on science.  
As the procedures used to test for contamination become increasingly sophisticated 
and sensitive, and as consumers in industrialised countries become increasingly sensitised to 
food quality issues, there has been some concern that SPS measures could lead to a ‘race to 
the top’ whereby industrialised countries set very exacting standards that are prohibitively 
expensive to control and monitor in ‘small’ countries that cannot afford to invest in the 
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required capacities (for example, personnel and laboratories). The result could be non-tariff 
barriers in the guise of consumer protection9.  
For this reason, ‘small’ countries such as Ukraine have a strong interest in an SPS 
agreement that ensures transparency and fairness. At the same time, Ukraine should take 
every possible step to ensure that problems with the quality of its own food exports do not 
fuel a demand for excessive SPS standards in other countries. As alleged findings of various 
types of contamination in shipments of Ukrainian grain to Brazil, France and Canada attest, 
the issue of product quality and the SPS measures employed to control this quality is 
already of vital importance to Ukraine10. While the costs of developing the required SPS 
infrastructure in Ukraine are high11, they are actually fairly small in comparison with the 
potential economic value of agricultural trade to the Ukrainian economy. Furthermore, 
investments in developing SPS capacity would fall into the Green Box category of 
agricultural support measures; they would represent vital support for the development of 
Ukrainian agriculture that is not subject to WTO disciplines. Moreover, there is 
considerable multilateral and bilateral international aid available to countries such as 
Ukraine for the development of SPS capacity. 
4 Conclusions 
Experience in many countries has shown that agricultural policy making is fraught 
with difficulties. Agricultural interests – farmers, landowners and input suppliers – tend to 
be well organised and ‘capture’ the policy making process. As a result, agricultural policy 
tends to be both inefficient and resistant to reform. Experience, for example in the EU or 
New Zealand, has also shown that when agricultural policy reform does occur, it is not 
because agricultural policy makers have suddenly ‘seen the light’. Instead, agricultural 
policy reform is almost always imposed from outside, for example by strapped budgets or 
by the need to meet international commitments. The WTO is one source of such 
international commitments. While the results of the Uruguay Round breakthrough on 
agriculture have been somewhat disappointing in retrospect, this breakthrough did at least 
bring agriculture to the table and initiate a discernable trend towards less distorting forms of 
agricultural support worldwide. 
An agreement on Ukrainian membership in the WTO is within reach. The likely 
agricultural conditions of WTO membership for Ukraine would not appear to be very 
onerous. Some liberalisation and market opening would result, but Ukrainian agriculture is 
only beginning to emerge from the transition crisis of the 1990s and agricultural policy in 
                                              
9 See JOSLING (2002) for a discussion of some of these issues. JOSLING reports that so far the 
evidence on the use of the SPS dispute settlement mechanism by smaller economies is not 
encouraging. He reports on 69 cases that have been raised so far by small economies. Of these, 
roughly two thirds were raised against OECD countries. In only roughly 20% of these 69 cases 
was the small economy able to reach its objectives. He suggests that small economies should 
make use of joint representation to pool scarce resources, and that funds be made available to 
small economies to help them both adopt SPS measures and, when necessary, initiate SPS 
disputes.  
10  See VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL (2002). 
11  See the evidence on the costs of the required investments in SCHULER (2004). 
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Ukraine is only beginning to take on clear contours. Hence, much is in flux and could be 
adapted with relative ease. It is much more difficult to change agricultural policy once it, 
and those who benefit from it, become firmly entrenched. If only for this reason, Ukraine 
should welcome WTO membership and make every effort to secure it quickly. The 
requirement that Ukraine would have to abstain from employing export subsidies as a WTO 
member would have especially far-reaching consequences in this regard; it would preclude 
the use of price support policies for agricultural products that Ukraine exports. This is just 
one of the ways in which WTO membership could help Ukrainian policy makers avoid the 
agricultural policy mistakes that have proven so costly and difficult to repair elsewhere. 
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2 Shifting Agricultural Policy towards Measures Envisaged 
by the Green Box  
SERHIY DEMYANENKO & VIKTORIYA GALUSHKO 
1 Introduction 
Opponents of accession to the WTO in Ukraine sometimes argue that Ukraine would 
surrender too much sovereignty in the area of agricultural policy by joining. In this chapter 
we argue that this is not the case. Even as a WTO member, Ukraine would still enjoy a great 
deal of freedom to support its agricultural sector. WTO regulations limit the use of certain 
types of support that are wasteful and trade distorting. But at the same time they stipulate 
that members can provide support to agriculture within the framework of so called Green 
Box measures. Green Box measures are exempted from reduction commitments, so WTO 
members are completely free to apply them. They are also efficient measures that are 
particularly well suited to fostering sustainable agricultural growth. Thus, by joining the 
WTO and emphasizing Green Box measures, Ukraine could make a step towards 
establishing favourable conditions for long-term, steady and sustainable agricultural 
development, the improvement of rural welfare, and the development of market and social 
infrastructure. Accession to the WTO would improve the prospects for agricultural growth 
in Ukraine by reducing the temptation to implement inefficient market and price support 
policies, and by focusing attention on Green Box measures that minimize distortions and 
maximize long run policy benefits for agriculture. 
The goal of this paper is to outline the potential for applying Green Box measures to 
support Ukrainian agricultural producers. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
describes Green Box measures that can be implemented through publicly-funded state 
programs or can be financed by the state budget. Section 3 discusses the importance of 
Green Box measures for the sustainable development of Ukrainian agriculture and their 
applicability in Ukraine. In the concluding section we provide recommendations for the 
future development of a ‘WTO-compatible’ agricultural policy in Ukraine.  
2 What is the Green Box?  
As a result of previous rounds of WTO negotiations, it was agreed to classify 
agricultural support measures into three categories according to whether they distort 
agricultural production and trade. Using the metaphor of a traffic light, these categories 
were labelled the Red Box (measures which are forbidden), the Yellow Box (measures 
which are tolerated but must be phased out over time via reduction commitments) and the 
Green Box (measures which are not subject to reduction commitments)1. To qualify for the 
Green Box, measures must meet the following criteria: 
                                              
1  As a result of a compromise between the EU and the US reached during the Uruguay Round of 
WTO negotiations, a fourth category, the Blue Box, was created. The Blue Box essentially 
contains Yellow Box measures that are temporarily exempted from reduction commitments. 
There are many indications that the Blue Box will be sharply curtailed and perhaps even 
eliminated, as a result of the current Doha Round of WTO negotiations. 
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• They shall have no or at most minimal trade-distorting effect or effects on 
production; and, 
• The support should be provided through publicly-funded government programs not 
involving transfers from consumers. 
Major Green Box measures included in general services are the following: 
1. Research, including general research and research related to particular products, 
research connected with environmental programs.  
2. Pest and disease control such as early-warning systems, quarantine and eradication. 
3. General and specialist training. 
4. Extension and advisory services, including transferring information and the results of 
research to producers and consumers. 
5. Inspection services for health, safety and standardization purposes. 
6. Marketing and promotion services. Expenditures for purposes that could be used by 
sellers to reduce their selling price or confer a direct economic benefit to consumers 
are excluded; and, 
7. Infrastructural services, including: electricity, roads and other transportation means, 
market and port facilities, water supply facilities, dams and drainage schemes and 
infrastructural works associated with environmental programs. In all cases 
expenditures should be directed to the provision or construction of capital works only 
and should exclude the subsidized provision of on-farm facilities. 
Besides these support measure, governments may also provide services to 
agricultural producers through other public programs. However, all these measures should 
meet the two main criteria mentioned above. Such measures and programs include: 
8. Accumulation and holding of stocks of agricultural and food products which form an 
integral part of a food security program identified in national legislation. Purchases to 
and sales from food security stocks should be transparent and made at current market 
prices. 
9. Support of low-income population through subsidized prices or food stamps. Such 
aid should be directly targeted. Food purchases by the government should be made at 
current market prices. 
10. Direct payments (in cash and in kind) to producers to support their incomes. These 
payments should have no or minimal trade- or production-distorting effects, they 
should be made through publicly funded government program and they should not be 
connected to price support. 
11. Indirect income support that is not related to production or prices. 
12. Government financial participation in income insurance and income safety-net 
programs. These programs should not be related to production or prices. 
13. Government participation in crop insurance schemes for relief from natural disasters. 
14. Structural adjustment assistance provided through producer retirement programs. 
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15. Structural adjustment assistance provided through resource retirement programs. 
16. Payments under environmental programs; and, 
17. Payments related to assistance programs for farms located in regions with 
unfavourable weather conditions. These programs are not related to production or 
prices. 
Thus, a wide variety of agricultural support measures are in line with WTO 
requirements. Slowly but surely, the trend in agricultural policy in most WTO member 
countries is to emphasize the use of these Green Box measures and reduce the use of 
‘traditional’ market and price support (MPS) tools such as intervention systems and various 
input and output subsidies. In the EU, for example, MPS accounted for 91% of all support 
to agriculture in 1986-88, but this share fell to 61% in 2000-02. The ‘Fischler Reform’ of 
the EU’s agricultural policy that was adopted in June 2003 will reduce the share of MPS 
significantly further, by ‘decoupling’ payments to farmers, i.e. making them independent of 
production so that they come under category 10 above. 
Why are countries such as the EU moving away from MPS and towards the Green 
Box? Three main reasons play a role, and all are very pertinent to the situation in Ukraine 
today. First, agricultural MPS distorts production and trade. This unfairly damages the 
interests of trading partners and leads to trade disputes that threaten to spill over to other 
sectors of the economy. Hence, disciplining agricultural policy is necessary as a means of 
stabilizing and improving international trade relations. In the case of Ukraine, some 
members of the farm lobby seem prepared to sacrifice WTO membership to defend 
Ukraine’s ‘right’ to freely implement MPS policies in agriculture, without considering the 
potentially catastrophic impact that this would have on Ukraine’s trade relations as a whole 
and, hence, its overall prospects for continued economic growth.  
Second, it is well documented that agricultural MPS is a highly inefficient way of 
helping agricultural producers. The OECD has recently published detailed analysis that 
demonstrates just how inefficient MPS can be. For example, using price support measures 
such as an intervention price system (something that many agricultural policy makers in 
Ukraine advocate) it is typically necessary to take 3 to 4 UAH away from consumers and 
taxpayers in order to increase farm incomes by 1 UAH. Income support payments that are 
not linked to prices or production (a Green Box measure) are much more efficient, with 
roughly 90% of each UAH that is taken away from consumers and taxpayers ending up in 
the pockets of agricultural producers. In other words, even if it did not threaten to damage 
international trade relations and compromise Ukraine’s bid to join the WTO, Ukrainian 
policy makers would be well-advised to eschew MSP simply because it is ‘bad’ policy. 
Third, and finally, it is increasingly recognized that Green Box measures are the best 
way to help agriculture grow in a sustainable manner. MPS generally aims at boosting 
agricultural incomes, but this does not necessarily help create a robust, competitive 
agricultural sector in the long run. The EU is an excellent example: After decades of 
expensive MPS, much of the EU’s agriculture remains inefficient and dependent on 
continued support. The difference between MPS and Green Box measures is perhaps best 
described as the difference between spending money on consumption (i.e. for short term 
pleasure) and spending on investment (i.e. for long term gain). Green Box measures – 
especially those related to education, training, research and extension – are investments, and 
this is, in our opinion, what responsible policy makers should focus on. 
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Of course, MPS is addictive. Countries such as the EU cannot eliminate these 
policies overnight, because farmers have become accustomed to them and the artificial 
economic ‘success’ that they create. So the process of reform – turning away from MPS and 
towards the Green Box – is slow. Some rich countries with little comparative advantage in 
agriculture (Japan, Norway and Switzerland, for example) insist on their need to continue 
with agricultural policies based on MPS. But in the major agricultural exporting nations of 
the world (for example, Australia, Canada, the EU and the USA), the move towards Green 
Box measures is clear and irreversible, encouraged by the need to reduce budget spending 
on agriculture and support for the WTO process. Ukrainian agricultural policy makers still 
have the historic opportunity to avoid the addiction of MPS and embark today on the sort of 
agricultural policy path that many of its important competitors on world markets are 
struggling to regain. 
3 Application of Green Box measures in Ukraine 
What is the current status of Green Box measures in Ukrainian agricultural policy 
today? Public investment in the Ukrainian agricultural sector and rural areas in general has 
been diminishing over the last few years due to severe fiscal constraints faced by the 
government. It is unlikely that government spending on agriculture can be increased 
significantly in the near future, which underlines the need for a better and more efficient 
allocation of the limited available resources. It is vital that the government identify policy 
measures that will strengthen the responsiveness of the agricultural sector to market signals, 
maximize sustainable growth and minimize trade distortions.  
According to the results of negotiations between Ukraine and the members of its 
WTO working party, a number of measures have been attributed to the Green Box (see 
KOBUTA & SHVETSOV, 2002). In the following we discuss the importance of these measures 
in contributing to the long-term, steady and sustainable development of Ukrainian 
agriculture and review the trends in government spending on these measures over the last 
few years.  
General research and research programs related to particular products. In order 
to not only maintain but also strengthen competitive advantage, farmers have to 
continuously strive to reduce production costs by improving their production methods. This 
is especially true in Ukraine, where production technology often lags behind international 
standards and many technologies that are successful in other countries have not yet been 
fully adapted to Ukrainian conditions (e.g. rapeseed and soybean production). Agricultural 
research plays an important role in driving cost-reducing technological change and in 
providing high-yield and disease-resistant crop varieties that will lead to increased food 
supplies, and, consequently, lower food prices for consumers.  
Budget expenditures on research include expenditures on exploratory development 
and applied research, scientific works of state and inter-sectoral programs, general basic 
research by scientific institutions and research related to particular products. The Ukrainian 
budget for 2002 envisaged appropriation of 291.2 mUAH to finance agricultural research; 
however, only 176.4 mUAH were actually spent. This is about 5% of total agricultural 
support. In the 2003 budget, the planned expenditures on research were reduced to 
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175.9 mUAH2 and the execution rate was roughly 98%. In 2004 the expenditures on 
agricultural research are planned to be increased by 34.5% compared to 2003 (a reduction of 
19% compared to 2002 planned expenditures). 
Extension and advisory services. Many Ukrainian farmers are highly inefficient and 
there is a wide gap between the actual productivity on farms and what could be produced 
with better know-how. This productivity differential is not – despite what some farm 
lobbyists would like us to believe – simply a question of supplying farms with capital so 
that they are free to invest. Instead, it arises due to unawareness by many farmer managers 
of the latest scientific progress in crop and animal selection, cost-reducing technologies 
(‘technology gap’) and employment of old management practices (‘management gap’)3. As 
a result, many farms in Ukraine produce far less with the inputs that they do have than they 
could.  
Extension plays an important role in transferring knowledge about improved seeds, 
other inputs and technologies from researchers to farmers, in giving advice to farmers in 
their decision-making and in educating farmers on how to make better decisions. Extension 
is an important tool in helping farmers to reduce differential between potential and actual 
yields by accelerating technology transfer, thus reducing technological gap, and by helping 
farmers to become better farm managers, thus reducing management gap. Public spending 
on extension and advisory services includes expenditures on maintenance of research 
laboratories, crop protection stations that provide consulting services to farmers and 
disseminate information. However, despite the importance of extension services, fiscal 
restraints have led to a financial crisis in agricultural extension in Ukraine. Indeed, 
expenditure on extension and advisory services accounted for only 0.04% of total 
agricultural support in 2002 (1.5 mUAH), and no money has been allotted for this purpose 
in 2003 and 2004. 
Pest and disease control. Animal disease control measures are crucial for ensuring 
animal health and protecting people from transferable diseases. It has been said that 
medicine cures people, while veterinary medicine heals mankind. Under-investment into the 
development of early-warning systems can result in huge losses for society as a whole. For 
example, the Ministry of Agrarian Policy reports that losses in England due to the recent 
outbreak of foot-and-mouth and mad cow disease amounted to roughly 32 and 12 bUS$ 
respectively; and hog cholera in Holland accounted for 4.5 bUS$. Pest control measures are 
crucial in ensuring high yields of agricultural crops, and, consequently, higher farmers’ 
incomes. Almost every year the grain harvest in the Southern regions of Ukraine is damaged 
by locusts, as a result of which farmers suffer significant losses. Nevertheless, no steps have 
been undertaken by the government to develop early-warning systems in order to avoid 
locust invasion, and only eradication measures are financed.  
                                              
2  Initially the government planned to spend 269.6 mUAH on agricultural research, however, due to 
the “wheat crisis” in 2003 and consequent disaster payments to agricultural producers 
(716 mUAH planned), the planned expenditures were reduced to 175.9 mUAH after revision of 
the budget in early summer.  
3  Inefficiency and management problems in Ukrainian agriculture are discussed in detail in chapters 
8, 9 and 11 of this book. 
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In the 2002 state budget 60.5 mUAH were appropriated for pest and disease control 
measures, of which only 37.2 mUAH were actually allocated for this purpose. The 2003 
budget includes provisions for 64.5 mUAH of spending, which is somewhat higher than in 
the previous year. At the same time the execution rate increased from 61% in 2002 to 98% 
in 2003. For pest control specifically, 2 mUAH are allocated each year, while the Ministry 
of Agrarian Policy estimated the need at 64.7 mUAH. The 2004 budget provides for an 
increase in government spending on plant and animal protection measures by 16.3 mUAH 
to 80.8 mUAH.  
General inspection services and inspection services related to particular 
products for health, safety and standardization purposes. In Ukraine the issue of food 
safety and standards should receive special attention as Ukraine is becoming an important 
exporter of agricultural and food products. Unfortunately, in the eyes of many foreign 
consumers, Ukraine is associated with the Chernobyl catastrophe and possible food safety 
deficits. For this reason, maintaining and strengthening Ukraine’s reputation as a reliable 
supplier of safe food is vital to Ukraine’s interests (GERMAN ADVISORY GROUP, 2002). 
Government spending on inspection services includes expenditures on the 
maintenance of state veterinary institutions, state seed inspections, state selection stations 
and state bread inspections. The trend over the last few years is a gradual increase in 
expenditures on guaranteeing safety and quality of agricultural and food products. In 2002 it 
was planned to spend 293.8 mUAH on these measures, however only 265.4 mUAH were 
actually allocated for these measures. In 2003 government spending was planned to increase 
to 338.5 mUAH, while 321.5 mUAH were actually spent. In 2004 spending on inspection 
services is planned to increase to 372.1 mUAH.  
Training facilities. Educating good specialists and managers for the agricultural 
sector is vital for boosting agricultural growth. Experience shows that farmers with higher 
education achieve higher yields by employing more appropriate production methods. 
Furthermore, education contributes to rural poverty alleviation, since it gives rural residents 
improved opportunities for off-farm employment.  
Expenditures on training services in Ukraine include expenditures for the 
maintenance of higher schools of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th accreditation level, and graduate 
schools of the 2nd and 3rd accreditation levels (Academies, Institutes, re-training centres, 
etc.). In 2002, 446.7 mUAH were slated to be spent on training services, however only 
393.9 mUAH were actually allocated. Budget spending in 2003 was planned to be increased 
to 521.8 mUAH and the plan was executed to 93%. In 2004 the government plans to further 
increase expenditures on agricultural education to 579.4 mUAH.  
Land reform. The under-developed land market in Ukraine hampers efficient 
agricultural production. Unresolved land issues also cut farmers off from external financing 
(for example, banks are reluctant to provide long-term credits to farmers because very often 
land is the only tangible asset but it has no market value and cannot be used as a collateral), 
slowing technological progress in the agricultural sector. 
Expenditures on land reform include expenditures on implementing the new land 
law, implementation of land registration procedures, cadastral examinations, determination 
of soil quality and agrochemical land certification. The share of these expenditures in total 
agricultural support remains tiny (0.17% or 6 mUAH). Furthermore, in 2002 only 
0.2 mUAH (or 3% of the plan) were actually spent! The 2003 budget envisaged government 
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spending of 5.7 mUAH, and the execution rate reached 98%. In 2004 it is planned to more 
than double expenditures on land reform implementation: the expenditures are slated at 
12 mUAH.  
Rural infrastructure. For Ukrainian agriculture to be sustainable in the long run it is 
necessary to improve farmers’ access to markets, both domestic and international. While 
Ukrainian trade policy has gradually been liberalized, the effect of trade liberalization can 
be enhanced if it is complemented by increased investment in rural infrastructure. 
“Infrastructure, and transportation and communication, in particular, is important to 
lubricate the wheels of trade and allow the benefits of these economic gains to be distributed 
across those living in the nations involved in the integration process” (BUTTON, 2002).  
Investment in infrastructure would enable farmers to increase returns to agricultural 
production by lowering the transaction costs, and to increase productivity due to better 
access to and availability of inputs. Rural infrastructure also has a poverty-alleviation effect, 
which occurs due to improved non-farm employment opportunities. Poorly developed 
infrastructure contributes to greater price fluctuations when a country switches from an 
export to an import situation and vice versa. The consequent grain market destabilization 
observed in 2003/2004 can serve as an illustrative example of the effect of under-
investments into infrastructure development. 
Expenditures on infrastructure include public investment in the construction of 
health-care institutions, water pipelines, sewage systems, gas supply networks, roads, sea 
ports, etc. Despite the importance of rural infrastructure, public spending has remained at an 
extremely low level (less than 0.5% of total agricultural support). Since 1995 no money has 
been appropriated for the construction and improvement of rural roads. The 2002 budget 
envisaged an allocation of 20.1 mUAH for rural municipal economic development, but only 
5.3 mUAH were actually spent. The planned spending was increased to 21 mUAH in 2003 
and this amount was actually spent. The 2004 budget envisages an increase in budget 
expenditures on rural infrastructure to 24.6 mUAH. 
Environmental protection. Spending on environment protection is precisely 
determined within the framework of the state programs. The share of public spending in 
total agricultural support is less than 1%. In 2002 42.4 mUAH were planned to be spent on 
environmental protection measures, however only 27.2 mUAH were actually allocated. The 
2003 budget envisaged 45.0 mUAH to be appropriated for this purpose and almost all this 
money (44.6 mUAH) was actually spent. The 2004 budget contains provisions for an 
increase in government spending on environment protection measures by 10.3 mUAH to 
55.3 mUAH. 
Summary. In table 2.1 we provide an overview of government spending on Green 
Box measures in Ukrainian agriculture in 2002, 2003 and 2004.  
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Table 2.1: Spending on Green Box measures in Ukrainian agriculture (2002-2004, in 
mUAH) 
2002 2003 
Planned Executed Planned Executed 
2004 
Plan 
 
mUAH mUAH % of TAS mUAH mUAH 
% of 
TAS mUAH 
Total agricultural support (TAS) 3517.6 3517.8 100.0 4061.5 4061.5 100.0  
Of which:        
-Green Box measures 1162.2 907.0 25.8 1050.0 1130.0 27.8 1506.0 
Of which:        
-Agricultural research 291.2 176.4 5.0 175.9 171.6 4.0 236.6 
-Pest and disease control  60.5 37.2 1.1 64.5 63.0 1.6 80.8 
-Extension & advisory services 1.5 1.3 0.04 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
-Inspection services 293.8 265.4 7.6 338.5 321.5 7.9 372.1 
-Agricultural training & education 446.7 393.9 11.2 521.8 485.2 11.9 579.4 
-Land reform implementation 6.0 0.2 0.01 5.7 5.6 0.1 12.0 
-Rural infrastructure development 20.1 5.3 0.2 21.0 21.0 0.5 24.6 
-Environmental protection 42.4 27.2 0.8 45.0 44.6 1.1 55.3 
Source:  Own calculations on the basis of the State Budget data and data provided by THE INSTITUTE OF 
AGRARIAN ECONOMY. 
The share of public spending on Green Box measures in total agricultural support in 
Ukraine was 25.8% in 2002 and 27.8% in 2003. This suggests that there is considerable 
scope for increasing Green Box spending for agriculture in Ukraine, even within the current 
constrained fiscal environment. Most of these Green Box expenditures were allotted to 
agricultural education followed by inspection services and agricultural research. However, 
crucial investments in extension and advisory services, infrastructure and the 
implementation of land reform have been ignored. While actual spending consistently 
lagged behind appropriations in 2002, the execution of the agricultural budget was close to 
the planned amounts in 2003 and Green Box measures were even over-executed. This and 
the fact that further increases in Green Box measures are foreseen for 2004 are promising 
signs. At the same time, however, there are indications of an increased commitment to 
market and price support measures (intervention systems etc.) by agricultural policy makers 
in Ukraine, and this, if borne out, does not bode well for the future efficiency and 
effectiveness of agricultural policy in the country.  
4 Conclusions and recommendations 
Accession to the WTO would not reduce Ukraine’s ability to support its agricultural 
sector. As a WTO member, Ukraine would still be free to implement the entire range of 
Green Box measures, as these are exempted from reduction commitments under the WTO. 
Green Box measures provide policy makers with a means of providing lasting support to 
agriculture in a way that does not distort trade and generate conflicts with trade partners.  
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The world-wide trend in agricultural policy is towards the increasing use of Green 
Box measures, as the cost and difficulties associated with market and price support become 
clear. Ukrainian policy makers should be aware of these difficulties and not take an 
idealized view of market and price support in countries such as the EU. Scarce fiscal 
resources should be invested in the future of agriculture, not wasted on propping up the past. 
Green Box measures provide an ideal vehicle for investments in the know-how, technology, 
management skills, extension services, rural infrastructure and the implementation of land 
reform that Ukrainian agriculture will need to be competitive in the coming decades. 
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3 Taxation and Ukrainian Agriculture  
SERHIY DEMYANENKO & SERGIY ZORYA 
1 Introduction 
It is no secret that Ukraine inherited an extremely distorted economic system from 
the Soviet Union with artificial prices, inefficient firms, an impractical legal system, and 
numerous economic and administrative barriers to the exchange of ideas, technologies and 
standards. In such an economy, the tax system was not designed to help the economy to 
grow and to distribute the income and wealth while minimising losses in economic 
efficiency. It rather served as a tool to allocate resources among enterprises and distribute 
output based on the bureaucrats’ decisions. In the transformation of Ukraine’s economy 
from plan to market, the reform of the tax system was an enormously important task to 
encourage private sector to develop and to allow the government to provide the public 
goods in the new market environment. 
In the market economy, taxes influence many outcomes, including the distribution of 
income (and wealth) and the allocation of resources. Taxes also play an important role in 
stabilising the economy. “Forms of taxation and the amount of tax burden have a direct 
impact on the amount and structure of consumption and savings, on the amount and 
structure of domestic and foreign investments, and on production and trade and so forth” 
(LUZIK, 1999). In agriculture, tax policy can have important effects on the number and size 
of farms, on organisational structures, and on the amount and relative mix of land, labour, 
and capital inputs. Moreover, agricultural taxation influences other sectors of the economy 
and the macroeconomic balance of the country as a whole.  
The process of transition in agriculture and overall economy is unique in that initial 
economic growth can be attained not only through well-known long-term factors such as 
investments, but also through the correction of ‘old’ inefficiencies and the creation of new 
market institutions. Although this source of productivity gains is exhausted after certain 
period of time, they create a strong potential for economic growth over the short and 
medium term (ODLING-SMEE & VAN ROODEN, 1999). Therefore, the creation of an efficient 
farm tax structure that will remove a large number of the ‘old inefficiencies’ and stop the 
appearance of the ‘new ones’ is a way to create a long-term competitive farming sector that 
can contribute to the general economic development of the country. 
Currently the agricultural sector in Ukraine enjoys a highly preferential taxation 
regime. This regime was expected to expire in 2004, but was prolonged until 2010. In this 
chapter, we consider the farm tax system with respect to its influence on the efficiency of 
the agricultural sector, the whole economy, and the fairness of the farm tax burden. The 
latter is closely related to the issue of farm subsidisation. However, we cover this issue only 
briefly since the pros and cons of farm subsidisation have been already discussed many 
times (see VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL & STRIEWE, 1999; VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL et al., 
2001). We also would like to stress that it is not our intention to present a draft tax law for 
Ukrainian agriculture – this is a task for policy makers. However, our economic analysis of 
farm taxation in Ukraine could help policy makers to look at farm taxation from a more 
comprehensive and long run perspective.  
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The chapter is structured as follows. The second section considers the main 
principles of taxation and defines the key issues of tax reform in transition economies. In the 
third section, the effects of the different taxes on farm efficiency and overall development 
are presented. Section four presents the current farm tax system in Ukraine and in section 
five the analysis of this system is conducted. Section six concludes and presents policy 
recommendations. 
2 Principles and the role of taxation in the economy 
2.1 The main principles of taxation 
In any economy, fiscal resources are needed to execute state functions. It has been 
said that what government gives it must first take away. In 1936, the U.S. President 
FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT said that “taxes, after all, are the dues that we pay for the 
privileges of membership in an organised society“ (cited in JAMES & NOBES, 1988, p. 8). 
The government can raise its income through different sources, and taxation is one method 
of transferring resources from the private to public sector. Others include money creation, 
charging for goods and services the state provide, and borrowing.  
Money creation simply means ‘printing money’ to finance state expenditures. The 
main problem is that this leads to inflation. As a result, this process has been described as an 
‘inflation tax’ (see FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, 1980, p. 267). Another possibility is for the 
government to change for the goods and services it provides. But in many cases it would be 
difficult to charge, for example, for defence and law enforcement. A further method of 
raising money is to borrow it. Governments can borrow either from their own citizens or 
from overseas, but there are limits to the amounts that people are prepared to lend, even to 
governments. Taxation has its limits as well, but they considerably exceed the amounts that 
can be raised by resorting to the printing press, charging consumers directly, or borrowing. 
“So while governments often use all four methods of raising resources, taxation is usually 
by far the most important source of government revenue” (JAMES & NOBES, 1988, p. 8).  
In most cases the market mechanism is able to supply goods and services efficiently 
via ADAM SMITH’s “invisible hand”. But under certain circumstances, the market itself is 
not able to produce the most efficient outcome, and in this case the state may be able to 
correct or improve the market mechanism. To do so, it will generally require revenue raised 
by one of the mechanisms described above. If it depends on tax revenue, then it is important 
that the tax system be effective or ‘good’. Economists and social philosophers from ADAM 
SMITH on have expressed their views on the principles of a good tax system (SULTAN, 
2000). The following are some of the important ones: 
• Economic efficiency: Taxes should be chosen so as to minimise interference with 
economic decision making in otherwise efficient markets. Such interference imposes 
efficiency losses that should be minimised. The preferential treatment of certain 
goods/services or sectors induces overall inefficiencies through distorted 
production/consumption decisions. 
• Economic growth: Taxes should foster economic growth through savings and 
investment. The tax structure should facilitate the use of fiscal policy for stabilisation 
and growth objectives (Keynesian contra-cycle fiscal policy, for example). Moreover, 
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it should ensure a stable and optimal amount of public revenues for financing the 
supply of public goods (DABROWSKI & TOMCZYNSKA, 2001).  
• Fairness: “The distribution of the tax burden should be equitable. Everyone should 
pay his fair share. People with equal capacity should pay the same tax (referred to as 
‘horizontal equity’), and people with greater ability to pay more tax (referred to as 
‘vertical equity’). A system that is not fair, and allows tax breaks arbitrarily, lacks 
respect and reduces the willingness to comply” (SULTAN, 2000). 
• Low compliance and administrative cost: If the incidental costs of complying with 
the requirements of the tax laws and procedures are high, people have a greater 
tendency to evade. In addition, the administrative costs have to be low to ensure 
adequate revenue from taxes. The tax system should employ procedures that are cost-
effective. 
• Simplicity and stability: If tax revenues are not stable over time, it will adversely 
affect state budget and its programs. Often changes in rates, rules, and exemptions 
make it difficult for the private sector to make long-term investment plans. Taxes 
then become a significant source of risk (SULTAN, 2000). 
2.2 Tax reform in the transition economies 
Based on the above-described principles of taxation, the important task of the 
government in a transition economy such as Ukraine is to adjust its tax system so as to 
accelerate the transition from plan to market and to ensure the system’s sustainability in the 
long run: 
• The general revenue objective of tax reform in transition economies is to “widen the 
tax base by shifting the main burden of taxes to households and to make the income 
tax on enterprises more moderate and more directly related to profits. Another 
revenue objective is to reduce direct cash payments as a means of subsidising an 
activity, while obtaining greater revenues by lower, more collectable rates” (see 
LEONARD, 2000). Although incomes declined in early transition, with economic 
growth incomes will grow and should become the main base for government 
revenues. 
• Economic efficiency and growth. The tax system should encourage markets by 
stimulating private production through tax neutrality across sectors and across the 
public and private spheres. In the new market environment, the state has to take upon 
itself many functions previously assumed by large enterprises. Hence, the tax system 
has to ensure stable and sufficient budget income to allow the state to fulfil its 
obligations.  
• To solve specific problems of the transition economy, the new tax system must aim 
to reduce specific distortions such as arrears, barter and corruption. Economic agents 
in the Soviet Union were allowed not to ‘pay’ taxes. Thus, to encourage the firms and 
individuals to pay taxes in the market environment, a comprehensive approach 
should be taken to change this behaviour without any exemptions and concessions.  
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3 The tax system and farm efficiency in the long run 
In general, the government can tax agriculture in different ways. Income, both 
individual and corporate, can be taxed; the state may tax value-added or sales; and finally, 
land, the major production factor of agriculture, can be taxed as well. Below we consider 
these taxes in turn.  
3.1 Personal income tax 
Personal income is a good measure of personal power to consume and save. The 
personal income of farm employees can be received in various forms, including (1) wages, 
salaries, premiums, and other employment income; (2) income from own household plots; 
and (3) gifts, inheritance and other irregular income. In transition economies such as 
Ukraine the second source of the income plays an extraordinary important role for the rural 
population. Therefore, legislation must precisely define income in a way that adequately 
reflects personal ability to consume/save, and it must also establish the same rules of 
taxation for all forms of income (otherwise, people can switch forms of income and reduce 
income tax liabilities). 
An important advantage of personal income tax is that it works as an automatic 
stabiliser. In the years of high income more is paid, and in years of low income less. 
“Another advantage is the broad and relatively stable tax base, which can be adjusted to the 
personal circumstances of the taxpayer” (LUZIK, 1999, p. 22). Personal income tax is 
expected to raise additional revenue for the state and to promote income de-polarisation in 
the society. Therefore, this tax can not be completely neutral to individual 
consumption/saving decisions. However, proper organisation of individual income tax can 
create minimum distortions in the lifestyle, traditions and habits of population. Clear 
definition and accurate measurement of personal income and related expenditures, therefore, 
can help to avoid/lessen possible distortions in employment, income patterns and the 
structure of saving/investments.  
The personal income tax also has disadvantages such as (1) complex rules of tax 
assessment and the large direct and indirect costs to the state and taxpayers of assessing and 
settling tax liabilities, and (2) high sensitivity of tax payers to changes in personal income 
tax legislation and the negative impact of personal income tax on saving. The practice of 
many countries shows that the deduction of certain expenses is permitted to allow 
individuals to reduce their taxable personal income. These deductions include pension 
contributions, medical costs, life insurance, child care allowances, moving expenses and 
educational costs. Politicians often develop long lists of different deductions to promote 
‘socially-acceptable’ income redistribution. However, these personal deductions can be a 
source of serious economic distortions, especially in the transition economies. The process 
of assessment and compliance can be very costly indeed (LUZIK, 1999). 
3.2 Farm (corporate) income taxation 
Traditionally, farm income tax is levied on net income received (accrued) during a 
specific period (profit), where net income is gross income from farming, capital gains, and 
other incomes less business expenses. Farm income taxation creates a good opportunity to 
tax returns on capital and to reduce the administrative costs of income taxation in 
comparison to personal income tax due to the smaller number of taxpayers and a reasonable 
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variety of receipts (LUZIK, 1999). This is especially important for Ukrainian agriculture, 
where the number of farms at roughly 60 000 (15 000 large agricultural enterprises plus 
45 000 small private farms) is relatively small by international comparison (for example, the 
number of farms in Germany is roughly 400 000 and in France – 679 800). 
In addition, the corporate income tax is often considered as the payments of the firms 
for infrastructure that the they use or the public education system from which the personal is 
chosen (SEROVA et al., 2000). However, if farm income taxation is high and its scale is 
progressive, tax avoidance becomes common and tax administration extremely complicated 
(DABROWSKI & TOMCZYNSKA, 2001). Therefore, the introduction and operation of a farm 
income tax requires special care to ensure minimum distortions. 
To avoid distortions, uniform definitions of gross incomes and expenses should be 
clearly stated for all sectors. Profit taxation of different sectors at different rates can cause 
economic inefficiencies and lead to tax avoidance/evasion. In addition, the presence of 
many tax exemptions is usually evidence of a weak government position and successful rent 
seeking by different lobbies. “In the case of transition economies they often reflect the 
legacy of the previous economic regime where tax incentives played a role of substitute of 
market equilibrium prices and market competition” (DABROWSKI & TOMCZYNSKA, 2001, p. 
7).  
As any business, farming involves risks. If an entrepreneur is discouraged from 
undertaking new risky activities, the effect on the growth of the economy would be 
extremely damaging. This may be especially important in agriculture where profits fluctuate 
from year to year more than in the industrial sector, for example. Therefore, farm income 
taxation should allow for the deduction of net losses to finance potentially long-term 
profitable projects, and for ‘income averaging’ to stabilise the income tax burden over the 
years. 
3.3 Value-added tax 
Value added tax (VAT) is currently the most important source of tax revenue in most 
countries, raising between 20 and 40% of the total revenue (HIID/CASE, 1998). The main 
feature of this tax, which distinguishes it from other taxes, is its wider base. Since the tax is 
based on consumption, revenue increases as consumption levels rise. If exemptions are few 
and the rate is uniform, the tax is neutral across different sectors of the economy. However, 
too many exemptions erode the tax base and create discriminations among different sectors.  
The economic neutrality of the value-added tax means that this tax (if properly 
organised) does not significantly affect: 
• consumers’ propensity to buy some or another goods and services; 
• the horizontal and vertical integration of production and trade; and 
• the territorial dispersion of production and trade within a country. 
VAT is based on self-enforcement by buyers and sellers. First, collecting VAT credit 
for purchased inputs through the invoice mechanism encourages purchasers to demand 
invoices from the sellers, thus preventing non-reporting or under-reporting of sales. The 
seller is interested in showing as low a price as possible while the purchaser is interested in 
showing as high a price as possible, in order to get higher input credit. The result is a cost 
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effective ‘self-policing mechanism’ and ensures better reporting and verifiable records of 
transactions (HIID/CASE, 1998). 
Concerning the VAT rate, the imposition of VAT at a single positive rate on imports 
and domestic expenditure and at a zero rate on exports, makes it administratively easy. 
Theoretically the application of reduced rates for basic goods and services does not 
influence tax neutrality very much because these goods/services do not compete with others 
and their demand is relatively inelastic. In practice, “however, reduced rate of VAT applied 
to basic products will lower the tax burden for all groups in the population (if they 
purchased these products) irrespective of their income”(LUZIK, 1999, p. 31) and is thus 
regressive. Moreover, “many income inelastic goods are price inelastic as well, hence the 
distortions associated with taxing different commodities at different rates are greater than 
often thought to be” (see STIGLITZ, 1988, p. 494). 
Special exemptions from VAT should be avoided, as “one exemption in the 
production/distribution chain (especially in the primary sector such as an agriculture) 
complicates the situation of the VAT payers in the next stages of production (because they 
cannot get a VAT refund) and creates temptation to proliferate exemptions” (DABROWSKI & 
TOMCZYNSKA, 2001, p. 16). Moreover, exemptions of goods/services from VAT at the 
production level can stimulate artificial vertical integration of enterprises involved in 
production/trade. Finally, if different goods are taxed at different rates, taxation becomes 
administratively complex; there are always some commodities that might fall into either 
high-tax or low-tax categories, and there are thus administrative problems associated with 
drawing these distinctions (STIGLITZ, 1988)  
In summary, this short analysis of the VAT demonstrates that unclear and/or unusual 
tax rules increase costs of taxation and create many economic distortions. Promotion of 
standard rules, reasonable tax rates and proper tax administration can help to avoid/reduce 
many of these distortions and contribute to a ‘good’ tax system. 
3.4 Land tax 
Finally, the government can tax the agricultural land. The defenders of the land 
taxation usually claim that this tax increases land use efficiency. This is especially relevant 
for the transition economies where “the agricultural growth is expected to benefit from the 
transfer of land from less to more efficient farmers, who are able to pay higher taxes and 
offer higher purchase prices for land” (VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL & STRIEWE, 2001, p. 
240). 
Moreover, the land taxation is often considered within the framework of regional 
policy and tax base mobility. Income tax, for instance, should be relatively uniform across 
regions; otherwise in the long run people will move to avoid higher tax rates. The same is 
true of a sales tax, but not (or at least much less so) of a land tax. Land is an immobile asset 
and can therefore be an important source of tax revenue for local administrations. 
4 The farm taxation system in Ukraine 
In the Soviet Union, farms did not pay taxes in the conventional market economy 
sense. The Soviet agricultural enterprises paid taxes into the centralised united social fund, 
the centralised social insurance fund and other social funds. They also paid individual 
income tax and farm profit tax. The payments to the united social fund depended on farm 
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profitability. If profitability was below 15%, the farms transferred 5% of their gross profits; 
if profitability was between 15 and 40%, the farms transferred 6%; and if profitability was 
over 40% they paid 9%. The tax to the social insurance fund was based on total wage 
expenditures at a rate of 2.4%. The rate of the individual income tax was equal to 8% with a 
tax allowance of 70 roubles per month. The farm profit tax rate was 0.1% for farms with a 
profitability rate of 25 to 30%; 0.2 % if the profitability was between 30 and 40%; 0.4% if 
the profitability was between 40 and 50%; and 0.5% (but not more than 25% of net farm 
income) if the profitability was over 50% (MINAGRO, 1985).  
The Soviet tax system, therefore, tended to support less efficient farms. Managerial 
performance was judged above all by success in achieving planned gross output and sales to 
the state, and not according to efficiency or profitability. Through its state order system, the 
state controlled both physical and capital input supply as well as output marketing. The 
production plans were set so high that most farms had no hope of fulfilling them and 
remained chronically in debt to the state. “These debts were periodically forgiven, as the 
state assumed that the country should produce everything it needed and the associated 
costs, both direct and in terms of foregone alternative uses of resources, were ignored” 
(VAN ATTA, 2001, p. 83). Agriculture in independent Ukraine, therefore, inherited from the 
Soviet system both poor payment discipline on the part of farms, and a lax attitude towards 
debts. 
From 1991-1999, the farms were part of the general tax system in Ukraine, with a 
few exceptions. As production collapsed and farms experiences more and more difficulties, 
policy makers felt the urge to provide them with support. Since the chronically under-
funded state budget could not finance significant subsidies, tax exemptions for agriculture 
were seen as a possible solution. As a result agriculture in Ukraine received a new tax 
system at the end of 1999. First a preferential fixed agricultural tax (FAT) was introduced, 
and later farms were excluded from paying VAT. Initially these tax holidays were granted 
until the end of 2003, but later they were extended until 2010. Below we consider this new 
tax system in detail.  
4.1 The fixed agricultural tax 
In 1999 the Verkhovna Rada introduced the FAT, which replaced twelve taxes 
previously paid by the farms1. The FAT lowered the tax burden on farms2 and simplified tax 
calculation and collection. FAT revenue goes to the Pension Fund (68%), the Social 
Security Fund (2%), and the local budgets (30%). In 2003, amendment of the FAT Law 
obliged FAT payers to pay income tax on sales of non-agricultural products. Thus, this 
amendment effectively separated the income tax from the FAT, even though the FAT was 
supposed to be levied in lieu of 12 different taxes, including the income tax. Although the 
State Tax Administration acknowledges that this is inconsistent, it has taken no steps to 
clarify the situation. 
                                              
1  The most important of these were: land tax; profit tax; automobile tax; individual income tax; and 
payments to the Pension, Social Security and Unemployment Funds. See Law of Ukraine “On 
Fixed Agricultural Tax”, December 17, 1998.  
2  According to SEROVA et al. (2000), the tax burden on Ukrainian farms decreased by three times in 
comparison to 1997 after the FAT was implemented.  
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Farms of different organisational and legal forms are eligible to pay the FAT 
provided that they are involved in agricultural production and agricultural products account 
for over 50% (currently increased to 75%) of their revenues. The base of the FAT is the 
value of a farm’s agricultural land as determined on July 1, 1997. Land value is determined 
according to quality and potential productivity and, therefore, can vary substantially from 
farm to farm. The average land value in Ukraine for FAT purposes 8733 UAH/ha, ranging 
from a maximum of 11297 UAH/ha in Cherkasy to a minimum of 6244 UAH/ha in 
Zhytomyr (excluding Kiev city, Sevastopil and Crimea). The tax rates are specified for two 
types of the agricultural land: (1) 0.5% of the value of arable land, haying, and pastures, and 
(2) 0.3% of the value of perennial plantations. In several regions, where the land is 
considered much less productive (for example, the Polissia zone or the Carpathian region), 
the tax rates are reduced to 0.3% and 0.1% correspondingly. Tax calculations have to be 
submitted to the rayon tax administration by February 1 of the corresponding year. FAT is 
paid monthly, but the payment rates vary so that 10% of the total payment is due in the first 
and second quarters, while 50 and 30% are due in the third and fourth quarters, respectively. 
Agricultural enterprises often pay FAT for leased land. Landowners should pay this tax, but 
for the tax administration it is easier to deal with one large enterprise than with hundreds 
pensioners and farm workers. Agricultural enterprises presumably reduce their lease 
payments to landowners by the amount of the FAT. 
From 1999 to 2001, farms only had to pay 70% of the FAT (the sum of the Pension 
and Social Security Fund shares). Initially the FAT could be paid either in cash of in kind, 
but now only cash payment is allowed. In 2001, Ukrainian farms should have paid 
421.7 mUAH the FAT (79 mUS$), but actual payments amounted to 337.4 mUAH 
(63 mUS$). While collections rates have improved somewhat, the total FAT burden is very 
low compared with what farms would pay if they were subject to the same taxation as other 
sectors. The value of this tax exemption is estimated to be 1400 mUAH (MAPU, 2002). 
4.2 Value-added tax 
Agricultural enterprises in Ukraine benefit from special provisions concerning the 
accrual and payment of the VAT. First, farms were exempted from paying the VAT to the 
national budget during the period 1999-2004. The accumulated VAT received from sales 
had to be deposited in special bank accounts and used only to purchase the agricultural 
production inputs. In 2001 the VAT tax exemption equalled to 582 mUAH (MAPU, 2002). 
However, the farms continued paying the VAT for produced non-agricultural products and 
services (see table 3.1). 
Second, producers of milk and meat charge no VAT when they sell their products. 
Moreover, 70% of the VAT received by processing plants when they sell milk and meat 
products is given to the farms, while the Ministry of Agricultural Policy accumulates 
another 30% to finance livestock breeding. According to the MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURAL 
POLICY (2002), this resulted in a benefit of 634 mUAH for milk and meat producers in 
2001.  
Third, the VAT rate for exported goods is equal to zero. In practice, however, 
exporters have often experienced problems with accurate and complete VAT 
reimbursement. Since April 2004, traders of wheat, rye and barley who are not involved in 
agricultural production and processing have lost their right to export VAT reimbursement 
(IER, 2004).  
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In general, the special VAT treatment of agriculture undermines the efficiency of the 
tax system and budget management in Ukraine. As a general principle, tax revenue should 
always enter the budget as a whole and not be ‘earmarked’ for specific expenditures. In 
Ukraine this principle continues being ignored. 
4.3 Other taxes 
Farmers in Ukraine pay a fee for environment pollution. This tax is accrued on the 
fuel consumed at a rate of 3 UAH/tonne of purchased fuel. This tax is distributed between 
the national (30%) and local budgets (70%). Farms which produce and sell alcoholic 
beverages and beer must pay 1% of the revenue from selling these products to the national 
budget. The revenues are used for development of viticulture, horticulture, and hop 
production in Ukraine.  
Finally, since 2001 additional payroll taxes to the Pension, Social Security, and 
Unemployment Funds have been introduced for farm enterprises. The pension fee is based 
on wages paid and equals 1% of the wage up to 150 UAH per month and 2% above. 
Payments to the Social Security Fund equal 0.25% of the wage up to 150 UAH per month 
and 0.5% above. 0.2% of all wages is paid into to the special security fund to insure against 
work-related accidents and illness. This is considerably lower the rate collected in other 
sectors and professions. 
4.4 The tax burden on agricultural enterprises in Ukraine 
Based on data from the WORLD BANK & OECD (2004), agricultural enterprises in 
Ukraine paid taxes of 3065 mUAH in 1998, 1459 mUAH in 1999, 798 mUAH in 2000, and 
1887 mUAH in 2001. Based on these estimations, we can calculate the tax burden as the 
ratio of taxes paid to Gross Agricultural Output of the large-agricultural enterprises. In 1998 
the tax burden was 12.7%, in 1999 it fell to only 6.7%, and in 2000 it dropped even further 
to 3.8%. In 2001, however, the tax burden grew to 7.4% (table 3.1). In 2000 and 2001, 
agricultural enterprises on average paid 52 UAH/ha of agricultural land or almost half of the 
amount in 1998. 
Table 3.1: Tax burden of agricultural enterprises in Ukraine, 1998-2001 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 
1 Taxes paid by agricultural enterprises, mUAH 3065 1459 798 1887 
2 Taxes paid from non-agricultural activities, mUAH na na 429 1353 
3 Taxes paid and tax privileges, mUAH  3272 3514 2837 4585 
4 Gross agricultural output of agricultural enterprises, mUAH 24081 21930 21151 25352 
5 Actual farm tax burden, % [1/4] 12.7 6.7 3.8 7.4 
6 Tax burden from agricultural activities, % [(1–2)/4] na na 1.7 2.1 
7 Assessed tax burden without tax privileges, % [3/4]  13.6 16 13.4 18.1 
Note: na – data is not available. 
Source: Own presentation based on STATE STATISTICS COMMITTEE OF UKRAINE (2002) and WORLD BANK & 
OECD (2004). 
The true tax burden of agricultural enterprises, however, was even lower than 
estimated above. In 2001, for example, VAT for non-agricultural products and services 
accounted for 72% of all taxes paid. If taxes from non-agricultural activities are deducted 
from the gross taxes paid by agricultural enterprises, the tax burden decreases from 3.8% to 
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1.7% in 2000 and from 7.4% to 2.1% in 2001. Finally, if farm enterprises had not been 
granted any exemptions in 1999, their tax burden would have increase to 16%. Analogous 
figures for 2000 and 2001 are 13.4 and 18.1%, respectively (table 3.1). 
5 Analysis of farm taxation in Ukraine 
5.1 The farm tax system and macroeconomic stability in Ukraine 
Farming does not occur in isolation from other economic activities. The farm tax 
system affects macroeconomic development in a country through a number of channels, 
most of which are invisible. Often agriculture becomes the hostage of these invisible effects, 
because macroeconomic destabilisation also affects farms. These issues are considered 
below. 
5.1.1 Farm taxes and the state budget in Ukraine 
Farm taxes have a direct impact on the state budget and thus overall economic 
development in Ukraine (table 3.2). Total farm tax privileges are large, equalling on average 
to 1.3% of GDP over the observed period. Under the existing tax system, farm taxes account 
for about 2.4% of the total budget incomes. Budget revenue would, however, be another 
3.9% higher if tax privileges for agriculture were eliminated. In this case, the budget would 
have been in surplus rather than in deficit in 1999, and the almost zero balance in 2001 
would have been a surplus of 1.8% of GDP. These results support the findings of LEGEIDA 
(2001), who states that the agricultural sector is among the largest net beneficiaries in the 
Ukrainian economy. Since the share of agriculture in Ukraine’s GDP equals roughly 12%, it 
is clear that the agriculture is taxed much less than other sectors. 
Table 3.2: The farm tax system and the state budget in Ukraine, 1999-2001 
 1999 2000 2001 
Farm taxes paid, mUAH 1459 798 1889 
Total farm tax privileges, mUAH  2055 2039 2696 
Share of different tax privileges, in % of total privileges    
Fixed agricultural tax* 68.1 68.7 51.9 
VAT tax exemptions 5.7 5.7 21.6 
VAT tax refund from food processors 11.5 20.0 23.5 
Tax arrears** 14.7 5.6 3.0 
Farm tax privileges as a share of GDP, % 1.6 1.2 1.3 
Share of agriculture in total GDP, %  11.4 11.0 14.7 
Share of farm taxes in total government revenue, %*** 3.3 1.3 2.6 
Share of farm tax privileges in total government revenue, % 4.7 3.2 3.7 
Budget balance as a share of GDP, % -1.4 1.1 0.5 
Budget balance as a share of GDP without farm tax exemptions, % 0.3 2.3 1.8 
Note: * FAT exemptions are assumed to equal 1.4 mUAH annually based on Ministry of Agricultural Policy 
information. ** Tax arrears calculated using the ratio of assessed to paid FAT at the end of calendar 
year. *** Budget revenue and budget balance including the Pension Fund. 
Source: Own calculations based on MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY OF UKRAINE (2002), WORLD BANK 
& OECD (2004) and UEPLAC (2001). 
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5.1.2 The indirect impact of the farm tax system in Ukraine 
The indirect impact of farm taxation is felt through an increased tax burden on other 
sectors of the economy, and reduced export competitiveness3. Generally, the higher the tax 
privileges granted to agriculture, the higher the tax burden on other economic activities. 
According to LEGEIDA (2001), the main beneficiaries of the distorted tax system in the 
Ukrainian economy are the agricultural and industrial sectors (though energy and gas 
sectors are net payers), while the net payers are the transport and communication, 
construction, and service sectors. Agricultural privileges are not free; they must be 
compensated by increasing the tax burden on ‘net payer’ sectors. 
The higher tax burden on other sectors of the economy is aggravated by increased 
incentives for resources to move to subsidised sectors, making them more expensive. 
“Agricultural tax privileges, for example, create a strong incentive to retain agriculture as a 
fundamental feature of the production structure, even though market demand might require 
a shift into services or other kinds of production” (LEONARD, 2000). In the long run higher 
taxes and more expensive inputs reduce the productivity and competitiveness of the ‘net 
payer’ sectors, reducing budget income and overall economic growth in Ukraine. The 
problem of export competitiveness is exacerbated in Ukraine by the delays in refunding 
export VAT and the accumulated export VAT arrears of recent years. By the end of 2003, 
the government’s export VAT arrears amounted to 6 bUAH, including 2.1 bUAH that were 
overdue. Total farm VAT exemptions between 1999 and 2001 amounted to 2 bUAH, which 
is equivalent to roughly 30% of the export VAT arrears. Hence, it is reasonable to expect 
that if agriculture had been paying ‘its share’ of VAT, the problem of export VAT arrears 
(essentially a tax on Ukrainian exports, including agricultural exports) could have been at 
least partly avoided. 
5.2 The impact of the farm tax system on agricultural sector in Ukraine  
Beside its macroeconomic effects, the farm tax system in Ukraine affects farm size 
and structure, the input mix, output diversification, the use of tax shelters and the ability of 
the state to provide public goods in rural areas. An important element of agricultural 
taxation in Ukraine is the FAT, which has several advantages for agriculture beside the fact 
that it is applied at a low rate and therefore places relatively little burden on farmers: 
• The FAT is relatively simple to calculate if land areas, land values, and tax rates are 
known. Given the complexity of the tax system in Ukraine, the simplification of the 
farm tax system that resulted from the introduction of the FAT represents a major 
improvement. Simplicity reduces the costs of tax calculations and allows farmers to 
make long-term plans. It also reduces ambiguities in the tax system, which is 
important because these ambiguities give tax and local authorities discretionary 
power that in the past has often been used as an excuse for interfering in the 
management of farms. 
                                              
3  Tax privileges for agriculture also affect macroeconomic variables such as the real exchange rate, 
which in turn influence the international competitiveness of Ukrainian exports (including 
agricultural goods). Chapter 4 The Linkages between Agriculture and Macroeconomic 
Development in Ukraine discusses the role of the real exchange rate in farm price determination. 
36  
• The FAT does not require that farms carry out complex tax accounting. Whether this 
is an advantage or not is debatable. On the one hand it reduces costs for farms. On 
the other hand, however, farms need good accounting systems if they are to make 
good decisions and gain access to credit. In the long run, especially the large farms in 
Ukraine can be expected to keep books according to international standards, for their 
own good4. 
• The FAT could be a good tax for the private subsidiary household plots in the future. 
These plots usually involve a few hectares of land or several cows. Unlike the large 
agricultural enterprises, they cannot be expected to keep detailed books, and the land 
tax would be a low-cost way to tax their income.  
• Some defenders of the FAT say that it raises the efficiency of land use (see SEROVA 
et al., 2000) as it places a larger burden on less efficient land users and puts more 
efficient users in a position to offer higher rental payments on the market for leased 
land. In principle this is true, but the key is the tax rate that the land user has to pay. 
If this rate is low, the advantage that the FAT conveys to efficient land users will be 
small, and the FAT will probably have little practical impact on the efficiency of land 
use.  
• Farm tax exemptions or simplifications within the framework of the general taxation 
system are not considered to be so-called ‘amber box’ subsidies by the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). Hence, they are not subject to the reduction commitments that 
apply to amber box subsidies. The Government of Ukraine, therefore, may use tax 
exemptions to support agriculture without having to make any commitments to 
reduce them if and when Ukraine joins the WTO. 
• Finally, under the FAT farmers do not have the incentives to hide sales/production 
and/or pay wages in-kind that they do under taxes that are calculated on the basis of 
sales, profits and wage costs. This can lead to a ‘de-shadowing’ of the agricultural 
economy and more accurate statistics on production and sales, etc. 
These positive effects of the FAT, however, are countervailed by several negative 
effects. These include: 
• The success of agricultural development hinges among other things on the provision 
of public goods such as research, education, extension, social services and 
infrastructure. In Ukraine, investments in such goods and/or systems that can provide 
them are desperately needed to close the productivity gap between farming at home 
and in the rest of the world, and to increase standards of living in the rural areas. FAT 
and VAT exemptions for agriculture reduce the ability of the state to invest in these 
goods. The result is a loss of agricultural competitiveness in the long run. 
Furthermore, large farms are often obliged to continue providing some of these goods 
(the so-called ‘social sphere’) which binds resources and reduced their 
competitiveness further. 
• The FAT does not comply with the principle of vertical equity (see section 2.2). On 
the contrary; the more profit a farm makes, the lower its relative tax burden. This 
                                              
4  See Chapter 11 Farm Management Challenges in Ukrainian Agriculture for a discussion of 
challenges to farm management in Ukraine, including the need to improve accounting tools. 
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regressivity is difficult to justify and not in keeping with most other aspects of the 
Ukrainian tax system. 
• Farmers pay the same amount of FAT each year, regardless of whether profits are 
high, low or even negative. Hence, the FAT has no auto-stabiliser effect (LEONARD, 
2000). Even though the FAT rate is low, the destabilising impact on farms that are 
just marginally profitable can be significant, leading to liquidity problems. This is 
especially important in Ukraine, where farms have little access to risk management 
tools such as futures markets or effective crop insurance.  
• The FAT places a different burden on farms in different regions. Consider two 
oblasts with similar climatic conditions and land quality such as L’viv and Ivano-
Frankivsk. Average farm profitability was 33 UAH/ha in the former in 2000, and 
72 UAH/ha in the latter. Nonetheless, the average FAT per hectare of agricultural 
land in L’viv was just 20% less than in Ivano-Frankivsk (SSCU, 2001; MAPU, 
2002). Current land productivity differs from the productivity ten years ago that 
serves as the basis of FAT calculation, leading to arbitrary distortions.  
• The FAT is biased against crop producers. It is true that livestock producers often 
utilise pastures and/or cultivate arable land to produce feed crops. Nevertheless, the 
tax burden per unit of cost, revenue or profit will be higher for crop producers than 
for livestock producers. Some livestock producers with next to no land (e.g. an 
intensive poultry or pig operation) will pay next to no FAT. On average, livestock 
production in Ukraine is unprofitable, so policy makers often claim that it requires 
state support. This might be seen as justifying the favourable treatment it receives 
under the FAT. However, what is true for the average need not be true for each of the 
parts, and some livestock producers in Ukraine are obviously getting off very easy 
under the current system.  
• The provision of the FAT Law according to which an enterprise is deemed 
agricultural if at least 75% of its revenue stems from sales of own agricultural and 
processed products (until 2004 the threshold was 50%), creates incentives for the 
creation of artificial structures involving farms and non-agricultural enterprises that 
are looking for ways to avoid paying taxes. Increasing the threshold from 50 to 75% 
has presumably reduced these incentives, but distortions will remain all the same. Of 
course, this is not a disadvantage of the FAT per se, but rather a consequence of the 
overall low level of taxation in agriculture compared with other sectors.  
• The FAT encourages the retention of labour in agriculture, because agricultural 
employers do not have to make contributions to payroll taxes per person employed. 
Agricultural employment is already high in Ukraine, accounting for 22% of total 
employment (SSCU, 2001), and labour productivity is very low5. Even without the 
influence of the FAT, agriculture in Ukraine has served as a buffer against low 
employment opportunities in other sectors, and this has hampered restructuring and 
productivity growth in the sector. The FAT aggravates this problem not only because 
it does not place any tax burden on labour use in agriculture, but also because, as 
                                              
5  See Chapter 11 Farm Management Challenges in Ukrainian Agriculture for data on labour 
intensity and productivity in Ukrainian crop production. 
38  
outlined above, low rates of taxation in agriculture lead to higher taxation and less 
job creation in the rest of the economy. 
6 Conclusions and policy recommendations 
Taxes play an important role in market economies. Taxes influence the distribution 
of income (and wealth) and the allocation of resources, and they can contribute to stabilising 
the economy. Tax systems are expected to ensure tax neutrality across sectors and generate 
stable and sufficient tax revenue to finance government social expenditure and public good 
provision. Tax systems are also expected to ensure vertical equity and should not generate 
incentives that lead to the proliferation or migration of activities in the shadow economy. 
Agriculture can be taxed in different ways. Usually governments tax individual and 
corporate incomes, value-added, and agricultural land. Farm taxation affects the number, 
size and structure of farms, as well as their input and output mixes. Simple and transparent 
tax systems tend to be the most efficient, while complexity increases the costs of tax 
compliance and can lead to discretionary power and interference on the part of tax 
authorities. 
The farm tax system in Ukraine creates significant privileges for agricultural 
producers, especially in the form of FAT and VAT exemptions. These privileges have a 
negative influence on rest of the economy in Ukraine because they increase the tax burden 
that other sectors must bear. In agriculture, the simplicity and transparency of the FAT 
certainly reduces the costs of tax compliance. Furthermore, the low rate at which the FAT is 
applied increases farm profitability. However, the FAT does not comply with the principles 
of neutrality and vertical equity. It is biased in favour of profitable farms and land intensive 
agriculture such as livestock farming. It encourages the retention of labour and reduces 
incentives for the introduction of up-to-date accounting systems on farms. As a result of the 
farm tax system, the state lacks the funds required to provide important public goods in rural 
areas. Altogether, the farm tax system in Ukraine does not contribute to the creation of 
sustainable agricultural sector.  
To improve the farm tax system in Ukraine, we recommend the following changes: 
• The government should adopt a new farm tax system based on farm incomes. Large 
farms should be expected to use modern bookkeeping systems and keep accurate 
records of their incomes and expenditures. Hence, the cost of complying with an 
income tax should not be excessive. Of course, the cost of tax compliance will be 
high if farms are forced by punitive or discretionary tax rates to keep two sets of 
books; one for tax purposes and one that reflects reality for management purposes. 
Hence, the rate of taxation must be reasonable. Furthermore, it is imperative that 
farmers be free to manage their farms and that local authorities refrain from 
interfering in farm production, investment and marketing decisions. 
• VAT privileges should be abolished to avoid macroeconomic and sectoral 
distortions, as well as indirect effects on farm-gate prices. 
• Agricultural policy makers should pay more attention to rural development. The 
welfare of farm employees depends on not only gross output and farm prices, but 
also on access to education, health care, other social infrastructure and off-farm 
opportunities. While farms should pay considerably more taxes than they have in the 
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past, they will only be prepared to do so if they feel that they are benefiting from the 
government activities that are financed with these taxes. For example, the state 
should take over the ‘social sphere’ functions that large farms have assumed by 
default from Soviet times. 
• The government could continue using the FAT for small farms or private households. 
The FAT provides a tool for tapping into the substantial economic activity that takes 
place on small farms and household plots without incurring large costs of tax 
compliance and monitoring. 
• Finally, the farm tax burden must be harmonised with the tax burden in the rest of the 
economy. The current privileges provided to agriculture represent a significant tax on 
the rest of the economy that is largely hidden. If agriculture is to be supported, this 
support should be provided ‘up front’ in the form of expenditure out of a budget that 
is funded evenly by all sectors of the economy. 
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4 The Links between Agriculture and Macroeconomic 
Development in Ukraine 
SERGIY ZORYA 
1 Introduction 
Farming is an undertaking that involves many decisions. What crops to plant, how 
much inputs to purchase and how much credit to borrow, when and how to plough, seed, 
cultivate, or harvest, how much to keep for own consumption, how much to sell, and how 
much to store for later sale: these decisions make up the daily routine of most agricultural 
producers. In contrast to the planned economy, where farming decisions are based on the 
directives of a small group of planners, in market economy farming decisions are mainly 
driven by prices. Price incentives guide factor allocation, technical change, and thus, they 
affect agricultural growth. To ensure an efficient allocation of resources, it is essential that 
the price system functions and is protected from macroeconomic disorder. 
Macroeconomic policy, therefore, plays an important role in creating conditions for 
sending undistorted price signals to the agricultural sector. The most influential 
macroeconomic variable influencing the agriculture is the real exchange rate (RER). This 
variable is often used in the literature on the effects of macroeconomics on agriculture 
(SCHUH, 1974; SCHIFF & VALDES, 1999). Policy makers cannot directly set the RER, but 
they can influence it via fiscal, monetary, trade, and structural policies. The RER serves as a 
sort of barometer of general macroeconomic conditions and reflects the quality of economic 
policy. 
This chapter discusses the linkages between agriculture and macroeconomic 
variables, and evaluates the effects of macroeconomic policy on agricultural incentives in 
Ukraine. We begin with a brief literature review on the RER and agriculture. The role of the 
RER in a small open economy and the effects of the RER, together with industrial 
protection, on farm relative prices are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 presents estimates of 
the Equilibrium RER and RER misalignment in Ukraine. The direct and indirect policy 
effects of this misalignment on relative agricultural prices in Ukraine are estimated in 
Section 5, and Section 6 concludes.  
2 Literature review 
The impact of the RER on agriculture is a popular topic in the economic literature. It 
has being intensively studied for both developed and developing countries, but less so for 
transition economies. No doubt, the most important paper on exchange rates, other 
macroeconomic phenomena, and agriculture is the classic paper by EDWARD SCHUH entitled 
“The Exchange Rate and US Agriculture” (SCHUH, 1974). The basic idea of SCHUH’s paper 
is that US exchange rate policy during the post-war era effectively taxed agricultural 
exports, thus reducing agricultural exports, prices, incomes, returns to farm labour, and 
ultimately agricultural land values. 
Confirming SCHUH’s findings, SHANE (2001) indicates that past exchange rate shifts 
have accounted for approximately 25% of the changes in US agricultural export value. 
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Other factors, such as income growth rates in developing countries, the growth and 
productivity of foreign agricultural sectors that compete with the US and weather conditions 
accounted for much of the rest. Since 1995 the appreciation of the US dollar has again 
become a handicap for US agricultural exports. According to the author, appreciation of the 
dollar was a major factor in the 2% decline in global share of all US agricultural exports 
between 1992 and 1998.  
Exchange rate issues were always important for European farmers as well. The very 
complicated EU agri-monetary system, a system primarily designed to avoid agricultural 
price reductions in EU member states with strong currencies (such as Germany) kept 
exchange rate issues near the top of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) agenda 
for over two decades1. The introduction of Euro (€) in 1999 made it possible to eliminate the 
agri-monetary system in all members of the EU’s Monetary Union, but ushered in several 
new challenges. Exchange rate movements have an important impact on the costs of 
financing the CAP. A substantial part of CAP expenditures is directed to financing export 
subsidies. The value of the export subsidies depends on the difference between world 
market prices (usually denominated in US$) and internal EU prices (denominated in €). In 
2001 and 2002, the € was weak vis-à-vis the US$, reducing the gap between world and 
internal EU prices and thus the cost of export subsidisation (see AGRITRADE, 2002). 
In the developing countries, discussions on the impact of macroeconomic policy on 
agriculture were triggered by attention to the anti-agricultural bias of industrialisation 
policy. “In the 1960-70s the agrarian society by its very nature was regarded as socially 
and economically backward, governed by tradition, impervious to market signals, and 
devoid of links to other sectors that could bring the benefits of progress in agricultural 
production to the economy as a whole” (SCHIFF & VALDES, 1999, p. 4). Hence, many 
thought that only industrialisation policies could achieve long-term economic growth. DIAZ-
ALEJANDRO (1970) used relative prices to examine the impact of industrial protectionism on 
agriculture in Argentina during 1930-1964. He found that this protectionism created a 
significant bias against agriculture. LITTLE et al. (1970) compared domestic value-added and 
value-added at world prices in seven developing countries in the 1950s and 1960s. “They 
found in several countries extremely high levels of manufacturing protection, e.g. 313% in 
India in 1961 (the lowest being 27% in Mexico in 1960). In four of the seven cases, nominal 
protection exceeded 100%, far higher than could be justified by those who argued in favour 
of protection of infant industries” (cited in SCHIFF & VALDES, 1999, p. 14). 
In the 1980s, greater attention began to be paid to the impact of the RER on 
agricultural development in the developing countries. KRUEGER et al. (1988) and SCHIFF & 
VALDES (1992) adapted the ‘elasticity’ approach to exchange rate determination in 
conjunction with an explicit treatment of non-agricultural prices. These works explored the 
combined effect of direct (sector-specific) and indirect (economy-wide) policies on 
agriculture in a sample of eighteen developing countries. The authors found that the impact 
of indirect taxation generally exceeded that of direct taxation. The total taxation of 
agriculture in the studied countries equalled 30%, of which 8% were due to direct price 
interventions, and 22% to indirect taxation through macroeconomic policy and overvalued 
                                              
1  For an overview of the evolution of the agri-monetary system, see VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL 
(1994). 
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RERs. The authors also found that high taxation of agriculture was associated with low 
growth of agriculture and of the whole economy.  
There is little applied research on the impact of the RER on agriculture in transition 
economies. This is surprising given the vast macroeconomic changes in these countries over 
the last decade. Exceptions are BOJNEC et al. (1997) and HARTELL & SWINNEN (2000). The 
latter explain the level of agricultural protection defined in terms of the Producer Subsidy 
Equivalent (PSE) in Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and the Slovak 
Republic for the period 1992-1996 using the RER, relative income, the structure of the 
economy, the net agricultural trade position, and institutional structure. They find that 
changes in the RER have a statistically significant and large impact on the level of 
agricultural protection and that lower RERs are usually associated with higher farm support. 
Finally, the impact of the recent 1997/98 financial crisis on agriculture in Eastern 
Europe has been a popular issue. In Russia the crisis triggered large-scale capital outflow, 
depreciation of the rubble against the US dollar from August to December 1998 of about 
75%, high inflation (120% from August 1998 to July 1999), and falling GDP (a drop of 5% 
in 1998). The crisis lowered food consumption for two reasons: substantial depreciation of 
the rouble raised domestic prices for foodstuffs, and the crisis reduced consumer wealth and 
income. However, the crisis helped rather than hurt Russian agriculture because Rouble 
depreciation improved the price competitiveness of tradable goods. Although the 
depreciation also raised prices for some tradable agricultural inputs such as energy, these 
inputs account for only a certain fraction of the value of most of agricultural outputs. Hence, 
LIEFERT (2000) finds that Russian agriculture’s terms of trade improved by about 35% 
between August 1998 and early 1999. 
3 Theoretical foundations 
In this section, the Dependent Economy Model (DEM) is used to explain the role of 
the RER in an open economy.  
3.1 The Dependent Economy Model 
The DEM is derived from the works of the Australian economists MEADE, SALTER & 
SWAN, and is extensively used to analyse trade and exchange rate issues2. The DEM model 
assumes a small open economy producing two types of goods, tradable and non-tradable. 
The economy consumes both domestically produced goods and imports (M). Imports are a 
substitute for and therefore compete with domestically produced goods. The level of exports 
(X) is determined by the excess supply of the exportable tradable goods over domestic 
consumption. For simplicity it is assumed that all three goods are final products so as not to 
complicate the model with intermediate goods. Exports and imports are aggregated into total 
tradables (T=X+M). Non-tradable goods (N) are consumed only domestically. 
The prices of the tradable goods (P*X and P*M – throughout, an asterisk indicates 
foreign or world market prices) are determined exogenously on the world market, and the 
assumption of a small open economy implies that a country has no influence on these prices. 
                                              
2 See original model in MEADE (1951), SALTER (1959) and SWAN (1960). 
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Domestic prices of tradable goods are derived from these world market prices, via the 
exchange rate and the relevant trade policy instruments: 
PM = E P*M [1+tM], (4.1)
where E is the nominal exchange rate and tM is the implicit tariff rate which is 
negative in the case of an import subsidy. Similarly:  
PX = E P*X [1-tX], (4.2)
where tX is the export tax, which positive in the case of an export subsidy. 
The prices of domestically produced non-traded goods (PN) are determined solely by 
domestic supply and demand, as well as by production costs and fiscal and monetary policy 
instruments that influence domestic prices. Finally, the model is based on the assumptions 
that prices and wages are flexible, and that there is full employment. “This assumption can 
be relaxed on the premise that any rigidity in the non-tradable price, for instance, will 
result in excess supply of N and consequently unemployment” (see CORDEN, 1997, p. 263). 
Capital is assumed to be fixed in each sector at least in the short run, so that the mobile 
factor in the model is labour. 
To derive the equilibrium properties of the model, X and M are aggregated into one 
composite tradable good (T) the price of which is determined by the following equation: 
PT = ß PM + [1- ß] PX, (4.3)
where ß is the share of M in T. This aggregation makes it possible to derive the key 
variable of interest in the model, the RER (e) which is defined as the ratio of tradable prices 
to non-tradable prices: 
e = PT/PN. (4.4)
Overall equilibrium in the model requires the simultaneous achievement of external 
and internal equilibrium, i.e. equilibrium in the tradable and non-tradable markets. The non-
tradable market is in equilibrium when domestic demand equals domestic supply. The 
demand for non-tradables (DN) is a function of the RER and a domestic absorption (A), 
which is in turn defined as a sum of domestic private consumption (C), investments (I) and 
state consumption (G). An increase in the RER (i.e. a devaluation) makes non-tradables 
cheaper relative to tradables (see equation (4.4)) and thus leads to an increase in demand for 
N. If the RER falls (i.e. appreciates), the opposite is true. The demand for non-tradables is 
defined as follows: 
DN = DN (PT/PN, A), 0>∂
∂
e
DN , 0>∂
∂
A
DN  (4.5)
The supply of non-tradable goods (SN) is solely a function of the RER – a rise in the 
RER induces a reduction in the production of N as PN falls relative to PT. Since prices are 
assumed to be flexible, the market for non-tradable goods always clears. 
SN = SN (PT/PN), 0<∂
∂
e
SN  (4.6)
Equilibrium in the tradables market is similarly derived by defining supply and 
demand. The demand for tradables (DT) is affected by changes in the RER and in domestic 
absorption. RER devaluation makes T more expensive for domestic consumers, inducing 
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lower consumption of T as they shift demand to N. RER appreciation has the opposite 
effect. 
DT = DT (PT/PN, A), 0<∂
∂
e
DT , 0>∂
∂
A
DT  (4.7)
The supply of tradable goods (ST) is determined by the RER alone. The RER 
determines the relative profitability of the production of tradables and consequently the 
movement of production factors between sectors that produce T and N. 
ST = ST (PT/PN), 0>∂
∂
e
DT  (4.8)
The equilibrium condition for tradable goods is not as strict as for non-tradable 
goods. The trade balance (TB) is allowed to deviate from 0 in the short run, because in 
reality short-term trade imbalances exist and are often financed by capital inflows (which 
are excluded from the basic model for simplicity). In the long run, however, trade 
imbalances are not allowed. TB is defined as:  
TB = ST (PT/PN) - DT (PT/PN, A). (4.9)
Overall equilibrium in the economy is attained by deriving aggregate supply and 
demand equations. Total supply in the economy (Y) is the sum of tradable (ST) and non-
tradable (SN) supply. Measured in terms of non-tradable goods this can be expressed as: 
Y = SN (PT/PN) + e ST (PT/PN). (4.10)
RER depreciation (a rise in the relative price of tradable goods) is expected to 
increase the supply of tradables through both income and substitution effects. It is also 
expected to reduce the supply of non-tradables because of the dominance of substitution 
over income effects (CORDEN, 1997). 
Total absorption (A) in the economy is derived from the demand functions for T and 
N: 
A = DN (PT/PN, A) + e DT (PT/PN, A). (4.11)
Overall equilibrium is attained when total income and total absorption are equal. The 
RER is the key relative price that makes this possible by inducing changes in supply and 
demand (absorption): 
Y-A = (SN - DN)- e (ST – DT). (4.12)
Overall equilibrium in the DEM is illustrated graphically in figure 4.1. NN and TT are 
the sets of all points at which the non-tradable and tradable goods markets, respectively, are 
in equilibrium. Full equilibrium is obtained at point S where there is balance both on the 
domestic market for tradable goods, and in foreign trade. To understand this, recall that e, 
the RER, is the relative price of tradable to non-tradable goods. NN slopes down, because as 
e falls, non-tradable goods become relatively more expensive so that domestic demand 
shifts from non-tradable to tradable goods (equation (4.5)) and domestic supply of non-
tradable goods increases (equation (4.6)). Since demand for non-tradable goods is falling 
while supply in increasing, more total absorption (A) is required, ceteris paribus, to 
equilibrate this market. Hence, points above (below) NN are characterised by too much (too 
little) absorption for a given level of e, which leads to excess demand (supply) for non-
tradable goods. Similarly, TT slopes upwards because as e increases, tradable goods become 
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relatively more expensive and more total absorption is required, ceteris paribus, to balance 
the resulting decreasing demand (equation (4.7)) and increasing supply of tradable goods 
(equation (4.8)). As a result, points above (below) TT are characterised by too little (too 
much) domestic absorption for a given level of e, which leads to excess supply (demand) of 
tradable goods and a corresponding trade balance surplus (deficit). 
Figure 4.1: Overall equilibrium in the Dependent Economy Model 
AA*
e*
N
N T
T
S
Trade balance surplus and 
excess demand for N (Zone I)
Trade balance deficit and excess 
demand for N
(Zone IV)
Trade balance surplus and 
insufficient demand for N 
(Zone II)
Trade balance deficit and 
insufficient demand for N
(Zone III)
 
Source:  Own presentation based on SWAN (1963). 
Deviations from the point S are grouped into four zones which SWAN (1963) calls 
“Zones of Economic Unhappiness”. Each zone is characterized by a unique combination of 
disequilibria on the tradable and non-tradable goods markets. For example Zone IV 
combines excess demand for both tradable and non-tradable goods. Zone IV depicts the 
situation in Ukraine prior to the financial crisis in 1998 very well. At the time, the country 
experienced a huge trade balance deficit as the nominal exchange rate was fixed which, 
combined with high inflation made Ukrainian import substitutes and exports uncompetitive 
on domestic and foreign markets, respectively. At the same time, the demand for non-
tradable goods was artificially high due to high budget deficits and the consequent capital 
inflows. The economy was a long away from equilibrium, and policy makers were obliged 
to reduce and switch expenditures at the same time. The financial crisis ‘helped’ them to do 
both:  
1. Since private investors refused to continue financing the budget deficit, the 
government had to reduce expenditures, improve the fiscal discipline, and 
consequently, balance the budget, achieving a surplus for the first time since 
independence in 2000. 
2. Since the government could not any longer satisfy the demand for foreign currency at 
the artificially low fixed nominal exchange rate, the exchange rate began floating and 
devalued from 2 UAH/US$ in mid-1998 to almost 5 UAH/US$ by late 1999. 
Nominal devaluation improved the competitiveness of Ukrainian import substitutes 
and export goods on domestic and international markets, respectively. Domestic 
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demand therefore switched from imports to import substitutes and non-tradable 
goods.  
Altogether, these changes reduced domestic absorption as both the private and public 
sectors in Ukraine were ‘forced to live within their means’. Devaluation of the RER – in 
other words, an increase in the prices of tradable goods relative to non-tradable goods – 
signalled to the Ukrainian economy that domestic demand should switch from tradable to 
non-tradable goods and supply (production) from non-tradable to tradable goods. This 
moved the economy first to the ‘north-west’ in figure 4.1, correcting the trade deficit, while 
stimulation of production of non-tradable goods and overall productivity improvements led 
to a combination of subsequent RER revaluation and a shift of the NN curve up and to the 
right. Together, these changes brought the Ukrainian economy closer to overall 
macroeconomic equilibrium, a fortuitous situation that has characterised the last roughly 4 
years. 
3.2 The exchange rate and agricultural prices  
Since agricultural commodities are mainly tradable, agricultural prices and markets 
are clearly affected by the macroeconomic forces and changes described in the previous 
section. Agricultural prices are determined on world markets and are exogenous for small 
open economies. The world markets send price signals to domestic farmers, and based on 
these signals farmers make production and investment decisions. The transmission of price 
signals from world to domestic markets, however, can be distorted by border control and 
other restrictive trade policy tools. To measure these distortions, economists use the 
Nominal Rate of Protection (NPR) which is defined as: 
1−=
w
d
P
PNPR  (4.13)
where Pd is the domestic farm-gate price and Pw is the border price (Pbp) converted into 
local currency at the official nominal exchange rate (E0) (i.e. Pw = E0 Pbp) and adjusted for 
marketing costs (transportation, storage, quality differences etc.). A negative NPR implies 
that domestic farm-gate prices are lower than they would be without distortions (i.e. taxation 
of domestic producers) while a positive NPR implies the opposite, i.e. that domestic prices 
are supported. 
KRUEGER, SCHIFF &VALDES, however, argue that this measure of price distortion is 
incomplete and propose modifying it to account for (a) effects of industrial policy via the 
prices of non-agricultural products (Pna), and, as described above, (b) any difference 
between the actual (e0) and equilibrium exchange rates (e*) that might be due to 
macroeconomic policies (see KRUEGER et al., 1988; SCHIFF & VALDES, 1992 and 1999). 
Farm profitability hinges on not only farm output prices but also industrial input prices (e.g. 
machinery, fuels). Since the ‘classical’ NPR does not account for the fact that the latter may 
be distorted by government policies (e.g. import duties on farm machinery, which 
effectively tax domestic farmers), KRUEGER-SCHIFF-VALDES propose adjusting the NPR 
accordingly. Moreover, the ‘classical’ NPR also assumes that the economy is in 
equilibrium, in other words that the actual and equilibrium exchange rates are equal. 
However, if the economy is in disequilibrium, the actual RER will deviate from its 
equilibrium level, and this will also imply taxation or support of agriculture. For example, 
prior to the financial crisis, RER overvaluation reduced the competitiveness of Ukrainian 
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agriculture – budget deficits, the fixed nominal exchange rate and other unsustainable 
macroeconomic policies acted as a hidden tax on farmers in Ukraine. The ‘classical’ NPR 
cannot capture effects of this nature either, which also calls for an adjustment. Hence, 
KRUEGER, SCHIFF & VALDES propose direct, indirect and total NPRs. 
The direct NPR (NPRD) is defined as:  
*
*
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w
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w
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P
P
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P
P
NPR
−
= , (4.14)
where P*w is the border price in the local currency adjusted for exchange rate 
misalignment (e*/e0) so that P*w = Pw e*/e0. Pna is non-agricultural price which consist of a 
tradable share β with a price PnaT and a non-tradable share 1-β with a price PnaNT, so that 
naNTnaTna PPP ]1[
* ββ −+= . P*na is the corresponding non-agricultural sector price 
corrected for exchange rate distortions (e*/e0) and any protectionist measures (measured by 
the tariff equivalent tna). Hence, naNT
na
naT
na Pte
ePP ]1[
]1[0
*
* ββ −++= . The direct NPR measures the 
impact of direct policies ((Pd-Pw)/Pna) relative to the agricultural price that would prevail in 
the absence of all interventions (P*w/P*na).  
The indirect NPR (NPRI) is defined as:  
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The NPRI measures only indirect distortions of agricultural prices caused by 
macroeconomic and industrial trade policies, including RER misalignment (e*/e0) and the 
effect of trade policy on prices of tradable non-agricultural goods (PnaT). NPRI is the same 
for all tradable products since Pd does not appear in equation (4.15).  
The total NPR (NPRT) is the sum of direct and indirect NRPs and measures the 
impact of both direct and indirect policies on agricultural prices ((Pd-P*w)/Pna) relative to the 
agricultural prices that would prevail in the absence of all interventions (P*w/P*na):  
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
na
w
na
w
na
d
na
w
na
w
na
w
na
w
na
w
na
d
IDT
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
NPRNPRNPR
−
=
−
+
−
=+= . (4.16)
4 The equilibrium real exchange rate in Ukraine 
The key issue in measuring the effects of macroeconomic policies on agricultural 
prices is the evaluation of the equilibrium RER (e*) and the deviation of actual RER (e0) 
from its equilibrium value. This deviation is referred to as ‘misalignment’. RAZIN and 
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COLLINS (1997, p. 1) call RER misalignment “a situation in which country’s actual RER 
deviates from some notion of an implicit ideal RER”. In the following, we model and 
estimate the ERER and, consequently, the RER misalignment in Ukraine.  
4.1 Modelling the equilibrium exchange rate  
There are many methods used in the literature to evaluate the ERER. We use the 
EDWARDS’s model (EDWARDS, 1989; EDWARDS & SAVASTANO, 1999)3. EDWARDS 
distinguishes between variables which influence the RER in the short and in the long run. 
The long-term variables are called ‘fundamentals’, and they determine the ERER. Whenever 
there are changes in these variables, there will be changes in the ERER. “In the short run, 
however, changes in monetary variables, such as domestic credit and nominal devaluation, 
will also affect the RER” (EDWARDS, 1994, p. 67). The long-term ERER can be written in 
the following form: 
titiLRt uFUNDe ++= )ln()ln( 0 ββ , (4.17)
where eLRt is the ERER and FUNDit is the vector of fundamental variables. In the 
short run the RER may deviate from the ERER due to temporary fluctuations of the real 
fundamentals as well as monetary and fiscal policies. The short-term path of the RER is 
defined as follows: 
)]ln()[ln(][)]ln()[ln()ln( 1
*
1 −− −+−−−Θ=Δ ttttLRtt EEZZeee θλ , (4.18)
where Θ measures what proportion of any misalignment between the ERER and the 
RER is ‘corrected’ in each period (the smaller Θ, the slower the correction), Zt is a vector of 
macroeconomic policies, Z* is a vector of macroeconomic policies that are consistent with 
the ERER, λ is the speed of adjustment to the sustainable policy value, and Et is the nominal 
exchange rate. The meaning of this dynamic equation is straightforward: the RER changes 
or adjusts in the direction of the ERER (first term on the right hand side) depending on the 
size of the misalignment and the speed of adjustment Θ. However, deviations between 
actual and sustainable levels of macroeconomic policy variables (second term), and changes 
in the nominal exchange rate (third term), can disturb this adjustment.  
Combining equations (4.17) and (4.18) leads to the following equation for the RER: 
tttttitit vNOMDEVZZeFUNDe ++−−Θ−+Δ+=Δ − θλγγ )()ln()1()ln()ln( *10 , (4.19)
where the parameters iγ are combinations of the respective iβ and θ , and tNOMDEV  
is the nominal devaluation. In order estimate equations (4.17) and (4.19), the variables 
affecting the ERER and RER need to be identified. According to EDWARDS & SAVASTIANO 
(1999), most empirical studies of the ERER for emerging economies consider the following 
fundamentals: terms of trade, output growth (or productivity differentials), the country’s 
openness to international trade, import tariffs, government spending and capital flows. The 
monetary and fiscal variables, as well as the nominal exchange rate, are usually included to 
reflect short-term movements of the RER. 
                                              
3 See ZORYA (2003) for details on this literature and the following estimation.  
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We use the quarterly data from 1996 to 2001 from various statistical sources in 
Ukraine (NBU, 2002; UEPLAC, 2002). Based on data availability and quality, the 
following variables are used to estimate the ERER in Ukraine: 
• The real exchange rate (RER) defined as the ratio of the US wholesale price index 
and consumer price index in Ukraine multiplied by the nominal UAH/US$ exchange 
rate (UAH/US$). An increase (decrease) of the RER means the RER depreciation 
(appreciation). 
• Openness of economy to international trade (OPEN) defined as the ratio of the 
sum of total export and imports to nominal GDP. Trade barriers or all sorts affect the 
ERER. For example, an increase in import tariffs will increase the relative price of 
importable goods, reducing import demand and lowering the price of foreign 
exchange. According to theory, increasing of openness will lead to ERER 
depreciation (EDWARDS, 1994). 
• Government spending (GOV) is measured as budget expenditures as a share of 
nominal GDP. Generally, increasing government expenditure leads to real 
appreciation by increasing demand and prices for non-tradable goods. But the 
ultimate impact on the long-term ERER depends on sectoral composition (tradable or 
non tradable sectors) of these changes (EDWARDS, 1994). 
• Capital flows (CAPFL) are expressed as the ratio of net capital inflows to lagged 
nominal GDP. Capital inflows will lead to ERER appreciation if they inflate the 
prices of non-tradable goods, mainly fixed assets. However, if capital inflows are 
demanded domestically due to high GDP growth (and not, for example, to finance 
budget deficits), they can be non-inflationary. 
• Expansive monetary policy (EXCMON) is proxied by the growth of domestic 
credit in excess of growth in lagged real GDP. Monetary policy is included in the 
RER analysis because of its impact on short-term RER movements; in the long run 
the money is neutral. Excessive monetary expansion unmatched by growth in the 
economy will boost the demand for non-tradable goods and thus, via inflation, induce 
an appreciation of the RER. 
• Fiscal deficit ratio (FISC) is defined as the ratio of the fiscal deficit to the lagged 
monetary base. Under a flexible exchange rate, an increase in the fiscal deficit 
relative to the lagged monetary base (loose fiscal policy) will increase domestic 
demand for non-tradable goods, and thus lead to an appreciation of the ERER. Under 
a fixed exchange rate, loose fiscal policy will initially boost domestic demand with 
the upward pressure on interest rate dampened by capital inflows and no impact on 
the ERER. In the long run, the higher demand for non-tradable goods will put upward 
pressure on inflation, and thus lead to ERER appreciation (MONGARDINI, 1998). 
• Nominal devaluation (NOMDEV) is the devaluation of the nominal exchange rate 
(UAH/US$). Nominal devaluation is a powerful tool to re-align the RER, but it 
affects the RER only in the short run. In the long run, if the fundamental sources of 
misalignment are not eliminated, the RER misalignment will increase again 
(EDWARDS, 1994).  
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4.2 Econometric estimation  
In order to estimate equation (4.19), the two-step error-correction model (ECM) of 
ENGEL and GRANGER (1987) is used. The error correction specification makes it possible to 
measure the speed of adjustment to long run equilibrium and short term effects as well. In 
the first step of the ENGLE-GRANGER procedure, the following long run relationship is 
estimated: 
ttttt uCAPFLGOVOPENERER ++++= −13210 )ln()ln()ln( γγγγ . (4.20)
The results are summarised in table 4.14. All coefficients have the expected signs and 
are statistically significant at conventional levels. Openness has a positive effect on the 
RER, indicating that an increase in openness leads to depreciation of the ERER. The results 
also indicate that increasing capital inflows induce ERER appreciation. The ratio of the 
government expenditures to GDP has a negative and significant elasticity, implying that 
largest share of state expenditures is spent on non-tradable goods. 
Table 4.1: Cointegrating regression, 1996Q1-2001Q4 (dependent variable is ln 
(ERER)) 
Variable Coefficient t-value Probability 
Constant 6.170 9.43 0.000 
ln (OPEN) 1.062 6.85 0.000 
ln (GOV) -0.462 -2.65 0.015 
CAPFL (-1) -0.007 -1.93 0.068 
R2 = 0.93 
DW statistics = 1.52 
ADF(0) = -4.126 (**) 
ADF (critical value at 1% significance) = -2.949 
Source: Own calculations. 
In step 2, deviations from the long run relationship in equation (4.20) are included in 
the following error-correction model: 
ttttt EXCMONCAPFLGOVOPENRER Δ−Δ+Δ+Δ=Δ − 11321 )()ln()ln()ln( λγγγ  
tttt ueNOMDEVFISC +Θ−−+Δ− − )ln()1( 12 θλ  
          (4.21)
The estimated coefficients of this model are presented in table 4.2. Despite the small 
sample size, most included variables are significant, and together they explain 71% of the 
observed changes in the RER. This indicates that real fundamentals as a group indeed play 
an important role in determining RER behaviour in Ukraine. The coefficient of the speed of 
RER adjustment to its equilibrium level is statistically significant: since 1- Θ = 0.85, Θ  
equals 0.15 which indicates that the RER converges quite slowly toward its long-run 
equilibrium level in Ukraine, with only approximately 48% of any misalignment being 
corrected within one year and full adjustment (99.9%) taking around 8 years5.  
                                              
4 See ZORYA (2003) for details on estimation method, diagnostic tests, etc. 
5 This result is similar to those obtained by EDWARDS (1989) for a group of developing countries 
(0.19), MONGARDINI (1998) for Egypt (0.21), and ELBADAWI (1994) for Chile, Ghana and India 
(around 0.30). 
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Table 4.2: Error correction regression, 1996Q1-2001Q4 (dependent variable is Δ ln 
(RER)). 
Variable Coefficient t-value 
 
Probability 
ln (et-1) -0.853  -3.07 0.005 Δ ln (OPEN) 0.834  3.86 0.004 
Δ ln (GOV) -0.785 -2.74 0.012 
Δ CAPFL (-1) -0.007 -3.05 0.005 
Δ EXCMON 0.148 0.86 0.198 
Δ  FISC -0.739 -2.42 0.010 
NOMDEV 0.261 1.59 0.035 
R2 = 0.71   
DW = 1.26   
Source: Own calculations. 
The first indicator of macroeconomic policy, EXCMON, has an unexpected sign, but 
is statistically insignificant. There is, therefore, no evidence of a relationship between 
monetary policy and the RER in Ukraine over the period 1996-2001. This result may be due 
to problems with our proxy for monetary policy, which is based on the assumption of a 
constant velocity of money. The second indicator of macroeconomic policy, FISC, is 
significantly negative. As expected, therefore, as fiscal policy becomes increasingly 
expansive, the RER will appreciate. According to the econometric results, budget deficit 
growth of 10%, ceteris paribus, leads to a 7.4% appreciation of the RER. This supports the 
view that inconsistent fiscal policies will result in growing pressure leading to RER 
overvaluation (EDWARDS, 1994). 
The coefficient on nominal devaluation, NOMDEV, is significantly positive but of 
low magnitude, indicating that nominal exchange rate changes are converted into 
corresponding real changes at considerably less than a one-to-one rate. This highlights the 
point that while nominal devaluations can serve as a powerful device to realign the ERER, 
they cannot replace the need to correct the fundamental source(s) of any misalignment. 
In table 4.2, the rate of openness and the ratio of government spending to GDP are 
significant and have the expected signs. The coefficient on OPEN is large (0.83), indicating 
that outward-oriented trade policy induces RER depreciation – this is true for increases in 
exports and imports. The impact of government spending (GOV) is also high (-0.79) and 
confirms that increasing government expenditures induces RER appreciation. Finally, an 
increase in capital inflows induces RER appreciation, although this impact (the elasticity 
equals -0.007) is much weaker than those of OPEN and GOV. 
Figure 4.2 depicts the actual and equilibrium RERs in Ukraine, as well as the 
difference between these two rates (RER misalignment) during the observed period. The 
ERER and RER misalignment have been calculated using the econometric results above as 
outlined in ZORYA (2003). These results should be treated with caution as the use of 
quarterly data might create some bias, leading to overestimation of RER misalignment in 
some periods. Nevertheless, RER misalignment during the periods 1996 to 1998 and 1999 
to 2000 is obvious.  
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Figure 4.2: Actual and equilibrium real exchange rates as well as real exchange rate 
misalignment in Ukraine, 1996-2001  
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Source: Own calculations. 
Between 1996-Q2 and 1998-Q4, the RER was overvalued, with the rate of 
overvaluation peaking in 1997-Q4 (21.9%) and averaging 4.6, 16.2 and 5% in 1996, 1997 
and 1998, respectively. In this period the Ukrainian economy was characterised by high 
government expenditures, unsustainable capital inflows, slow structural changes, and 
inward-oriented trade policy. The financial crisis in 1998-Q4 clearly demonstrated how 
macroeconomic mismanagement can be punished in an open economy. As discussed using 
the Dependent Economy Model in section 3 above, the only options available to the 
Ukrainian Government were exchange rate devaluation and a move towards more 
sustainable fiscal policies. 
Nominal devaluation began in 1999, although the government tried to avoid a sharp 
devaluation. In 1999, the RER was undervalued by roughly 4.8% and in 2000-Q2, the rate 
of undervaluation reached 12.5%. In this period, the rate of openness reached its peak, state 
finances were balanced, and foreign capital flowed out of the country. In 2001, the actual 
RER returned to its appreciation path and was slightly overvalued by an average rate of 3%. 
As 2001 was the first year of strong GDP growth in Ukraine (9%), a certain degree of RER 
appreciation due to increasing productivity was to be expected, and the 3% overvaluation 
we find may not represent misalignment6. 
                                              
6 An attempt to capture this so-called Balassa-Samuelson effect in our econometric analysis using a 
variable that measures technical change (real industrial output per unit of labour employed in 
Ukraine) was not successful, perhaps because significant growth and productivity improvements 
only took place at the very end of our sample period. In a similar study, DE BROECK and SLOK 
(2001) estimate an impact of technical change on the RER that, if it were also true for Ukraine, 
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5 Impact of macroeconomic policy on agricultural 
incentives in Ukraine 
We next evaluate the impact of RER misalignment and industrial protection on 
agricultural incentives in Ukraine using the KRUEGER-SCHIFF-VALDES methodology 
described in section 3.2. Nominal Rates of Protection (classical, direct, indirect and total) 
are calculated for nine agricultural products using data from the OECD (2003). The index of 
RER misalignment required for these calculations is taken from figure 4.2, and rates of 
industrial import protection are calculated as average import tariffs for industrial goods 
(without energy) increased by 20% to account for non-tariff barriers in Ukraine (ZORYA, 
2003, table 14). The share of tradable goods in total non-agricultural production is assumed 
to be 40%, while the share of non-tradable goods (construction, transportation, 
communication and other services) is correspondingly assumed to be 60% (calculations 
based on IMF, 2001). It is also assumed that all agricultural products are tradable: this 
assumption is very close to reality for crops in Ukraine, but it is not always true for 
livestock products produced by households. The results are summarised in table 4.3. 
The results in table 4.3 show that macroeconomic policy and non-agricultural prices 
have a very important impact on agriculture. For example, the average classical NPR for 
wheat in Ukraine was 18.4% between 1996 and 2001. However, the corresponding total 
NPR, which accounts not only for agricultural policies but also includes the indirect effects 
of macroeconomic imbalances and non-agricultural policies, equals only 7.7%. This 
indicates that the classical approach of measuring price support overestimates the true 
protection rates; policy makers may feel that they are supporting agriculture via policy 
measures such as import tariffs on agricultural products, but this support is eroded and 
sometimes reversed by other, non-agricultural policies. This erosion peaked in 1997-1998 
when RER misalignment was at its greatest, and reversal (i.e. where indirect taxation of 
agriculture exceeds direct support) can be observed for a number of products and years (for 
example wheat, sunflower sees and beef and veal in 2001). This result is confirmed at the 
bottom of table 4.3 for exportable agricultural products as a whole. We see that in some 
years (1997, 1998 and 2001), the impact of macroeconomic and industrial policies on 
agricultural prices was larger than the impact of agricultural policy itself, suggesting that 
agricultural policy per se is often not responsible for the decisions and incentives that matter 
most to agriculture. 
                                                                                                                                                      
would have generated an RER appreciation of 3.6%. This suggests that RER misalignment was 
more or less zero in 2001. 
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Table 4.3: Direct and indirect nominal rates of protection for selected agricultural 
products in Ukraine, in %, 1996-2001 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Wheat Classical NPR (NPR) -42.3 121.7 24.4 -18.5 21.9 3.2 
 Direct NPR (NPRD) -43.7 83.3 17.9 -14.9 33.8 -0.1 
 Indirect NPR (NPRI)* -4.8 -10.8 -7.3 -1.4 0.4 -6.4 
 Total NPR (NPRT) -48.5 72.5 10.6 -16.4 34.2 -6.5 
Maize NPR -5.7 -18.5 -12.5 5.9 -13.5 -2.6 
 NPRD -5.5 -15.2 -12.4 7.0 -17.0 -2.7 
 NPRT -10.2 -26.0 -19.7 5.6 -16.5 -9.1 
Barley NPR -5.4 -0.1 17.8 -21.5 -10.7 -16.1 
 NPRD -5.2 -0.1 17.7 -25.6 -13.5 -16.7 
 NPRT -9.9 -10.9 10.4 -27.0 -13.1 -23.1 
Sunflower seeds NPR -17.2 -16.8 -26.9 -32.2 -25.1 5.5 
 NPRD -16.5 -13.7 -26.7 -38.2 -31.6 5.7 
 NPRT -21.3 -24.5 -34.0 -39.7 -31.2 -0.7 
Sugar beet NPR 191.1 38.2 14.3 7.5 26.5 36.5 
(sugar equivalent) NPRD 183.7 31.2 14.3 8.9 33.4 37.8 
 NPRT 178.9 20.4 7.0 7.5 33.8 31.4 
Milk NPR -34.0 -1.9 -0.3 -27.7 -29.2 -26.3 
(dairy product equivalent) NPRD -29.3 -1.5 -0.3 -33.0 -36.8 -27.3 
 NPRT -34.0 -12.3 -7.6 -34.4 -36.4 -33.6 
Beef and veal NPR -10.4 16.3 -21.8 -13.5 6.9 5.3 
 NPRD -10.0 13.3 -21.7 -16.1 8.7 5.5 
 NPRT -14.8 2.5 -29.0 -17.5 9.2 -0.9 
Pig meat NPR 8.5 -3.9 41.4 16.9 3.9 40.6 
 NPRD 8.1 -3.2 41.2 20.1 4.9 42.0 
 NPRT 3.4 -14.0 34.0 18.7 5.3 35.7 
Poultry NPR 3.2 49.9 75.0 2.6 54.2 45.2 
 NPRD 3.1 40.8 74.6 3.0 68.3 46.8 
 NPRT -1.7 30.0 67.3 1.6 68.7 40.5 
All exportable products** NPR -12.4 29.9 2.6 -9.5 2.9 5.6 
(weighted by production NPRD -12.5 20.8 1.5 -10.1 4.8 4.9 
shares) NPRT -17.3 10.0 -5.8 -11.5 5.2 -1.4 
Note:  * The indirect nominal rate of protection (NPRI) is identical for all products and therefore only shown 
once. 
 ** Sugar and poultry are excluded as they are imported. 
Source:  Own calculations based on WORLD BANK & OECD (2004). 
6 Conclusions  
Macroeconomic policy has played and will continue to play an important role in 
agricultural development in Ukraine. Our calculations demonstrate that between 1996 and 
2001, indirect policies had effects on agricultural prices that were at least of the same order 
of magnitude as the effects of direct, agriculture-specific policies. The size and the direction 
of the impact of all economic policies on agriculture therefore differed considerably from 
the size and the direction of the impact of agricultural policies alone. Clearly, agricultural 
development and agricultural policy must be considered in an economy-wide framework 
and not in isolation. In this respect, special attention should be paid to the RER and its 
misalignment. The RER reflects all the major and internal and external forces acting on the 
economy and is a good barometer of the quality of overall economic policies.  
In Ukraine, where agriculture occupies an important place in the national economy in 
terms of GDP contribution, employment, export shares and food expenditures, agricultural 
policy itself greatly affects non-agricultural sectors and the above-mentioned 
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macroeconomic variables. If policy makers use distortive policy instruments to protect 
farmers, macroeconomic stability and economic growth as a whole can suffer as a result, 
and this can at least partly neutralise the desired impact of protection on agriculture. In 
summary, agriculture is not only influenced by agrarian policy: it is also influenced by and 
itself influences economic policy making in general. Agricultural policy makers must 
consider these links if they want to implement truly effective agricultural policies and do 
justice to their responsibility for overall economic development as opposed to narrow 
sectoral interests in Ukraine. 
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5 Agricultural Productivity Growth: a Vehicle for Rural 
Poverty Reduction in Ukraine? 
VIKTORIYA GALUSHKO & STEPHAN VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL 
1 Introduction 
The link between agricultural growth and rural poverty has long been of great interest 
to economists, and this interest has generated a voluminous literature on the topic. However, 
few attempts have been made to quantify the links between agricultural growth and rural 
poverty in transition countries. In this chapter we analyse the relationship between 
agricultural productivity growth and rural poverty in Ukraine from 1999 to 2002, which is a 
period of early recovery in Ukrainian agriculture. Highlighting the linkages between 
productivity and rural poverty may help policy makers identify effective strategies for 
fighting poverty.  
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a discussion of the links 
between agricultural growth and rural poverty and a description of key trends in Ukraine. In 
section 3 we develop an empirical framework for exploring the links between agricultural 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth and rural poverty in Ukraine, and present the results 
of a corresponding empirical analysis. Section 4 summarizes the findings and discusses 
policy instruments for alleviating rural poverty.  
2 Agricultural growth and rural poverty in Ukraine: Theory 
and description 
In the 1950s and 60s it was believed that economic growth would yield benefits to 
the poor. Furthermore, it was believed and supported by some evidence that what mattered 
for poverty reduction in agrarian societies was agricultural growth, while “the rapid growth 
of urban areas in the absence of sustained rural growth tends to reinforce the rural-urban 
disparities and does not benefit the poor” (RAVALLION & DATT, 1999). The main argument 
for agricultural growth having poverty alleviation effects was that it would have positive 
spill-over effects on the poor through increased employment opportunities in both the farm 
and off-farm, agriculture-related sectors.  
Empirical evidence accumulated by the early 1970s, however, suggested that the 
relationship between agricultural growth and rural poverty was ambiguous. The impact of 
agricultural growth on the rural poor depends on initial conditions as well as the structure of 
incentives and the level of institutional development. Agricultural productivity growth can 
yield benefits to the poor in the form of lower prices for staple food and increased 
availability of food. It also affects factor markets, and, in particular the labour market: 
theoretically higher marginal productivity of labour results in higher wage rates and 
increased employment.  
However, there is also reason to believe that agricultural aggregate productivity 
growth can have adverse effects on rural poor, particularly in the short-run. Because of the 
peculiarities of transition economies – such as large-scale and rapid labour-shedding in 
agriculture – the transformation from state to private ownership accompanied by aggregate 
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productivity growth can result in lay-offs of surplus labour rather than increased 
employment as predicted by theory, thus leading to loss of wage earnings for the rural poor 
(especially unskilled workers who are most likely to be laid off). Even though it is believed 
that agricultural growth stimulates the development of rural small-scale businesses such as 
processing and trade, which then create off-farm employment opportunities that can absorb 
shed labour, because of the underdevelopment of institutions in transition economies it may 
take years before the new industries related to agriculture are established and absorb 
unskilled rural labour. Furthermore, in countries such as Ukraine most rural households are 
handicapped by inadequate endowments of the physical and human assets that are required 
to adapt and take advantage of new opportunities, for example by establishing small 
enterprises. 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 present evidence on some of these processes in Ukraine. The 
rapid decline in agricultural output up to 1999 adversely affected food availability and 
affordability, which induced a large portion of rural households to produce their own food 
supply. Throughout transition the agricultural land area owned by rural households has been 
steadily increasing, as has household production (figure 5.1). While this indicates that food 
production provides a ‘fall back’ option for rural households, income from farming and 
subsistence production are often inadequate to keep households from falling into poverty. 
Figure 5.1: Trends in agricultural production and agricultural land ownership by 
private households in Ukraine (1990-2002) 
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Source:  STATE STATISTICS COMMITTEE OF UKRAINE (2003). 
Spurred by important reforms in 1999 and 2000 as well as the beneficial impact of 
devaluation following the financial crisis in late 1998 and 1999 (see chapter 4 on the links 
between macroeconomic developments and agriculture), Ukrainian agricultural production 
began to grow again in 2000. This growth contributed to an increase in real agricultural 
wages of 52% between 2000 and 2002 (figure 5.2). At the same time, however, it seems to 
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have reduced employment in agriculture, with the rate of lay-offs of farm workers 
accelerating from 6 and 5% in 1999 and 2000, to 14 and 17% in 2001 and 2002, 
respectively. This suggests that as productivity increased, farms were both laying off 
increasing numbers of workers and paying the remaining workers considerably higher 
wages. Furthermore, total employment in rural areas (both on- and off-farm) slightly 
increased from 93.2% in 2000 to 93.4% in 2002, which indicates that agricultural growth 
may have been associated with increased off-farm employment. 
The net impact of these developments on poverty is not clear a priori. Due to a lack 
of data we cannot trace the development of poverty during the early stages of transition 
when agricultural output was declining. However, we do know that rural poverty (headcount 
ratio) declined from 50.8% in 2000 to 39% in 2002. This suggests that the net impact of 
growth and productivity increases has been to reduce poverty. Significant regional 
differences in rural poverty rates remain, however, so aggregated national data might not 
provide an accurate picture.  
Figure 5.2: Farm employment and real agricultural wages in Ukraine (1995-2002) 
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Source:  STATE STATISTICS COMMITTEE OF UKRAINE (2003). 
In summary, it is not clear how agricultural growth has affected poverty in Ukraine. 
In the long run it appears clear that agricultural growth will reduce poverty, when all factors 
of production are mobile, factor markets work efficiently and individuals can be retrained to 
suit emerging job opportunities. But agriculture in Ukraine has only been growing for a 
short time following a significant decline in the first years of transition, and agriculture and 
the economy as a whole in Ukraine continue to be plagued by a variety of rigidities and 
distortions. In the following sections we therefore carry out an econometric analysis of the 
available data to see whether this leads to clear conclusions. 
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3 Agricultural growth and rural poverty in Ukraine: An 
econometric analysis 
3.1 A model for the econometric analysis  
In the following we derive a set of reduced-form equations that relate TFP growth, 
poverty and inequality and a series of other variables in Ukraine. We begin by postulating 
that the main determinants of rural poverty are: 
• Income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient (Gini). 
• Employment of skilled workers measured as the share of workers with tertiary 
education in the economically active population (Skilled). 
• Employment of unskilled workers measured as the share of workers with secondary 
education in the economically active population (Unskilled). 
• Terms-of-trade measured as the ratio of grain prices to the non-food GDP deflator 
(TT). 
• Real agricultural wages paid by agricultural enterprises (Rwage). 
• Government spending on agriculture (Agrospen); and,  
• The agricultural bias of economic growth (Growth). 
The relationship between income inequality and poverty can be complex, but it is 
plausible to expect that greater inequality will be associated with increased levels of 
poverty. While increased employment of well-paid skilled labour will, ceteris paribus, 
reduce poverty, increased employment of unskilled could lead to increased numbers of 
working poor, depending on wage levels and regulations (i.e. minimum wage legislation). 
Increases in real wages paid by agricultural enterprises are expected to reduce rural poverty, 
while higher terms of trade are expected to increase it. Government spending on agriculture 
includes market intervention and support for enterprises, as well as spending on the social 
sphere (e.g. village schools, local infrastructure), all of which might be expected to reduce 
rural poverty. The variable Growth, measured as the ratio of value added in agriculture to 
value added in the non-farm sectors, is included to measure the impact of ‘agriculture 
biased’ growth. As mentioned at the beginning of section 2, some authors suggest that 
agriculture biased growth reduces rural poverty. The resulting poverty equation is therefore: 
+++++= ttttt TTUnskilledSkilledGiniPoverty )log()log()log()log()log( 43210 ααααα  
tttt GrowthAgrospenRwage εααα ++++ )log()log()log( 765  
(5.1)
In the next step we introduce TFP in agriculture as a variable that influences some of 
the variables on the right hand side of equation (5.1) and, thus, ultimately influences 
poverty. 
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3.2 TFP growth and income inequality 
Equation (5.2) specifies the link between TFP growth and income inequality as 
follows:  
)log()log()log()log()log( 541210 RMWageEconactiveVATFPGini tttt δδδδδ ++++= −  
ttAgrospen ξδ ++ )log(6 . 
(5.2)
The link between agricultural productivity growth and income inequality is 
controversial. DE JANVRY & SADOULET (1995) show that “inequality can indeed increase 
with growth, and for growth to reduce inequality requires very high growth”. Due to the 
specifics of agricultural transition discussed in section 2 above, we suspect that TFP growth 
may initially increase inequality. However, the impact of TFP on inequality depends on the 
extent to which the rural poor participate and share in growth, and this is conditioned by the 
other variables on the right hand side of equation (5.2). Rapid development of the non-farm 
sector (real value added in the non-farm sector lagged by one year – VAt-1) can help absorb 
rural unemployed, thus leading to increased earnings by the poorest and reducing inequality. 
The share of the population that is economically active (Econactive) measures the 
proportion of population that is likely to share in the benefits of economic growth: the 
higher this share the lower the inequality. The real minimum wage (RMWage) is expected to 
reduce disparities between unskilled workers, who are usually paid minimum wages, and 
skilled workers. Thus, the minimum wage shifts those at the lower end of income 
distribution up, and reduces income inequality. Finally, the impact of government 
agricultural spending on income inequality depends on the nature of this spending. If it is 
devoted to the development of infrastructure, research, extension services and social 
programs for the poor, then it is likely to reduce income inequalities. However, if 
government programs primarily support profitable farms, then government spending will 
increase inequalities. There are indications that some government spending in Ukraine 
functions in this manner. For example, the government subsidises interest payments on 
commercial credits to agricultural producers provided the interest rate does not exceed 18% 
per annum. Banks only provide loans at such ‘low’ rates to larger, profitable farms, farms 
that are less likely to retain unproductive labour and more likely to introduce capital-
intensive (labour-replacing) technologies. The result can be increased inequality in the short 
run. 
3.3 TFP growth and employment 
TFP growth is postulated to influence employment of skilled and unskilled labour as 
follows: 
+++++= −− ttttt RMWageTFPTFPTFPSkilled )log()log()log()log()log( 4231210 γγγγγ  
ttCapitalha ϑγ ++ )log(5 ; and, 
(5.3)
+++++= −− ttttt RMWageTFPTFPTFPUnskilled )log()log()log()log()log( 4231210 ϕϕϕϕϕ  
ttCapitalha ϑϕ ++ )log(5 .  
(5.4)
If TFP rises due to the introduction of new technologies such as high-yielding 
varieties, the demand for skilled labour can be expected to rise. However, to the extent that 
TFP growth involves investments in capital-intensive, labour replacing technologies, the 
resulting decline in rural employment could reduce employment of unskilled labour. In the 
 63 
longer run, TPF growth will be associated with output expansion and lower prices for food 
and raw materials. This can stimulate other sectors of the economy, creating employment 
opportunities for both skilled and unskilled labour. To capture these effects, lagged TFP 
growth is included in equations (5.3) and (5.4). Otherwise, both equations postulate that 
employment is also determined by the real minimum wage (RMWage) and the availability 
of capital per hectare (Capitalha). As the minimum wage rises, unskilled labour becomes 
relatively costly, which leads to a substitution of capital (either physical or human) for 
unskilled labour. Thus, we expect that a rise in the minimum wage increases employment of 
skilled workers and reduces employment of unskilled workers. Increased availability of 
capital per ha is likely to decrease the employment of both skilled and unskilled workers.  
3.4 TFP growth and the real agricultural wage 
The relationship between TPF and real agricultural wages is specified as follows:  
+++++= −− ttttt RMWageVALabourSTFPRwage )log()log()log()log()log( 4132110 βββββ
tWestdummy ηβ ++ )_log(5 . (5.5)
TFP growth in one year is expected to lead to higher agricultural wages in the next. 
The lag is introduced to account for delays associated with agricultural production processes 
and the renegotiation of wages and other conditions of employment. Agricultural wages are 
also influenced by the minimum wage, the development of the non-farm sector (value added 
in the non-farm sector) and the supply of labour. As was mentioned above a rise in the 
minimum wage (RMWage) is expected to reduce the employment of unskilled workers (who 
receive low wages) and increase the employment of skilled workers. As a result, the average 
agricultural wage will increase. Rapid urban sector growth (VA) stimulates migration from 
rural areas, which puts upward pressure on agricultural wages. Increases supply of labour 
(LabourS) will reduce wages, ceteris paribus, and dummy_West – is a dummy variable for 
the Western oblasts of Ukraine that is incorporated to account for the fact that many workers 
in Western Ukraine migrate or work seasonally in neighbouring countries such as Poland.  
3.5 TFP growth and terms of trade 
The final equation (5.6) to be specified links TFP growth and agricultural terms of 
trade:  
ttttttt PGrowthIncomeWpriceREERTFPTT υμμμμμμ ++++++= )log()log()log()log()log()log( 543210  
Under conditions of free international trade, domestic productivity improvements 
will have no influence on agricultural commodity prices. However, in Ukraine grain prices 
fall below the export parity price in the post-harvest period for two reasons: (i) surplus grain 
cannot be moved out of the country immediately and there is an excess supply of grain on 
the market, and (ii) most farmers do not have storage facilities and are thus obliged to sell 
their crops straight away after harvesting. Hence, as a result of TFP growth the domestic 
price for grains will fall at least seasonally, thus affecting annual average prices as well. 
Besides TFP growth, domestic prices for agricultural commodities and grains in particular 
will be positively correlated with the corresponding world market price (Wprice). Incomes 
will have little impact on the numerator of TT (grain prices), since these, as just argued, are 
mainly determined by world market prices. However, rising incomes will have an impact on 
the prices of non-tradable goods (e.g. housing) and services (e.g. transportation), thus 
64  
increasing the denominator of TT. Hence, the impact of Income on TT is expected to be 
negative. Since grain is a tradable commodity, its domestic price depends on the real 
exchange rate: following a depreciation of the real exchange rate (REER) domestically-
produced tradable goods become less expensive for foreign countries, leading to increased 
export demand and prices.  
3.6 Data description and method 
Equations (5.1) through (5.6) are estimated using regional data for 25 Ukrainian 
Oblasts over 4 years (1999-2002)1, for a panel of 100 observations. To estimate the 
headcount ratio as a measure of rural poverty and income inequality, household surveys 
provided by STATE STATISTICS COMMITTEE OF UKRAINE are used. The poverty threshold 
defined by the World Bank, 1 US$ a day per capita, is used. 1 US$ in 1999 was transformed 
into the local currency using the official exchange rate in 1999. For 2000-2002 this poverty 
threshold is inflated using the consumer price index. Data on the share of workers with 
basic, secondary, incomplete and complete higher education are provided by STATE 
STATISTICS COMMITTEE, which is also the source of data on: wages paid by agricultural 
enterprises; the GDP deflator (CPI); value added in the farm and non-farm sectors; and the 
economically active population in rural areas. Government spending on agriculture is taken 
from the reports of the Ministry of Finance on local budgets. FAO statistics provide world 
market grain prices. 
TFP in Ukrainian agriculture is calculated using the Malmquist productivity index. 
The method of calculating TFP is beyond the scope of this paper; for a detailed description 
and a review of the obtained results see chapter 8 in this book. 
Clearly, the causality linking some of the variables of interest is indeterminate. For 
example, while productivity affects poverty, poverty can constrain productivity growth 
because the poor do not have access to education, public facilities and credits, which 
deteriorates their human capital and limits future TFP growth. However, the available data 
do not allow us to extend the analysis to include the causal link between initial inequality 
and poverty and TFP growth. Thus, we assume that over the relatively brief period 
considered, TFP is predetermined and causality runs exclusively from TPF to poverty via 
the variables included on the right hand side of the poverty equation (5.1)2.  
3.7 Results 
The results of the econometric analysis are summarised in table 5.1. Since our 
primary interest lies in analysing the effect of TFP growth on rural poverty, only this effect 
                                              
1  In 1999, STATE STATISTICS COMMITTEE OF UKRAINE’s methodology of collecting information on 
households’ living standards was changed. Hence, measures of inequality generated before and 
after 1999 cannot be compared. 
2  This was confirmed using endogeneity tests in which the dependent variables in equations (5.2) 
through (5.6) are regressed on all exogenous variables, i.e. variables that do not appear on the left-
hand side of these equations, and the resulting residuals are added to equation (5.1). The p-values 
of the corresponding zero coefficient tests are: 0.65, 0.93, 0.72, 0.89 and 0.36 for equations (5.2) 
through (5.6), respectively, indicating that the null hypothesis of exogeneity cannot be rejected in 
any case. 
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is discussed in the following. Note however, that most of the other variables included in the 
equations are significant and have plausible signs.  
Table 5.1: Indirect effects of TFP growth on poverty 
Explanatory 
variable Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
Explanatory 
variable Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
Poverty (equation 5.1) Inequality (equation 5.2) 
Ginit 
Skilledt 
Unskilledt 
TTt 
Rwaget 
Agrospent 
Growtht-1 
Constant 
 0.41* 
-0.92* 
-0.68** 
 0.35* 
-0.15*** 
-0.003 
-0.05 
 9.12 
0.121 
0.294 
0.302 
0.067 
0.081 
0.003 
0.037 
2.259 
TFPt 
VAt-1 
Econactivet 
RMWaget 
Agrospent 
Constant 
 0.19* 
-0.01** 
-0.27** 
-0.22** 
 0.005** 
 0.55 
  
0.062 
0.095 
0.028 
0.128 
0.002 
0.630 
 
R2        within 
            between 
            overall 
 =  0.48 
 =  0.20 
 =  0.34 
R2       within 
           between 
           overall 
=  0.17 
=  0.41 
=  0.24 
Skilled employment (equation 5.3) Unskilled employment (equation 5.4) 
TFPt 
TFPt-1 
TFPt-2 
RMWaget 
Capitalhat 
Constant 
 0.23* 
-0.11 
-0.14 
 0.21*** 
-0.13*** 
 2.98  
0.074 
0.097 
0.109 
0.114 
0.077 
0.446 
TFPt 
TFPt-1 
TFPt-2 
RMWaget 
Constant 
-0.25* 
 0.04 
 0.10 
-0.13 
 4.58 
 
0.067 
0.082 
0.100 
0.103 
0.002 
 
R2       within 
          between 
          overall 
= 0.30 
= 0.06 
= 0.14 
R2       within 
          between 
          overall 
= 0.35 
= 0.15 
= 0.24 
Real rural wage (equation 5.5) Terms-of-trade (equation 5.6) 
TFPt-1 
LabourSt 
VAt-1 
RMWaget 
Dummy_West 
Constant 
 0.28* 
-0.46* 
 0.23* 
 0.41* 
-0.22* 
 2.55 
0.075 
0.161 
0.049 
0.092 
0.069 
0.745 
TFPt 
REERt 
Wpricet 
Incomet 
PGrowtht 
Constant 
-0.16* 
 1.88* 
 3.77* 
-0.34* 
 5.19* 
 -17.64  
0.054 
0.201 
0.089 
0.026 
0.885 
0.567 
R2      within 
          between 
          overall 
= 0.76 
=  0.72 
=  0.73 
R2      within 
          between 
          overall 
= 0.98 
= 0.68 
= 0.93 
Notes:  * - significant at 1%, ** - at 5% and *** - at 10%. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
In equation (5.1), the effect of income inequality and grain prices on poverty is found 
to be significant and positive. Increases in agricultural wages and in both skilled and 
unskilled employment appear to reduce rural poverty, as does agriculture-biased economic 
growth. As expected, TFP growth increases inequality (equation 5.2): a 1% increase in TFP 
raises the Gini coefficient by 0.19%. Increases in TFP increase rural skilled employment 
(equation 5.3), but reduce in rural unskilled employment (equation 5.4). The effects of 
lagged TFP growth are not significant in these equations. As expected, TFP has a lagged, 
positive impact on wages: 1% growth in TFP results in a lagged increase in the real 
agricultural wage of 0.28% (equation 5.5). Finally, the effect of TFP growth on agricultural 
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terms of trade is significant and negative as expected (equation 5.6): a 1% increase in TFP 
results in a reduction of relative grain prices by 0.16%. 
The aggregate impact of TFP change in the current period on the incidence of rural 
poverty can be calculated as follows: 
ttttt TFP
TT
TT
Poverty
TFP
Unskilled
Unskilled
Poverty
TFP
Skilled
Skilled
Poverty
TFP
Gini
Gini
Poverty
dTFP
dPoverty
∂
∂⋅∂
∂+∂
∂⋅∂
∂+∂
∂⋅∂
∂+∂
∂⋅∂
∂= . 
The partial derivatives are the coefficients of the model taken from equations (5.1) 
through (5.4) and (5.6). Multiplying the corresponding coefficients and adding up indicates 
that a 1% growth in TFP reduces the incidence of rural poverty by 0.02%. Since the rural 
headcount index accounted for 39% or about 5.8 mill. rural inhabitants in 2002, 1% TFP 
growth would have reduced this number by 1160 persons. This is evidence that due to the 
complex trade-offs discussed above, TFP growth in agriculture yields only marginal net 
benefits to the rural poor. 
The aggregate impact of lagged TFP growth on rural poverty can be found using 
equations (5.1) and (5.5) as: 
11 −− ∂
∂
∂
∂=
tt TFP
RWage
RWage
Poverty
dTFP
dPoverty . 
Substituting the corresponding coefficients indicates that 1% TFP growth triggers a 
lagged 0.04% reduction in the incidence of rural poverty. Combining the contemporaneous 
and lagged effect of TFP growth indicates that within two years 1% growth in TFP can 
produce a net reduction in the number of the rural poor by 0.06% or 3480 people.  
Summarising, the findings show that in the early recovery stage, TFP growth has a 
net poverty reducing impact that is, however, small due to the complex trade-offs discussed 
above. 
4 Conclusions and policy options 
In this paper we explore the theoretical and empirical relationships between 
agricultural TFP growth and rural poverty in Ukraine. The results reveal that TFP growth 
has positive spill-over effects in the form of increased real earnings from agricultural 
activities and increased employment of skilled workers. At the same time, TFP growth 
increases disparities between rich and poor and reduces the employment of unskilled labour. 
Due to these trade-offs, the poverty reduction resulting from agricultural TFP growth in 
Ukraine is quite low: within two years a 1% increase in agricultural TFP decreases the 
incidence of rural poverty by only 0.06%.  
These findings provide a justification for policies that reinforce the poverty 
alleviation impacts of TFP growth in Ukrainian agriculture. First, progressive taxation and a 
functioning social security net can help to ensure that those who are squeezed out of work in 
the course of the restructuring that accompanies productivity growth are not forced into 
poverty. Policies that encourage factor, especially labour, mobility and the accumulation of 
human capital (education, research and extension) can also play an important role. Second, 
since a large proportion of the rural poor is increasingly dependent on off-farm employment 
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for wages, the government should launch rural public works programs that would absorb 
unskilled labour laid-off as a result of agricultural TFP growth.  
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6 Agricultural Policy versus Rural Policy: Core Tasks and 
Joint Responsibilities 
ARNIM KUHN & SERHIY DEMYANENKO 
1 Old and new policy concepts for rural areas 
The farm sector is expected to contribute to overall welfare in Ukraine by delivering 
high-quality food at low prices and by generating employment and export earnings. 
However, agriculture is also responsible for what happens on the lion’s share of Ukraine’s 
land. Furthermore, one third of the Ukrainian population lives in rural areas, and most of 
this rural population still depends to a large extent on agriculture. Since independence, 
agricultural policy in the narrow sense of production and prices in Ukraine has had a mixed 
record; undeniable successes have been overshadowed by generally slow progress towards a 
vital, market-oriented sector. The picture does not improve when policies for rural areas in 
general are considered. Today, there is no coherent development concept for rural areas in 
Ukraine, and policy responsibilities are not clearly defined. This chapter develops policy 
goals and concepts for both rural areas and the agricultural sector. 
1.1 Current agricultural policy approaches 
The major problem of the agricultural sector in Ukraine today is its low level of 
productivity. Despite Ukraine’s often-cited production potential, despite rising trends in 
world market prices for the major export crops and products, triggered by increasing world 
demand, and despite swift economic growth in the rest of the economy; large parts of 
Ukrainian agriculture continue to stumble rather than stride into the future. According to 
agronomic experts, current crop yield levels could almost be doubled in the near future, if 
the so-called ‘productivity gap’ could be closed1. 
Agricultural policy and the activities of the Ministry of Agricultural Policy (MAP) 
have focused on improving the conditions for the agricultural sector. Unfortunately, most of 
these policies have largely failed to tackle the productivity gap. The reason for this is that 
the implicit goals of this policy have not been targeted at productivity increases, but rather 
at sustaining existing structures and procedures by granting aid2 and tax breaks to producers, 
and attempting to control prices and quantities on output (e.g. grains, sunflower seed and 
sugar) and input (e.g. machinery and credit) markets. Import protection for farm machinery, 
for example, may provide support to the domestic farm machinery industry. But it also 
forces farmers to pay more for the machines that they need (or to work with lower quality 
machines than they otherwise could). In this way, the productivity gap is sustained. 
                                              
1 See chapter 11 Farm Management Challenges in Ukrainian Agriculture for a further discussion 
on the subject.  
2 See the budget figures later in this chapter and the discussion in chapter 2 Shifting Agricultural 
Policy towards Measures Envisaged by the Green Box. Almost 40% of Ukraine’s agricultural 
budget is spent on the financial support of production or farms. 
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Policy has also been inconsistent in its attempt to support the farm sector. While 
farmers receive tax breaks and some subsidies on the one hand, they are indirectly taxed by 
export taxes and bureaucratic ‘monitoring and control’ of markets on the other. Policy 
makers are ‘stepping on the gas and the brakes’ at the same time, thus damaging the car 
while not getting very far. 
1.2 Core competences versus shared responsibilities 
What is agricultural policy about? Many actors in agricultural policy believe that the 
agricultural sector is basically identical with the rural economy. However, this view is 
antiquated. ‘Rural’ is a geographic concept, and agriculture is only one of many economic 
sectors and activities that take place in rural areas. Thus, agricultural policy should not 
strive to assume responsibility for the whole range of rural development issues such as the 
social situation in rural areas, rural infrastructure, medicine, schools etc. This is primarily 
the task of other Ministries (Economy, Infrastructure, Education, Social Policy). The MAP 
should focus on its core competences, because this will make successful work much more 
likely. Clearly, experts from the MAP must collaborate in inter-ministerial rural policy 
working groups. Policies aimed at rural areas are a shared responsibility in which 
agriculture plays an important but by no means exclusive role. Rural development should be 
regarded as a cross-sectional task to be coordinated between several Ministries. 
In the next Section we make suggestions on what should be considered the core 
competence of an agricultural policy that is aimed at increased the productivity of the sector. 
Then we deal with rural development policy as a prominent example of a joint responsibility 
of agricultural policy to be shared with other policy areas. 
2 Core competences: New goals for agricultural policy 
2.1 Developing coherent policy goals 
Agricultural policy makers in Ukraine should adopt a realistic set of agricultural 
policy goals against which individual policy measures can be evaluated. In a market 
economy, agricultural policy should enable agriculture to: 
• Create real value added through high productivity. 
• Supply high-quality products; and, 
• Contribute to preserving nature and landscape. 
The main intentions behind these policy goals are as follows: 
2.1.1 Create real value added through high productivity 
The purpose of any economic activity is to produce goods the value of which is 
higher than the value of the resources required for their production. Higher production 
efficiency increases the value added from production, while direct or indirect subsidies from 
budget funds or through the taxation of competing imports decrease value added, as they 
increase resource costs for the total economy. Policy should focus on fostering technical 
progress and avoid prolonged heavy subsidisation, trade protection, and other distortions of 
market outcomes. Following this principle is the basic way to ensure that agriculture 
delivers a real contribution to overall economic growth. 
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2.1.2 Supply high-quality products 
Food (domestic or imported) has to be available in sufficient quantities in order to 
cover the nutritional needs of the population, but it is also important that it is healthy and 
safe. Moreover, if Ukraine is to benefit from the export of agricultural raw materials and 
processed food products, product quality is an important factor in determining 
competitiveness on domestic and international markets. 
2.1.3 Contribute to preserving nature and landscape 
Agricultural production has widespread ecological consequences. The use of 
fertilisers and chemicals affects groundwater quality and biodiversity. Moreover, the 
structure of fields and the patterns of agricultural production shape the rural landscape, 
which defines the feeling of ‘being at home’ for citizens, as well as the attractiveness of the 
countryside for tourism. An increasingly important aspect is animal welfare, i.e. that 
animals are held under decent conditions and do not suffer unnecessarily. 
All these goals are compatible with a market economy, and they do not force 
agricultural policy makers to support agricultural producers in a way which finally leads to 
excess surpluses and consequent conflicts with international trade partners. But there are 
conflicts between these goals which have to be overcome through compromises. Efficient 
production and competitiveness can conflict with ecological considerations. A compromise 
could consist in setting minimum ecological standards and supporting the competitiveness 
of organic farming in Ukraine. 
Among these goals, priorities should be defined. The core priority should be to 
increase productivity subject to constraints such as the maintenance of minimum food 
reserves3, quality standards and environmental standards. 
2.2 Measures to achieve these agricultural policy goals 
2.2.1 Create maximum real value added through high productivity 
The reforms in the agricultural sector should be continued by allowing land sales and 
bankruptcy procedures. It is very important to raise the educational standards in the 
agricultural labour force by introducing advisory services, updating curricula and 
broadening education contents for agricultural professionals, as the productivity gap is 
predominantly caused by a lack of skills. Moreover, plant and animal pest control and 
prevention systems should be improved. The influence of state bodies on commodity 
markets has to be strictly limited to give producers the freedom to make market-oriented 
decisions. Direct and indirect subsidies should be abolished, and the freed funds used for 
long-term investments in public services in the area of agriculture (see above). Finally, 
joining the WTO as soon as possible in order to ensure fair treatment by international trade 
partners in the future should remain a first priority4. 
                                              
3  See chapter 14 The 2003 Wheat Crisis and Food Security for a discussion of food security and 
reserve stocks. 
4  See chapter 1 The Implications of WTO-Accession for Agricultural Policy in Ukraine.  
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2.2.2 Supply high-quality products 
Competition on the food market should be enhanced by breaking up remaining 
regional monopolies. Only competition makes producers supply high quality products at 
reasonable prices. In addition, quality standards for agricultural products that are consistent 
with international standards are required. On the other hand, existing inspection services 
should be adapted to new, international standards, and instances of corruption and bribery 
involving the inspection services should be aggressively prosecuted. The initiation of 
regional food quality labels might help farmers to market their products both domestically 
and abroad. 
2.2.3 Contribute to preserving nature and landscape 
Environmental standards for the use of fertilisers and pesticides, feed quality, and 
animal welfare need to be introduced. This will make it easier to market Ukrainian produce 
as ‘ecologically clean’, and may enable farmer to charge a mark-up for inherent ‘process 
quality’. Cooperating with the Ministry for Environment and the state bodies responsible for 
tourism is mandatory in the area of land management, for instance to turn marginal lands 
into nature reserves or allocate them to extensive production is another area. 
The (non-exhaustive) suggestions contain some ‘do not’ elements aimed at reducing 
interventionism. Hence, this is partially – but not exclusively – an agenda for state 
inactivity. Uncoordinated and ad hoc activity by various state organisations as well as 
regional and local authorities is extremely damaging to agriculture and must be reined in. 
The ‘do’ elements, however, require a lot of activity from the Ministry of Agricultural 
Policy, many of them in areas that have received little attention so far, at least when 
measured in terms of budget priorities in recent years. 
2.3 Consequences for the agricultural budget 
What consequences would the priorities outlined above have on the state budget? On 
the revenue side, indirect tax exemptions should be phased out within several years. On the 
other hand, taxation of agriculture through export taxes and export VAT refund arrears 
should be abandoned. On the expenditure side, individual items of agriculture policy 
spending should be evaluated against their potential to increase the productivity of 
Ukrainian farms. 
Table 6.1 presents an overview of the agricultural budget in Ukraine for the years 
2003 and 2004. At slightly more than 3.5 bUAH in 2004, the agricultural budget made up 
5% of the state budget of Ukraine. In order evaluate whether the budget is likely to 
contribute to the suggested policy priorities, we distinguish between productivity-decreasing 
expenditures, productivity-enhancing expenditures, and neutral expenditures. Among the 
productivity-decreasing expenditures we consider financial support, direct payments and 
administrative expenditures. These types of spending maintain inefficient structures and 
therefore tend to reduce the productivity of Ukrainian agriculture in the long run. 
Administrative expenditure, while not directly affecting productivity, will tend to increase 
the power of the bureaucracy and the potential for intervention that distorts markets and 
reduces productivity. Together, productivity-reducing measures account for almost 50% of 
the agricultural budget. 
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Table 6.1: Assessment of the agricultural budget in 2003 and 2004 
 Share in 2003 (%) 
Share in 2004 
(%) 
Change 
2003/04 
(%) 
Change 
2003/04 
(percentage points) 
Financial support 38.9 36.1 -7.2 -2.8 
Direct payments 4.9 4.1 -18.0 -0.8 
Administrative expenditures 4.8 8.9 +85.8 +4.1 
R&D, education, training 23.0 30.4 +32.6 +7.4 
Land reform 7.5 2.2 -70.9 -5.3 
Pest and crop disease control 2.0 2.1 +3.3 +0.1 
Inspection services 15.6 11.5 -26.2 -4.1 
Rural development 0.7 0.7 +3.4 +0.0 
Reserve stock accumulation 1.0 2.0 +105.1 +1.0 
Environmental protection 1.7 2.0 +23.3 +0.3 
Expenditures with a negative 
productivity impact (1-3) 48.6 49.1 0.9 0.5 
Expenditures with a positive 
productivity impact (4-6) 32.5 34.7 6.9 2.2 
Expenditures with a neutral 
productivity impact (7-10) 18.9 16.2 -14.2 -2.7 
Source: Laws of Ukraine “On Budget of Ukraine” (diff. years). 
There are also measures which are useful or necessary, but have a neutral impact on 
productivity growth. Among these are inspection services, which are supposed to guarantee 
product quality, but which can also be misused to extort bribes from producers and 
processors. The share of these measures in the budget is decreasing, mainly because 
inspection services have been slimmed down. 
Measures that are likely to increase the economic productivity of agricultural 
production are research, education and training, land reform, and disease control. These 
measures account for slightly more than one-third of the budget, and the significantly 
increased expenditures on research and training in the 2004 budget are definitely a positive 
signal. The share of spending on land reform, on the other hand, is reduced, which may have 
to do with the prospect of having these activities financed by a World Bank loan during the 
next years. 
The high share of unspecific financial support to producers under the productivity-
decreasing measures (almost 50%) indicates that there is still considerable financial leeway 
for agricultural policy to change course and adopt long run, productivity-enhancing 
priorities. 
3 Rural policy as a joint responsibility 
Rural policy is going to be one of the dominant issues in Ukrainian economics over 
the next years, touching on regional development, social security systems, infrastructure 
maintenance and development, sustaining economic growth, and many other issues. Rural 
policy is basically about two issues: a) delivering public services in rural areas, particularly 
physical and social infrastructure, and b) supporting economic development in rural areas. 
In addition to its core tasks in agricultural policy, the MAP can and should also contribute to 
this joint task together with other ministries. In this section we define the role of rural areas, 
point out the challenges and dilemmas that rural policy faces under the special 
circumstances in Ukraine, and make recommendations for policy. 
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3.1 The economic role of rural areas 
It is a common mistake to equate agricultural and rural development. This mistake 
results in rural policies that are biased towards agriculture, neglecting other economic 
activities, and thereby contributing to the ongoing depopulation and economic degradation 
of the countryside. In order to arrive at a reasonable policy agenda, there has to be a clear 
idea about the role of rural areas for the well-being of Ukrainians, both villagers and city-
dwellers. What benefits do rural areas deliver to Ukrainian citizens? 
• Rural areas deliver food through a functioning agricultural sector and thus contribute 
to material needs of all citizens. At the low income levels prevailing in Ukraine, food 
prices play an important role in consumer budgets5. 
• Rural areas are the economic basis for many professions including farming but also 
forestry, inland fisheries and tourism. However, rural areas can be much more. Any 
larger village or small city should offer various public and private goods and services 
for the people who live there. In most rural areas in Germany, for example, 
agriculture and forestry play only a marginal role for the creation of value added and 
employment. 
• Rural areas provide living space for the rural population. As such, they need to be 
endowed with basic infrastructure. An increasing number of city dwellers in Ukraine 
will probably move to rural areas around the cities and commute to work in the next 
decade. These new rural inhabitants will be looking for places to build their houses, 
and will demand local schools, health care and other public services. Other, more 
remote rural areas will probably be faced with out-migration and an ageing 
population. Rural areas are already diverse and will probably become increasingly so 
in the future, ranging from the rural/urban fringes of agglomerations such as Kiev to 
remote, agriculture-dominated regions especially in the centre and west of the 
country. Rural policy will have to be flexible to deal with this diversity. 
• Another important role of rural areas is that they offer opportunities for recreation. 
There are many beautiful areas around cities which already today are used for 
household plots, cottages and other leisure purposes. More remote areas might offer 
sports-focused tourism. For that reason it is important to preserve nature and what is 
generally referred to as the ‘multifunctional’ and ‘cultural’ landscape.  
• Another important reason for preservation efforts is that rural areas and forests in 
particular deliver ecological goods such as clean water and air. Misusing the 
countryside as a garbage dump; the use of too much fertilizer and pesticides in 
intensive agricultural production; the building of roads and pipelines in sensitive 
areas: all have the potential to damage the ecological balance and endanger rare 
species. 
A sustainable balance between all of these functions constitutes the vision for the 
future of rural areas in Ukraine. Agriculture is an important part of that vision, and must 
                                              
5 Food security issues are discussed in chapter 14 The 2003 Wheat Crisis and Food Security, and 
chapter 5 Agricultural Productivity Growth: a Vehicle for Rural Poverty Reduction in Ukraine? 
presents an empirical assessment of the impact of agricultural growth on prices and poverty in 
Ukraine.  
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contribute to it. But the MAP can and should not claim sole responsibility for determining 
rural policy in Ukraine. Agricultural priorities are not synonymous with optimal rural 
development and must be balanced and tempered by other inputs into the policy making 
process. Rural policy is an ambitious, horizontal task that should be coordinated between 
several ministries. 
3.2 Dilemmas facing rural policy in Ukraine 
Taking into account their various functions, developing a coherent policy strategy for 
rural areas is a complex task. Moreover, rural policy faces several dilemmas. The most 
important of these is demography: Rural areas need investments to improve living 
conditions, but negative population growth and the out-migration of rural inhabitants from 
many small settlements will probably continue. The projections of the UN Population 
Division for Ukraine suggest that its rural population will decrease by one-third in the next 
25 years (Figure 6.1). 
Figure 6.1: Past and projected population development in Ukraine 
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Source:  UN Population Division. 
A related dilemma concerns structural change of the rural economy in the course of 
technical progress in general and the special demands of the transition from collective to 
private agriculture. Rural development and diversification in Ukraine will require the 
massive creation of non-agricultural jobs, especially since farms restructuring will continue 
to decrease the number of purely agricultural jobs6. But in remote rural areas with a general 
                                              
6  This implication of agricultural growth is discussed in detail in chapter 5 Agricultural 
Productivity Growth: a Vehicle for Rural Poverty Reduction in Ukraine? Specifically, the 
empirical analysis in chapter 5 shows that agricultural productivity growth as a negative impact 
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trend to out-migration, there are few promising business alternatives to agriculture and 
related services. 
The following conclusions can be drawn: 
• Existing rural policy concepts for developing countries should not be copied, as these 
are rather designed to deal with booming populations under increasing resource 
pressure. Ukraine’s countryside is not confronted with these problems. 
• Instead, rural policy designs should explicitly anticipate the demographic and 
economic trends and go along with them. It is certainly futile to try to ‘stem the tide’ 
of rural depopulation by administrative means or by propping up inefficient 
enterprises. Rural economies can create jobs, provided the right infrastructure and 
skilled labour is available. This is where policy can play a role, by investing in these 
forms of capital and making it as easy and un-bureaucratic as possible to start up new 
enterprises.  
• Policy goals for rural areas should be modest and measurable. Otherwise, huge 
budget funds could be wasted. 
• Proper local targeting is a major challenge facing rural policy. Therefore, rural 
development should be based on the principle of local participation, combined with 
local responsibility for co-financing. In the case of Ukraine, this requires more fiscal 
independence for regional and local jurisdictions. 
• A project approach should be adopted, oriented at specific goals. Small, locally based 
projects have proven to work better than complex national programmes.  
• Projects, once approved, should run over several years and should not be subject to 
frequent renegotiation. The need to reapply every year for funds leads to political 
influence and lengthy bargaining procedures that reduce transparency and efficiency. 
It also makes it almost impossible to make the sort of long-run investments that are 
most needed. 
4 Fields of action for rural policy 
Rural development is a complex issue. Besides agriculture it encompasses questions 
such as the development of roads, transport systems, communication, gas and water supply, 
sewer systems, health care, education, culture, household services, agricultural and non-
agricultural businesses and employment. Beyond agriculture, the following fields of action 
seem to be most urgent and promising: 
Non-agricultural employment. Many new jobs in rural areas will be created in 
sectors that service agriculture or process agricultural products. Moreover, there will be 
increasing demand for services for rural households. However, developing these businesses 
is a task for the private sector and not for the state. Public support could come in the form of 
ensuring business-friendly environments by fighting both corruption and the harassment of 
small or newly established businesses. Moreover, technical, social and cultural 
                                                                                                                                                      
on the employment of unskilled labour in Ukraine, but a positive impact on the employment of 
skilled labour. 
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infrastructure plays an important role in attracting businesses. In areas with a potential for 
tourism, effective environmental policies play a crucial role. 
Physical infrastructure. The supply and maintenance of infrastructure is a core 
public activity in regional and rural policy. While the road network is fairly well developed 
in Ukraine, much could be done to extend the telecommunications network in order to 
improve the business environment, particularly through the use of the internet. The various 
utility networks (water, electricity, sanitation) are in need of repair and reform. 
Social infrastructure. One of the most pressing issues is improved health care. 
Providing such care in thinly populated rural areas is a difficult challenge especially when, 
as in Ukraine, health care provision even in the urban centres such as Kiev is poor and 
deteriorating. Health care is needed to help the aging rural population, but also to ensure that 
rural areas remain attractive places for raising families. Tobacco, drug and alcohol addiction 
and AIDS are extremely costly afflictions for individuals and enterprises, and increased 
investment in prevention should be a priority. 
Education and training. Finally, education in rural areas is a problem that is often 
underestimated. According to international statistics, almost 100% of Ukraine’s population 
is literate. However, much physical infrastructure and large parts of the curricula in medium 
and higher education in Ukraine are outdated. The level of professional and vocational 
training in particular is below international standards. This hinders the adoption of modern 
technologies and management techniques in agriculture which, in turn, contributes to 
persistent low productivity. Ukraine may be able to import capital and technologies from 
abroad, but an educated and well-trained workforce has to be mainly ‘home grown’. Policy 
makers in Ukraine have largely neglected investment in education and research. Due to the 
demographic problems in rural areas, providing sufficient schooling and training 
opportunities in rural areas will be a challenging task. 
Almost all ministries can and should be involved in rural policy issues. The list of 
participating ministries should contain the Ministry of Economy as the coordinating body, 
and the Ministries of Transport and Communication, Labour and Social Issues, Health Care, 
Science and Education, and Agrarian Policy as ‘sectoral’ specialists. 
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Part II: 
Farm Enterprises and Economic Reform in 
Ukraine 
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7 Ensuring Competition on the Market for Lease Land in 
Ukraine 
ARNIM KUHN & SERHIY DEMYANENKO 
1 Introduction 
Until the end of communism land was the property of the state. During the period of 
transition towards a market economy, private ownership of land has been established step 
by step. Thus, the real restructuring of the former collective farms (CAEs) which started in 
the year 2000 is creating a new class of small landowners. These new landowners basically 
have two options for the use of this productive asset. Of course they can set up their own 
farms, but most of them opt for leasing out their land plots to other agricultural enterprises, 
be they small or large farm units. Most of these landowners are pensioners for whom the 
lease payments constitute an important source of income. These individuals will be 
interested in keeping the shadow price of land reflected in the lease payments as high as 
possible. 
On the other hand, large farms (former CAEs), or newly established private farms 
which want to increase their acreage, are now forced pay for a productive asset which was 
basically available for free in the past. Land users and landowners constitute the main agents 
on the market for agricultural land in Ukraine. This paper deals with the problem of 
ensuring competition on the market for lease land given the land use structure and 
distribution of property in Ukraine. 
Without doubt it is true that the existence of landowners makes agricultural 
production more expensive by imposing additional costs on agricultural producers. 
Landowners receive a rent from their land, a kind of income they get in exchange for the 
exclusive right to receive the fruits and benefits of land which is now enjoyed by the tenant. 
One could argue that the large share of lease land drains monetary resources from Ukrainian 
farmers and thus constitutes a burden on their competitiveness. On the other hand, any 
decision to transfer the main part of agricultural land to the property funds of large former 
CAEs would have finalised the expropriation of millions of small landowners under 
communism. The restitution of this land to its original owners was no longer possible after 
so many decades, but there was a broad consensus in society that this land should be 
returned to the people on a broad basis.  
The most important function of a land market in a market economy is to facilitate the 
‘movement’ of land from less efficient to more efficient producers. However, the emerging 
land market in Ukraine is burdened with two major inter-linked factors: high transaction 
costs and an inequality in bargaining power between tenants and landowners. This has the 
inevitable consequence that much agricultural land in Ukraine is worked by inefficient 
farms, simply because these farms are very large and headed by directors who are very 
influential in their communities. The empirical analysis in this paper indicates a strong 
positive relation between the number of private family farms, competition on the market for 
lease land, and lease land prices.  
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2 Why are transaction costs too high? 
Transaction costs are costs which arise when two or more economic agents 
(individuals, enterprises) want to conclude a business deal. They have to look for and find 
one another, and then they have to undergo a certain procedure (contracts, notary) to 
legalise the transaction. Thus, transaction costs originate from uncertainty and the need for 
information and security. To understand this better, imagine a land rental transaction from 
the perspective of the landowner and the tenant, respectively. 
After the expiration of a lease contract, the landowner has the choice between: a) the 
continuation of the contract with the same tenant; b) finding another tenant; c) working the 
land by himself; and d) selling the land to someone else. All these alternatives imply 
different transaction costs. If we assume that the land plot is located somewhere within a 
large field (which is probably the case for most land plots in Ukraine), the cheapest option is 
to simply continue the contract. Alternatives b) and d) require finding a new tenant or a 
buyer, which may be difficult because the land plot may be very small and therefore not 
interesting to other farmers unless many landowners with adjoining plots all agree to follow 
the same course of action (which would also involve high transaction costs). Option c) 
would not require this. But any withdrawal of land (when located in the middle of a field) 
from the present tenant would require an exchange of land parcels, either with a landowner 
from the same field when our landowner intends to work the land himself, or with a 
landowner from another field or even village. In the latter case, if the reason the landowner 
wishes to cancel the contract is that the tenant does not pay enough (maybe because he is an 
inefficient farmer), he will have a tough job to convince someone else to entrust his land to 
that tenant. Even if one cuts out a small rectangle on the border of a field, it will be less 
convenient for the farmer to carry out fieldwork with huge machinery, which may lead to 
conflicts between landowner and the former tenant. The consequence of all these 
considerations – which have probably gone through the heads of hundreds of thousands of 
new Ukrainian landowners already – is that land transactions are very costly, and that it is 
better to wait for a favourable offer or to collude with other landowners instead of seeking 
opportunities on one’s own. The high level of transaction costs originates from both 
information deficiencies and the fact that land is immobile and cannot be physically moved 
to another tenant or owner. 
From the perspective of the tenant the situation looks somewhat more favourable, 
particularly when the tenant is a large former CAE. In many cases tenants deal with former 
workers of the CAE, mostly a whole village. This makes it much easier to rally all the 
owners of plots in one or several fields and come to an agreement. This does not say 
anything about the price a tenant is likely to pay in the end, but only about the costs of 
concluding the transactions. If a tenant does not want to continue a contract, he simply 
informs the assembly of landowners, or all owners individually. 
A medium-sized private farmer may face more difficulties if he intends to change his 
land use, e.g. enlarging his acreage. He has to find a proper field where tenure contracts are 
about to expire, and he has to convince the owners. For a newly established farmer, this may 
be somewhat more difficult (lack of trust on the part of the landowners) than for a long-
established former CAE. But this is an empirical question. 
Generally speaking, transaction costs on the land lease market in Ukraine are quite 
high for the landowners, and considerably lower for the average tenant. This means that the 
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initiative is mostly on the part of the tenant, and it is the tenant who will initiate a change 
when it is in his best interests to do so. As for the landowners, they will not so easily change 
their tenure relations. The reason is the particular land property and use structure in Ukraine, 
which as a legacy of the planned economy has led to a very unequal ratio of relatively few 
large tenants (probably around 14 thousand) to many small landowners (about 7 millions). 
3 How high transaction costs hamper competition in the 
land market 
As already explained in the previous section, high transaction costs for land market 
transactions can be found in Ukraine. These costs are mainly a burden for landowners 
willing to transact land, while most tenants can act more easily. This creates a power 
asymmetry on the land lease market. Large farms can exercise a certain degree of market 
power (in this case monopsony power), which means that they can force the price of leased 
land below the level which would be determined by the market if the size relations were 
more equitable. Landowners often have little choice but to lease, and often have little choice 
regarding to whom they can lease their land. The immediate consequences are: 
• Land market transactions are relatively seldom. 
• The land use patterns change only slowly. 
• The emergence of new small and medium-sized farms is going at a slow pace. 
• Land lease prices are relatively low. 
• Land prices (as a property item) are low as well; and, 
• Land is not attractive as collateral for credits. 
This list of consequences allows us to construct the following causal chain: land 
property/use structures create an unequal distribution of land market transaction costs. 
These lead to monopsonistic land market relations that, in turn, mean thin land markets and 
depressed prices for land. In the end, low land prices are a reason for the lack of credit due 
to the low level of collateral value. This creates problems for exactly the same large farms 
which seem to benefit from the current situation of low land lease prices. However, in the 
long run the number of landowners will probably decline due to sales to large farms or 
investors. This will lower the transaction costs in land markets and thus ease the 
“migration” of land to the better farmers.  
4 Competition for land and lease prices: Some empirical 
evidence 
The considerations above suggest that where there are several farmers on the land of 
a former CAE, the competition among them for lease land should lead to higher land prices. 
Tables 7.1 and 7.2 present information on land lease payments and the number of tenant 
farms competing for lease land. This information clearly indicates that there is a direct 
positive correlation between the number of competing farms on the land market and the 
level of the lease payments – the higher the competition level, the higher is the level of lease 
payments. 
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Table 7.1: The relationship between the number of tenant farmers per thd. ha and 
the level of the lease payments per ha across all oblasts of Ukraine in 2001 
Land lease payments UAH per ha Tenant farmers 
per thd. has 
Number of oblasts 
in a group Minimum Maximum Average 
1 3 46.0 68.3 57.1 
2 8 48.3 103.6 71.6 
3 and more 14 57.1 116.0 84.5 
Source:  STATE STATISTICS COMMITTEE OF UKRAINE (2002a); own calculations.  
Of course, lease payments are influenced by other factors as well, such as the climate 
zone and soil quality. For instance, the Transkarpathian region has the highest level of farms 
per thd. ha (28 farms). But this region represents a special case where natural conditions 
play a key role – limited quantity of land, which is moreover difficult to work due to its 
hilly profile. To eliminate these factors, we compare two oblasts which have the same 
natural conditions but different levels of land lease competition (see table 7.2). In Kharkiv 
oblast, where there is only one farm per thd. ha of leased land, the lease payment is 
68.3 UAH/ha and year. In Kherson oblast with 5 farms per thd. ha, average lease payments 
are 110.5 UAH/ha or 61.8% higher than in Kharkiv. In Kherson, higher levels of average 
profit per farm and per ha are found, but at the same time the yields of grain and sunflower 
seeds, the main commercial crops, are lower in Kherson than in Kharkiv (grain 26.5 and 
30.2 dt/ha, respectively; sunflower seed 5.5 and 12.4 dt/ha, respectively). Hence, greater 
competition for lease land has not hindered farms in Kherson from becoming more 
profitable than their counterparts in Kharkiv. Competition in the land market leads to higher 
farm productivity and efficiency, because competition helps to drive under-performers out 
of the market.  
Table 7.2: Main indicators of agricultural enterprises’ activities in Kharkiv and 
Kherson oblasts in 2001 
Indicators Kharkiv oblast  
(with ~ 1 farm per 1 000 ha) 
Kherson oblast  
(with ~ 5 farms per 1 000 ha) 
 Minimum Maximum Average Minimum Maximum Average 
Size of farms, ha  10 10974 2980 18 15063  3098 
Number of workers per farm 2 980 160 16 979 185 
Value of assets, thd. UAH 6 109768 15812 7 108515 9560 
Profit, thd. UAH 2 980 160 1.2 6988 468 
Profit, UAH per ha  0.1 7069 142.9 0.8 12049 318.5 
Lease payment, UAH per ha 2.2 483.3 68.3 0.7 1309.0 110.5 
Source: STATE STATISTICS COMMITTEE OF UKRAINE (2002b); own calculations. 
To study these questions in greater detail, the results of a small econometric analysis 
are presented in the following. The dependent variable in the analysis is the average lease 
price in an oblast, while soil quality and the competition for lease land are chosen as 
explanatory variables. The average yield (in dt/ha) of wheat in an oblast serves as a proxy 
for soil quality, while competition is reflected in the ratio between former CAEs and new 
private family farms as reported in regional statistics. The higher the ratio of private to 
former collective farms (labelled Farm Ratio below), the higher is the assumed level of 
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competition for farmland. The results of the regression are presented in the following 
equation (with standard errors in square brackets)1: 
[ ] [ ] [ ]138.1071.1023.25
445.0)(976.2)(540.2351.5 2 =++= RratioFarmYieldpriceLease . 
These estimates can be interpreted as follows: an increase in the yield by dt/ha 
increases the lease price by 2.54 UAH/ha, while a doubling of the number of private farmers 
keeping the number of former CAEs constant increases the lease payment by 2.98 UAH/ha. 
Hence, as expected the results reveal a clearly positive relation between soil quality (proxied 
by yield levels) and lease prices. But the interesting finding is that the more private farms 
exist in comparison to former CAEs, the higher are the lease prices in a region. The more 
private farms the bigger the land market, the more intense the competition for land, and the 
higher the lease prices. The R2 of 0.445 signals that the fit of the regression is fairly good, as 
almost 45% of the variation in actual lease prices is explained by the exogenous variables. 
Figure 7.1 compares the actual and the estimated lease price in each oblast, corrected 
for the influence of regional yield levels. The positive relation between competition in the 
form of more private farms per former CAE in a region and land lease prices is clear. At 
first glance this relationship will benefit landowners, many of whom are pensioners who are 
dependent on additional income due to low pension entitlements. Of course, higher land 
lease prices increase costs for agricultural enterprises who rent land. However, private farms 
may benefit from higher land prices relative to former CAEs. Their share of own land is 
much higher than for the former CAEs, and a higher value of this asset will increase their 
access to long-term credit. 
                                              
1  A more detailed presentation of the data employed and the regression results can be found in the 
Appendix. 
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Figure 7.1: The relationship between competition (ratio of private farms to former 
collective agricultural enterprises) and yield-corrected lease payments in 
the oblasts of Ukraine 
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Source:  Own calculations using the data and regression results in the Appendix. 
5 Recommendations 
In order to increase the competition for lease land, the conditions for setting up new 
private farms should be improved. A possible contribution of agricultural policy could be to 
avoid any discrimination against small farms when it comes to subsidies and other support. 
Beyond that, the following approaches could be pursued:  
1. The empirical results of this study show that private family farms can play a key role 
in creating livelier markets for lease land. Local authorities should create the 
necessary conditions for the development of private family farms. They should help 
potential farmers with farm registration and getting land titles. 
2. On the national level the land legislation should be improved. This concerns the law 
on the distribution of land parcels among the landowners, and possibilities to 
exchange the land parcels in case of changing the lessees.  
3. The high costs of land transactions could be lowered by institutional innovations. 
Any steps suited to improve the access to information for landowners could help 
small market agents to find business partners: both those willing to exchange land 
plots, and alternative lease takers. An improved framework for the role of real estate 
agents in rural areas could help to create the critical mass of supply and demand 
necessary for the Ukrainian land market to function. 
86  
4. The state still owns a lot of agricultural land which needs to be distributed. The 
manner in which this is done can have a very important influence on local land 
markets, creating or stifling competition.  
5. Moreover, information campaigns and legal recourse have to be offered to 
landowners, most of them poor people living in remote places. The rights of land-
owning peasants who are perhaps not accustomed to standing up to local authorities 
must be protected, especially since these peasants are often very dependent on the 
goodwill of local authorities and can be subjected to considerable pressure. 
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7 Appendix 
Appendix Table 7.1: Detailed regression results – lease prices as a function of soil 
quality and competition intensity using data from 25 oblasts 
in Ukraine  
Regressions-Statistics
Multiple Correlation 0.667
R^2 0.445
Adjust. R^2 0.395
Standard Error 14.449
Observations 25
ANOVA
Degrees of freedom F-Value F critical
Regression 2 8.822 0.002
Residue 22
Gesamt 24
Coefficients Standard Error t-Statistic P-Value
Intercept 5.351 25.023 0.214 0.833
Average yield 1999-2001 2.540 1.071 2.372 0.027
Farm ratio 2.976 1.138 2.616 0.016  
Source: Own calculations using the data in Appendix table 7.2. 
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Appendix Table 7.2: Data on land lease in the oblasts of Ukraine (2001) 
Oblast Total land 
lease 
payments, 
thd. UAH 
Land in 
lease, 
thd. ha 
Lease 
payment 
per ha, 
UAH 
Number 
of 
former 
CAEs 
Number of 
private 
family 
farms 
Ratio 
private 
farms/ 
former 
CAEs 
(“Farm 
ratio”) 
Farm 
density 
(# per 
thd. ha) 
Crimea 90864 783 116.0 394 1860 4.7 2.9 
Vinnytsya 94407 1095 86.2 886 12389 1.4 1.9 
Volyn 27263 415 65.7 453 571 1.3 2.5 
Dnipropetrovsk 95712 1167 82.0 467 3265 7.0 3.2 
Donetsk 87625 920 95.2 518 2192 4.2 2.9 
Zhytomyr 41765 871 48.0 721 596 0.8 1.5 
Transkarpathian 4244 59 71.9 229 1420 6.2 27.9 
Zaporizhya 98845 1078 91.7 392 2387 6.1 2.6 
Ivano-Frankivsk 8672 130 66.7 252 658 2.6 7.0 
Kiev 70569 821 86.0 639 1415 2.2 2.5 
Kirovograd 87072 1012 86.0 464 2451 5.3 2.9 
Luhansk 6106 958 63.7 396 1531 3.9 2.0 
L’viv 16695 251 47.6 583 1190 2.0 7.1 
Mykolaiv 71317 799 89.3 444 4373 9.8 6.0 
Odesa 101434 1223 82.9 758 5393 7.1 5.0 
Poltava 83716 1201 69.7 618 1477 2.4 1.7 
Rivne 27516 454 60.6 376 535 1.4 2.0 
Sumy 55329 973 56.9 578 814 1.4 1.4 
Ternopil 38089 499 76.3 581 721 1.2 2.6 
Karkiv 89067 1304 68.3 532 1298 2.4 1.4 
Kherson 70526 638 110.5 319 3080 9.7 5.3 
Khmelnytskiy 66163 880 75.2 720 1090 1.5 2.1 
Cherkasy 93318 901 103.6 595 879 1.5 1.6 
Chernivtsi 13588 169 80.4 285 633 2.2 5.4 
Chernihiv 45947 998 46.0 618 532 0.9 1.2 
Source:  STATE STATISTICS COMMITTEE OF UKRAINE (2002a); own calculations.  
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8 The Organisational Forms and Performance of 
Agricultural Enterprises in Ukraine: What Conclusions can 
be Drawn? 
SERHIY DEMYANENKO & STEPHAN VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL 
1 Introduction 
One of the main goals of agricultural policy reform in general and the reorganisation 
of collective agricultural enterprise in particular is to enhance the efficiency and 
competitiveness of domestic agricultural production. One way to achieve this is to create 
conditions under which agricultural enterprises can evolve in accordance with market 
requirements. Critical steps towards the creation of such conditions were taken in Ukraine 
for example in December 1999 (Presidential Decree “On accelerating reforms in 
Agricultural Sector of Ukraine”) and in 2001 with the adoption of a new Land Code. As a 
result, the structure of agricultural enterprises in Ukraine changed more in 2000 and 2001 
than in the previous almost nine years of transition, and the heterogeneity of existing forms 
of agricultural enterprise has increased dramatically. 
What lessons can be drawn from this experience? Using data on the results of the 
economic activity of agricultural enterprises in Ukraine, and detailed data on agricultural 
enterprises in Cherkasy Oblast, we focus on two important lessons in particular. The first 
concerns the issue of organizational form. Many policy makers and analysts in Ukraine 
continue to talk in terms of ‘optimal’ enterprise sizes and structures in agriculture. The data 
illustrates that this can be misleading and distracts from more important issues. The second 
lesson concerns the (mis)use of information on average performance when designing 
agricultural policies. Policy decisions based on average economic indicators will often ‘miss 
the mark’ considerably, providing unnecessary assistance to above-average enterprises in 
agriculture, and too little assistance to below-average enterprises. In the following two 
sections we deal with these two lessons in turn, before drawing conclusions in section 4. 
2 The organisational forms and performance of agricultural 
enterprises in Ukraine 
In the course of agricultural reform, an integral part of which was the reorganisation 
of the so-called CAEs (collective agricultural enterprises), several organisational forms of 
agricultural enterprises have emerged that are new to Ukraine. These include private 
agricultural enterprises, farms, agricultural companies (mainly limited liability companies) 
and agricultural production co-operatives. The main goal of this reorganisation and creation 
of new organisational forms was to enhance the efficiency of agriculture in Ukraine by 
establishing private ownership for production factors and providing factor owners and 
managers with market driven incentives. 
The switch from collective to individual forms of farming is perhaps the defining 
feature of organisational form changes over the last 2 years. The general trend is towards a 
reduction in the total number of agricultural enterprises and their size in the course of 
restructuring. This trend is driven by the creation of large lease enterprises and small private 
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family farms on the basis of restructured CAEs. The number of small private family farms 
increased from 38.4 thd. in 2000 to 43 thd. in 2003 and their agricultural land increased for 
this period from 2157.6 thd. ha to 3094.6 thd. ha or on 43.4%. As illustrated in table 8.1, 
this feature is reflected in the number of private and family farms that is falling less slowly 
than the number of cooperatives. Between 2001 and 2003, the number of private agricultural 
enterprises and family farms decreased by 462 or 15.6%. The number of agricultural 
companies decreased by 1261 units or 18.1%. Meanwhile the number of production co-
operatives declined by 713 units or 32.9%. The same tendencies occur with agricultural 
land. Generally speaking, agricultural production co-operatives have many features of the 
former kolkhozes. Dissatisfaction with this form of organisation on the part of members as 
well as its disappointing economic performance1 are the mains reason for the decline in the 
number of production co-operatives.  
Table 8.1:  The number of enterprises and land that had emerged from collective 
agricultural enterprises as of 2001 and as of 2003, by organisational form 
2001 2003 Change Change in % Organizational 
form Number Agricultural land, thd. ha Number 
Agricultural 
land, thd. ha Number 
Agricultural 
land, thd. ha Number 
Agricultural 
land 
Private enterprises  
and family farms 2967 4580 2505 4046 - 462 - 534 -15.6 -11.7 
Agricultural 
companies 6970 13982 5709 11912 - 1261 - 2070 -18.1 -14.8 
Agricultural 
productive co-
operatives 
2165 3954 1452 2834 - 713 - 1120 - 32.9 - 28.3 
Source:  STATE STATISTICS COMMITTEE OF UKRAINE (2002a and 2004); own calculations. 
Thus, the statistical information presented here supports the idea that an 
individualisation process (a switch from collective to individual organisational forms) is 
taking place in Ukrainian agriculture. While the numbers of all types of agricultural 
enterprise are falling, private enterprises are falling at the slowest pace, both in terms of 
number and share of land. This process is accompanied by a concentration of the land and 
property of the former CAEs into the hands of one or a few persons. This tendency to 
individualisation is bringing Ukrainian agriculture more into line with agriculture in the rest 
of the world. Note that the trend towards individual ownership does not necessarily imply 
the creation small-sized enterprises. Experience both in Ukraine and elsewhere shows that a 
private enterprise or a family farm can be large and make use of thousands hectares of 
leased land. Certainly, in the industrialised countries of Europe and North America, the 
trend towards larger farm structures and consolidation is clear, even though the family farm 
continues to dominate in these countries. 
Table 8.2 presents information on the size and performance of agricultural enterprises 
by organisational form in Cherkasy oblast in 20012. The data reveal that on average there are 
no substantial differences in the sizes of private farms, companies and co-operatives. This is 
                                              
1  We are referring here to the economic performance of co-operatives on average. This does not 
preclude some co-operatives performing comparatively well (see below). 
2  Chapter 9 Farm Efficiency and Productivity Growth in Ukraine presents an analysis of farm 
efficiency and its determinants (including organisational form) in Ukraine based on a detailed 
econometric analysis. 
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true for acreage farmed, the average number of workers employed, production costs and 
total sales. As for profit, on average it is much higher for private farms than for companies 
and co-operatives. This supports the argument that individualised forms of asset ownership 
generate greater incentives to operate efficiently.  
Note that the range of variation of profit is considerably higher in companies than in 
private farms and co-operatives. Furthermore, the largest companies are much larger than 
the largest private farms or co-operatives, when measured in terms of acreage farmed, 
capital and total sales. This illustrates that there is great heterogeneity within the individual 
categories – especially companies – in table 8.2. One must therefore be very cautious when 
drawing conclusion about the performance of companies or co-operatives in general. In 
terms of profit, the best co-operatives perform quite well, even though co-operatives 
perform worse than other categories on average3. It would therefore be unreasonable to 
attempt to define or even prescribe an ‘optimal’ organisational form for agricultural 
enterprises in Ukraine. A form that works well in one setting may not work well in others.  
Table 8.2:  Characteristics and performance of agricultural enterprises in Cherkasy 
oblast by organisational form in 2001 
Indicator Minimum Maximum Average Standard 
deviation 
Coeff. of 
variation 
Private farms (57) 
Farm land, ha 6 3972 1467 926 0.63 
Number of workers 3 438 141 101 0.74 
Fixed and current assets, thd. UAH 12 14296 3589 101 0.99 
Production costs, thd. UAH 14 4153 1099 3539 0.94 
Sales revenue, thd. UAH 17 6963 1406 1432 1.02 
Profit, thd. UAH - 373 3004 134 485 3.62 
Profit per hectare, UAH -220 756 86 173 2.00 
Companies (450) 
Farm land, ha 3 35500 1688 1892 1.12 
Number of workers 2 3065 162 172 1.06 
Fixed and current assets, thd. UAH 2 53378 4908 5690 1.16 
Production costs, thd. UAH 28 44791 1461 2616 1.79 
Sales revenue, thd. UAH 22 55291 1702 3201 1.88 
Profit, thd. UAH - 1394 3720 72 422 5.84 
Profit per hectare, UAH -19651 9467 16 1341 82.5 
Cooperatives (45) 
Farm land, ha 12 3836 1846 931 0.50 
Number of workers 21 481 211 107 0.52 
Fixed and current assets, thd. UAH 520 29560 8967 6513 0.73 
Production costs, thd. UAH 79 3570 1477 786 0.53 
Sales revenue, thd. UAH 77 4469 1683 990 0.59 
Profit, thd. UAH - 904 1649 51 374 7.50 
Profit per hectare, UAH - 10112 7067 - 115 1918 - 16.7 
Source:  STATE STATISTICS COMMITTEE OF UKRAINE (2001c); own calculations. 
It is also unreasonable to attempt to define an ‘optimal’ size for agricultural 
enterprises, or ‘optimal’ sizes according to agro-climatic zone or type of production, etc. 
                                              
3  Note that the co-operatives in Cherkasy generated losses of 115 UAH/ha on average in 2001, 
while average profits per farm were positive at 51 thd. UAH. This can be explained by the very 
large losses incurred by some co-operatives that specialise in livestock production on small areas. 
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Analysis of the data reveals that size has no clear and unequivocal impact on enterprise 
performance in Ukrainian agriculture. One enterprise might perform very successfully with 
10 ha, while another does the same with 10 thd. ha. This is not surprising, and has been 
found to hold in other countries as well. Of course, in purely technical or engineering terms, 
there may be an optimal size for a certain production process. In general, larger enterprises 
will benefit from scale efficiencies that enable them to produce units of output at a lower 
cost than smaller enterprises. However, managing an agricultural enterprise involves much 
more than optimising technical processes, and technical efficiency is only one of the many 
factors that contribute to enterprise performance. For example, the ability to manage, 
motivate and monitor workers is at least as important. As farms get larger, the costs of 
monitoring labour grow. It becomes more difficult to control shirking and even theft or 
sabotage, and the link between individual effort and individual reward becomes more 
difficult to establish. At some point the associated costs will cancel out any technical 
efficiency that might result from further growth. Different managers in different settings 
using different organisational forms will each find their own optimal compromise between 
these competing factors. Any attempt to define or prescribe optimal sizes will not do justice 
to this heterogeneity. 
This heterogeneity, by the way, is exceedingly valuable. Each agricultural enterprise, 
with its unique characteristics in its unique setting represents an experiment in which a 
specific organisational form, size and strategy is tested. Some experiments succeed while 
other fail, and in the process new ideas and new information on how to manage an 
agricultural enterprise and how to avoid pitfalls is generated. It has often been stated that 
one of the great weaknesses of current Ukrainian agriculture is that most farm managers are 
not willing to experiment; many are too accustomed to simply following norms passed 
down from above. Agricultural enterprises should be encouraged to experiment and to seek 
solutions to problems that are tailored to the specific conditions on individual farms. Policy 
makers should not try to ‘homogenise’ enterprise structures and sizes, but rather should 
allow the combination of heterogeneity and market disciplines to drive agriculture towards 
new solutions and greater efficiencies. 
This is not to say that scientist should not study the question of optimal sizes and the 
tradeoffs between technical efficiencies on the one hand and management inefficiencies on 
the other. Such studies may be able to identify trends and to contribute to our understanding 
of the forces shaping the evolution of agricultural enterprise structures. For example, as 
grain-producing technology develops, it is becoming increasingly possible to replace labour 
with capital, thus making it possible to increase technical efficiency and reduce the costs of 
motivating and monitoring workers. The result is a clear trend to increasing sizes of grain 
enterprises, for example in the EU.  
Indeed, it may be that many grain farms in Ukraine are much closer to the optimal 
size, however defined, than farms in the EU and elsewhere. However, this is contingent on 
Ukrainian grain enterprises employing the modern, capital intensive and labour extensive 
grain production technology referred to above. Given the current scarcity of capital and 
abundance of labour in Ukraine, employing this technology may not be possible. Under 
Ukrainian conditions it may make sense to employ more labour intensive technologies, even 
if this entails somewhat smaller enterprise sizes. But this is not something to be decided or 
imposed by academicians, consultants or bureaucrats; the natural market ‘laboratory’ 
described above is a discovery mechanism that will find the best answer(s) quickly and 
flexibly. The degree to which agriculture in the Former Soviet Union lagged behind the 
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West, in terms of technology but especially in terms of management practice, demonstrates 
how much dynamic is lost when policy makers put an end to this experimentation and 
dictate rigid structures.  
3 The (mis)use of average indicators of agricultural 
enterprise performance  
The heterogeneity discussed above also has the important implication that average 
indicators of agricultural enterprise performance often say little about actual conditions on 
the vast majority of the individual enterprises. Hence, it is often not very sensible to draw 
conclusions about the activity, performance and policy needs of agricultural enterprises in 
general on the basis of average indicators.  
Figure 8.1 depicts the development of profitability levels for Ukrainian agricultural 
enterprises on average, for enterprises in Cherkasy oblast on average, for Zolotonisky rayon 
on average, and for one of the best enterprises in Zolotonisky4. Table 8.3 contains 
information on minimum, maximum and average values as well as the variation of the main 
indicators characterising agricultural enterprises in Zolotonisky district. Obviously, average 
indicators differ drastically from minimum and maximum values. 
Figure 8.1: Agricultural enterprise profitability in Ukraine, in Cherkasy oblast, in 
Zolotonisky rayon, and on one of the best agricultural enterprises in 
Zolotonisky rayon. 
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4   Zolotonisky is a rayon or district in Cherkasy oblast. 
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As can be seen in table 8.3, the profits per hectare for agricultural enterprises in 
Zolotonisky range from -473 to +4614 UAH, with an average value of 173 UAH. Capital 
investments range from 5.22 UAH/ha to 3003 UAH/ha, with an average value of 
247 UAH/ha. Corresponding figures for the rate of profitability are -63.9, 88.3 and -2.57%, 
respectively; for current assets they are 208, 11874 and 1332 UAH/ha. Note that table 8.3 
contains data only for enterprises located in one rayon. Clearly, if we were to look at the 
results of economic activity of agricultural enterprises in Cherkasy oblast or Ukraine as a 
whole, the differences between minima and maxima would be even greater. 
Given these differences, how effective are agricultural policies that are based on 
average indicators? Imagine that parliament were to pass a law that provides for an 
agricultural subsidy that is calculated to ensure that the average farm in Ukraine attains a 
10% rate of profitability. For many agricultural enterprises that are below average, this 
subsidy would be too small to make them profitable. On the other hand, enterprises that are 
profitable already (and such enterprises exist, see table 8.3) would receive an unnecessary 
‘windfall’. As a result, the money spent on the subsidy would not yield the expected results. 
Agricultural policy making on the basis of average performance indicators can be 
compared with medicine. Does it make sense to treat a hospital patient on the basis of the 
average body temperature of all patients in the hospital? This average temperature might be, 
for instance, 37°C. But this is of little help to those whose temperature is 35 or 40°C. 
Applying a uniform treatment would be wasteful at best, and dangerous at worst. 
Agricultural policy discussions in Ukraine sometimes fall into a similar trap. The exemption 
from the uniform agricultural tax is justified by reference to the fact that the average 
profitability of agricultural enterprises in Ukraine is too low. This may be true, but the tax 
exemption provides the same amount of support per hectare to all enterprises, regardless of 
their profitability. The least profitable enterprises receive too little support to make a 
meaningful difference in their situation, while the most profitable enterprises are permitted 
to escape from their obligation to contribute a fair share to state revenues.  
Basing policy on averages is based on the false assumption that all farms are 
homogeneous and potentially profitable and thus deserve support to help them attain 
profitability. In reality, many agricultural enterprises in Ukraine are not viable5. The sooner 
these enterprises are forced to exit the sector, the sooner their assets can be re-employed by 
better managers, and the sooner the government can redirect the support they receive 
towards enterprises that have a real chance to become profitable, or to reducing social 
hardships in rural areas in a targeted manner.  
                                              
5 Chapter 11 Farm Management Challenges in Ukrainian Agriculture contains a discussion of 
different levels of intensity and profitability in Ukrainian crop production in the forest-steppe 
zone that also identifies a significant proportion of non-viable enterprises. 
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Table 8.3: Main indicators of economic activity of the agricultural enterprises in 
Zolotonisky rayon in 2001 
Indicator Minimum Maximum Average Standard 
deviation 
Coeff. of 
variation 
Profit, thd. UAH -1334 3720 258 980 3.79 
Profit per hectare, UAH -473 4614 173 805 4.64 
Capital investments per hectare, UAH 5.22 3003 247 486 1.97 
Profitability, % -63.9 88.3 -2.57 26.89 -10.46 
Current assets per hectare, UAH 208 11874 1332 1837 1.38 
Current liabilities per hectare, UAH 42.5 7760 846 1248 1.48 
Source: STATE STATISTICS COMMITTEE OF UKRAINE (2001b); own calculations. 
4 Conclusions and recommendations 
• Ukrainian agriculture displays a clear trend to individualisation. This can be observed 
as an increase in the relative size and number of private enterprises and family farms, 
and a steady decline in the relative number and size of agricultural production co-
operatives, which differ little from the former kolkhozes. This trend is in accordance 
with worldwide experience in agriculture. Individualisation, however, does not imply 
the creation of small-sized agricultural enterprises. Private enterprises and family 
farms founded on the basis of CAEs tend to be large based land and property leasing 
from the former members of CAEs. Furthermore, the size of an enterprise is not a 
criterion of its efficiency. 
• Although private farms and co-operatives founded on the basis of CAEs are 
approximately the same in size, private enterprises and family farms on average 
generate more profits per hectare of land than agricultural production co-operatives. 
This may indicate that co-operatives suffer from some organisational weaknesses 
compared with other forms. At the same time, however, the best co-operatives 
perform as well as the best private enterprises and companies. Hence, there is no 
‘optimal’ organisational form for agricultural enterprises; different solutions will 
work in difference situations. 
• Analysis of the main indicators reveals that size has little impact on the economic 
performance of agricultural enterprises. Performance depends on specialisation and 
the optimal combination of production factors – land, capital, labour and especially 
management. Determining the optimal size of an agricultural enterprise is not just a 
question of optimising technical or engineering processes. Management, especially 
the management of labour, becomes increasingly critical as farm size increases, and 
may make it impossible to reap all of the potential technical benefits of size.  
• Policy makers should view agriculture as a giant laboratory in which farms change, 
adapt and try to find the best possible sizes, organisational forms and strategies to 
suit their individual conditions. They should not attempt to dictate sizes and 
organisation forms, but rather should allow the combination of experimentation and 
market disciplines to generate innovations and new solutions. 
• It can be very misleading to draw conclusions about the performance of agricultural 
enterprises and to design agricultural policies on the basis of average indicators in a 
district, oblast or the country as a whole. Such policies will lead to a waste of state 
funds and will not yield desirable results. There are huge differences between the 
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values of the indicators describing the worst and the best agricultural enterprises. 
Average values are therefore not very representative of the real situation in 
agricultural sector. Policy makers should employ policy tools that can be focussed at 
enterprises that need and can make use of support. 
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9 Measuring the Productive Efficiency of Ukrainian Farms 
VIKTORIYA GALUSHKO, BERNHARD BRÜMMER & SERHIY DEMYANENKO 
1 Introduction 
Transition from a planned to a market-oriented economy has proved to be a 
painstaking process for almost all Central and Eastern European countries. Nevertheless, 
studies that compare the successes and failures of these countries (e.g. LERMAN et al., 2004) 
demonstrate convincingly that market orientation brings about improved efficiency and 
favours efficient resource allocation. The first ten years of transition in Ukrainian 
agriculture were marked by a persistent decline in output. Agricultural output in 2000 
accounted only for 53% of the 1990 level, and it is only since 2000 that it has begun to 
recover. A natural question arises: why did market mechanisms fail to produce the expected 
improvements and to which factors can the observed patterns of development in Ukrainian 
agriculture be attributed?  
Generally, a decline in output can be explained by a reduction in input usage, a fall in 
pure technical efficiency (i.e. by less efficient utilization of resources), a decline in scale 
efficiency (i.e. a deviation from scale efficient output levels) and technological regress. All 
these factors contribute to changes in production levels and their effects may run opposite 
directions; that is, production increases due to technological progress and may be dwarfed 
by a simultaneous deterioration of technical efficiency. To which factors an increase (or 
decrease) in output can be attributed is an empirical question. It is the goal of this paper to 
analyze the effect of each of these factors on productivity changes in Ukrainian agriculture 
between 1996 and 2000.  
Efficiency analysis is important for several reasons. First, at the aggregate level the 
decomposition of productivity changes may be valuable for policy-makers, since it reveals 
potential sources of productivity growth and, possibly, output expansion. Furthermore, 
efficiency analysis at the farm level may be helpful in determining optimal farm size1, the 
optimal resource mix and the minimum amounts of inputs required to produce a given 
output.  
We estimate technical and allocative efficiencies at the level of individual 
agricultural enterprises and analyse the links between an enterprise’s efficiency and its 
ownership pattern. An effort is also made to determine optimal input ratios and optimal 
amounts of each input required to produce a unit of output. At the aggregate level, we 
review the trends in Ukrainian agriculture over a five-year period and provide a 
comprehensive analysis of the changes in productivity, technical efficiency and 
technological change. 
                                              
1 Chapter 8 The Organisational Forms and Performance of Agricultural Enterprises in Ukraine: 
What Conclusions can be Drawn? includes a discussion of ‘optimal’ farm sizes in which it is 
stressed that this is not an absolute ‘one size fits all’ concept but rather, as used here, something 
that changes from farm to farm as a function of factors such as natural conditions, management 
skills, proximity to input and output markets, etc. 
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The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology employed. 
Section 3 contains a discussion of the data used. The rest of the study actually consists of 
two separate analyses. The first of these in section 4 focuses on the analysis of particular 
agricultural enterprises in 5 central regions of Ukraine. The second in section 5 covers the 
performance of agricultural enterprises at the regional level from 1996 through 2000 and, 
thus, aims at explaining changes in Ukrainian agriculture as a whole. Section 6 presents 
implications and policy recommendations. 
2 Methodology 
We employ Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). The advantage of this (non-
parametric) approach over parametric approaches applied to Ukrainian and Russian 
agriculture (VOIGT, 2002; KURKALOVA & JENSEN, 2002) is that it assumes no specific form 
of production function.  
The efficiency of a firm usually refers to its ability to extract a maximum output from 
a given set of inputs (output-oriented technical efficiency). Alternatively, efficiency can 
mean the ability to produce a given amount of output using a minimum amount of inputs 
(input-oriented technical efficiency). Both statements are interchangeable under the 
assumption of constant returns to scale and which is used depends on the optimisation 
behaviour of the producing unit. If the enterprise maximises revenue then the former 
formulation is appropriate; however, if the enterprise minimises costs, then the latter 
formulation is. We assume here that agricultural enterprises act as revenue maximizing 
decision-making units. Under the planned economy agricultural enterprises were given 
output targets and were supposed to achieve these targets, even at the cost of highly 
inefficient resource use. At the outset of transition, input supplies by the state to agricultural 
enterprises began to decline and soft budget constraints were eliminated. This induced 
agricultural producers to use inputs more efficiently. It is reasonable to assume that facing 
hard budget constraints and scarcity of resources such as capital, agricultural producers will 
try to extract as much as possible from a set of available resources. Hence, in our analysis 
we focus on output-oriented measures of efficiency.  
DEA is based on the construction of a best-practice frontier. This is achieved by 
solving the following linear optimization problem for each observation in the sample: 
Fkt = max λ  (9.1)
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where Fkt=max λ  is the FARREL measure of technical efficiency of firm k, zk are 
variables which show the intensity with which each farm is used to construct the best 
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practice frontier, yk,m is the m-th output of k-th firm, xk,n is the n-th input employed by firm k, 
t is time and k = 1…K is the number of enterprises. Solutions to this optimization problem 
are obtained using the computer program OnFront2. Fkt can range from 1 to infinity, with 
enterprises having an efficiency score of 1 being the most efficient. Values of Fkt greater 
than 1 show by how much output could be expanded using the given set of inputs. 
According to COELLI’s (1998) definition of output-oriented technical efficiency, which is 
the inverse of the measure defined in (9.1), technical efficiency scores run from zero to one. 
In our paper we use COELLI’s definition. 
Before proceeding, we mention a few qualifications to be made when interpreting 
technical efficiency. First, technical efficiency is a relative measure, that is, we consider an 
enterprise’s technical efficiency relative to other enterprises. If the sample is small enough 
and the enterprises are more or less homogeneous then it might appear that the majority of 
enterprises is efficient, even though from an economic point of view they are all together 
inefficient. Since Fkt measures relative performance, it is very sensitive to outliers, and, 
hence, before starting the analysis a careful look at the data is required to exclude outliers 
from the sample.  
Second, in the real world, the inputs used in production are rarely homogeneous 
across enterprises. This point is especially relevant for agricultural inputs such as land. To 
provide a complete and accurate picture of the real world, one should account for input 
heterogeneity. But heterogeneity, for example, in land reflects differences in climate, natural 
land fertility and other factors that are difficult to measure. For the sake of simplicity we 
make the strong assumption of input homogeneity. Third, Fkt was initially developed for 
physical amounts of inputs and outputs. However, what one usually observes is aggregated 
output (e.g. revenue) and aggregated input (e.g. labor and material cost). Aggregation can 
result lead to a downward bias of DEA efficiency scores (FÄRE et al., 2002).  
So far, our discussion has focused on technical efficiency. However, economists are 
also interested in measuring the ability of an enterprise to choose an optimal (revenue-
maximizing) combination of outputs. This ability is referred to as allocative efficiency. The 
product of technical and allocative efficiency yields a measure of economic efficiency, 
which shows an enterprise’s ability to extract as much output as possible from a given set of 
inputs and to choose the optimal combination of outputs. 
One of the objectives of this analysis is to compare the efficiencies of different 
enterprise forms in Ukraine. For this purpose we construct a Grand Frontier. The idea of this 
approach is represented in figure 9.1 for the one input-one output case and two kinds of 
ownership structures. 
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Figure 9.1: Grand Frontier 
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Source:  Own presentation. 
Let ABCD be the technology frontier for, say, state enterprises and RQFG the 
frontier for private enterprises. Technology set ABFG is constructed under the assumption 
of a common technology and is referred to as the Grand Frontier. Consider a state enterprise 
S. The distance SL measures technical inefficiency within the group of state enterprises. The 
distance from the state enterprise-specific frontier to the Grand frontier (LN) measures 
inefficiency attributed to ownership pattern and is referred to as ‘structural’ technical 
inefficiency. Next consider private enterprise P. Even though it is technically inefficient 
within the group of private enterprises, its structural technical efficiency equals 1. Thus, 
higher average values of structural technical efficiency for private enterprises, for instance, 
would indicate that they have an organisational advantage over state enterprises.  
The technical efficiency measures discussed above lend themselves readily to 
productivity measurement. In fact they are the natural building blocks for measuring Total 
Factor Productivity (TFP) which lies at the heart of our discussion of regional patterns of 
agricultural development. TFP is the ratio of average productivities in certain time periods, 
that is: 
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The input-oriented Malmquist Productivity Index (Mi) that we employ to measure 
TFP is calculated as follows: 
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or, alternatively,  
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Where E(.) is a relative efficiency change index under constant returns to scale which 
measures the degree of catching up to the best-practice frontier for each observation 
between time t and t+1, and T(.) represents the technological change index which measures 
the shift in the frontier between two time periods (MAO & KOO, 1996). 
3 Definition of variables and data description 
3.1 Data resources for estimating technical, allocative and economic 
efficiencies 
Farm level data are taken from the financial statements of agricultural enterprises for 
2001 provided by MINISTRY OF AGRARIAN POLICY OF UKRAINE . The research covers 85% 
of the agricultural enterprises in 5 central oblasts: Vinnytsya, Kiev, Kirovograd, Cherkasy 
and Poltava. After ‘cleaning’ the data for missing and nonsensical observations and outliers, 
the sample produced 2658 observations: 529 private enterprises, 1651 agricultural 
companies, and 468 state farms and cooperatives. Since cooperatives are farms that took the 
easiest possible path when forced to restructure by Presidential Decree at the end of 1999, 
there is no real difference between state enterprises and cooperatives except for the formal 
name and we consider them as one group – cooperatives. 
We use the following 10 outputs: (i) grains (dt), sunflower seeds (dt), sugar beet (dt), 
sales revenue from other crops (thd. UAH); (ii) beef (dt), pork (dt), milk (dt), sales revenue 
from other animal products (thd. UAH); and (iii) processed meat (dt) and sales revenue from 
other processed products (thd. UAH). To calculate economic efficiency as an aggregated 
output we use sales revenue. The potential problem with using sales revenue as an output 
variable is that output prices might vary systematically across different organisational 
forms. For example, state enterprises might receive inputs from the state but then be obliged 
to sell their produce to procurement organisations at below-market prices. Thus, given the 
same production of output in physical units state enterprises may appear less efficient 
because they receive lower output prices. We assume that output prices are equal for all 
enterprises, but note that this may bias our results. 
In the analysis we use 7 inputs: seeds, forage, mineral fertilizers, energy, fuel and 
repairs, land and labour. Data on the cost of mineral fertilizers was transformed into tonnes 
of effective ingredient using information provided by the Ministry of Agrarian Policy on the 
average price of a tonne of effective ingredients in 2001 (1825 UAH/tonne). The cost of 
energy consumption was transformed into physical amounts using a price of energy of 18.8 
kopeks per kW-hour. As labour input we use the average annual number of workers 
employed in the production process.  
3.2 Data resources for measuring TFP 
To measure TFP we use data on agricultural inputs and outputs for 25 oblasts 
between 1996 and 2000. This provides us with a panel of 125 observations. The aggregated 
oblast-level data include agricultural enterprises only (households and family farms are 
excluded).  
102  
The outputs and inputs used to measure TFP as well as efficiency and technological 
changes at the aggregate level are: 
Labour – the number of workers employed in agricultural enterprises taken from the 
Statistical Yearbook of Ukraine in 2001. 
Land – the area of agricultural land used by agricultural enterprises taken from 
information provided by the Ministry of Agrarian Policy on net profits of agricultural 
enterprises and profits per 100 has of agricultural land. 
Machinery power – a proxy for capital input and measured in horse power provided 
by the Ministry of Agrarian Policy. Clearly, this variable does not take into account the age 
and condition of the machinery used. However, no other variables for capital stock are 
available. 
Mineral Fertilizers – the total effective weight of fertilizers employed measured in 
thd. tonnes provided by the Ministry of Agrarian Policy. 
Gross value of production by agricultural enterprises – the output measured in 
mUAH (in constant 1996 prices). 
4 Farm efficiency: Empirical considerations 
If there are significant differences in the average efficiencies of agricultural 
enterprises depending on their organisational form, we should estimate form-specific 
technologies rather than a common technology. Results obtained from estimating form-
specific technologies cannot be used to compare efficiencies between organisational forms, 
but they do provide valuable insights into heterogeneity within each group. Thus, we begin 
by estimating the Cobb-Douglas production functions using a cross-section of 2658 
observations. To allow for possible shifts in technology among different ownership forms as 
well as different production elasticities we introduce dummy variables for the intercept and 
interaction terms. Thus, we discriminate between private enterprises, agricultural enterprises 
and cooperatives. The econometric estimation results are presented in appendix table 9.1. As 
the hypothesis that intercepts and production elasticities are equal across groups can be 
rejected at the 1% significance level, the assumption of a common technology not tenable 
and we estimate efficiency scores for each form of ownership individually.  
Kernel density functions that describe the distribution of the individual efficiencies 
are plotted in appendix figures 9.1 through 9.3. An interesting finding is that all 
distributions are bimodal in the sense that all types of enterprises have a relatively small 
cluster of highly efficient farms and a relatively large cluster of inefficient farms. 
Furthermore, agricultural companies appear to be the most heterogeneous category. Average 
efficiencies are reported in table 9.1 below. 
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Table 9.1:  Average values of efficiencies  
 Technical 
efficiency 
Allocative 
efficiency 
Economic 
efficiency 
Structural 
efficiency 
Private enterprises 0.87 (1.15) * 0.75 (1.33) 0.65 (1.54) 0.86 (1.16) 
Agricultural companies 0.75 (1.33) 0.52 (1.92) 0.40 (2.50) 0.94 (1.06) 
Cooperatives 0.86 (1.16) 0.68 (1.47) 0.60 (1.67) 0.79 (1.27) 
Note:  * Following the discussion in section 2 using COELLI’s definition of output-oriented efficiency scores, 
the scores range from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating the most efficient enterprises. If one wants to find the 
amount by which output can be expanded given the data set one should find the inverse of the 
COELLI’s efficiency score. We provide these numbers in brackets. 
Source:  Own calculations. 
The results indicate that the average technical efficiency of private enterprises equals 
0.87. Hence, the average private enterprise could increase output by 15% by making the best 
possible use of its existing resources. Private enterprises appear to be less successful in 
optimally choosing output combinations than in extracting as large an output as possible 
from a given set of resources; if their production were to occur at the allocatively efficient 
point, their output would, on average, increase by 33%. Agricultural companies could on 
average expand production by 2.5 times without additional resources by just improving 
management and allocating outputs more efficiently. Thus, the results reveal that 
agricultural enterprises have large potentials to increase their output. 
These results cannot, however, be used to compare efficiency across groups because 
the reference for the measurement of efficiency is different for the three groups. For this 
purpose we estimate structural technical efficiency, which to a great extent captures the 
effect of organisational form on enterprise’s performance.  
It is well known that owner-managed firms, private firms, state firms and 
cooperatives are each associated with distinctive sets of incentives for efficiency. In private 
enterprises in most cases the manager is the owner and he has a strong incentive to keep a 
close eye on things. In enterprises where there are a few owners and management is 
separated from ownership, managers have incentives to satisfy their own objectives rather 
than use resources in the most efficient way. Thus, a priori we would expect private 
enterprises to be the most efficient. The average values of structural technical efficiency 
reported table 9.1 indicate that it is the greatest for agricultural companies. This suggests 
that agricultural companies have an advantage over private enterprises and cooperatives as 
an organizational form. At a first glance, this seems to contradict our expectations. A 
plausible explanation for this is that the most efficient agricultural companies (companies 
that form the frontier) are in essence private enterprises in all but name. For example, many 
agricultural companies have only two shareholders – husband and wife. Even though they 
are formally ‘partnerships’ they are actually family-managed and essentially private 
enterprises. At the same time, the number of shareholders substantially fluctuates (from 2 to 
100) across agricultural companies, which explains the large heterogeneity of this category 
of farms.  
Even though cooperatives are on average the least efficient enterprises, the most 
efficient cooperatives are just as good as the best private farms (table 9.2). Indeed, 
performance indicators appear to be higher for the best cooperatives than for the best private 
farms. Thus, enterprise’s performance is to a great extent a matter of management rather 
than organizational structure. Despite the structural shortcomings of cooperative ownership, 
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some managers clearly function well in a cooperative setting and manage to attain a great 
deal with their farms. 
Table 9.2: Some characteristics of 15 the most efficient enterprises in each category 
 Revenue per ha of land, 
thd. UAH 
Revenue per worker, 
thd. UAH 
Revenue per unit of 
capital, thd. UAH 
Private farms 1.82 0.12 3.37 
Agricultural companies 2.34 0.14 4.19 
Cooperatives 2.30 0.17 4.47 
Source:  Own calculations. 
Labour-intensive farms appear to be less technically efficient than otherwise identical 
farms employing more capital-intensive techniques (see appendix figure 9.4). We define 
capital-intensity as the ratio of capital services to workers. Furthermore, 
appendix figures 9.5 and 9.6 reveal that labour-intensive alternatives always use more 
labour and more capital per unit of output than processes with high capital-labour ratios. On 
agricultural cooperatives, for example, the capital-labour ratio is 33% higher for the most 
efficient farms than for the least efficient, while the returns to capital and labour are higher 
by 120 and 192%, respectively. Thus, by better equipping workers Ukrainian farms could 
significantly increase the productivity of both labour and capital.  
The land reforms launched in 2000, the privatization of assets and laws regulating the 
restructuring of collective and state farms were intended to increase economic efficiency. A 
natural question arises: Was the agricultural reform of the year 2000 effective? Effective 
restructuring implies improved management of resources. Effective agricultural reform also 
implies price liberalization and, as a result, improvements in the functioning of input 
markets, which should inevitably lead to a better resource allocation. Combined, these two 
effects should have yielded improvements in economic efficiency on Ukrainian farms. Has 
this improvement occurred? Figure 9.2 presents kernel density functions that describe the 
distributions of economic efficiency scores in 1999 and 2002. Monetary values in 2002 
were deflated using the corresponding deflators: total production costs were deflated with a 
weighted deflator2, sales revenue from other crop products was deflated using a price index 
for crop products, and sales revenue from other animal products using a price index for 
animal products. Enterprises in 1999 and 2002 were pooled and a common technology 
frontier was estimated. Thus, since efficiency in 1999 and 2002 is measured with respect to 
the same frontier, a shift in the distribution reflects both a change in economic efficiency 
and a possible shift of the best practice frontier between 1999 and 2002. The first column of 
panels in figure 9.2 was constructed for collective agricultural enterprises (CAEs) that were 
transformed into private enterprises, the middle column for CAEs that were transformed 
                                              
2 To compare data and results from 1999 and 2002, monetary values in 2002 were deflated using 
corresponding deflators. Total production costs were deflated by a weighted deflator constructed 
using the cost structure for an average farm: wage bill – 20.4%, capital – 41.8% and intermediate 
inputs – 37.8%. As a wage deflator we employed agricultural wage index (1.74, 1999=1), capital 
deflator – Producer Price Index (1.288) and a deflator for intermediate inputs – Price Index for 
agricultural crops (1.327) Thus, the weighted deflator was calculated as follows: PI = 0.204*1.74 
+ 0.418*1.288 + 0.378*1.327 = 1.39.  
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into agricultural companies and the right-hand column for CAEs that were transformed into 
cooperatives. 
A priori, one would expect that restructuring would have shifted the efficiency 
distributions to the right. Moreover, for private enterprises the rightward shift of the 
distribution is expected to be larger than for CAEs that were transformed into agricultural 
companies and cooperatives. This is supported by the evidence in figure 9.2. In all zones but 
the Steppe, private enterprises experienced a rightward shift of the distribution, with private 
enterprises in the Polissya zone enjoying the largest rightward shift based on a test of the 
sample means. The shift in the efficiency distributions for CAEs that were transformed into 
agricultural companies is lower. Mean values of efficiency significantly increased for 
agricultural companies in the Polissya, Karpathian and Steppe zones, while in the Forest-
steppe the shift was not significant. The efficiency distributions of CAEs that were 
transformed in to cooperatives changed little in the Forest-steppe and Polissya zones; in the 
Steppe zone economic efficiency appears to have deteriorated, while in the Karpathian zone 
the proportion of efficient farms increased after the restructuring.  
Thus, the results suggest that the transformation of CAEs into private enterprises 
yielded noticeable improvements in terms of economic efficiency and technical change (a 
shift of the technology frontier between 1999 and 2002). Transformation into agricultural 
companies has been less effective, while transformation into cooperatives characterized by a 
lack of effective restructuring, including both management reform and operation 
adjustments. While the first results presented above suggest that agricultural companies are 
the most efficient in a static sense (which may be because the CAEs that chose this 
organisational form were more efficient initially), private enterprises are the most efficient 
organizational structure in a dynamic sense, that is, they appear to adjust to the prevailing 
conditions and improve their efficiency and technology faster than the other types of 
enterprise. 
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Figure 9.2: The effect of restructuring on economic efficiency 
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Figure 9.2 (continued): The effect of restructuring on economic efficiency 
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To explain the differences in technical inefficiencies across farms we regress their 
efficiency scores on a number of explanatory variables using Tobit models truncated at zero 
and one. The explanatory variables are: farm size (ha), specialisation1, the ratio of fertilizer 
to land and the ratio of capital to labour. The results are reported in table 9.3 below; since 
we are primarily interested in the direction of the effects we report only coefficients and not 
marginal effects.  
Table 9.3: Tobit estimation of the impact of various factors on technical efficiency 
Explanatory variables Estimated coefficient (standard error) p-value 
Constant 0.691 (0.022) 0.00 
HI 0.151 (0.041) 0.00 
Fertilizers/land 0.422 (0.142) 0.00 
Farm size -0.003 (0.001) 0.00 
Capital/labour 0.023 (0.022) 0.00 
Source: Own calculations. 
The effect of farm size is found to be significant and negative. Thus, small farms are 
on average more technically efficient than large ones. Specialization also has a positive 
impact on technical efficiency: enterprises that concentrate on fewer activities are more 
technically efficient than others. Fertilizing land also has a significant positive effect on 
efficiency and the magnitude of this effect exceed that of all other variables. 
5 Total factor productivity change in Ukrainian agriculture 
We first present the results of the aggregated analysis using data on agricultural 
inputs and outputs for all of the 25 regions in Ukraine between 1996 and 2000. Over this 
period, Ukrainian agriculture experienced a decline in output of about 30%. This decline 
might have been due to a reduction in input use, as enterprises responded to increasing input 
prices. As can be seen in figure 9.3, labour employed by agricultural enterprises and capital 
input were decreasing throughout 1996-2002. Agricultural production changes cannot, 
however, be explained without also considering efficiency and technological change over 
the period. 
A priori we formulate the following hypotheses: (i) as the number of private 
enterprises increased each year, technical efficiency is expected to have increased, since 
private ownership creates incentives for the efficient use of resources; and (ii) technological 
changes were only of minor importance, for no major innovations occurred over this period. 
                                              
1 Specialisation is measured using the Herfindahl index HI=∑ si2, where si is the share of the i-th 
activity in an enterprise’s total activities. The larger HI, the greater the degree of specialization. 
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Figure 9.3: Output and input trends (agricultural enterprises all of Ukraine) 
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Source:  MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY OF UKRAINE, own calculations. 
To test these hypotheses, Malmquist TFP indices were calculated for each period. 
Average annual changes in TFP are reported in appendix table 9.2. The results reveal that 
productivity grew by only 0.7% per year on average, with technological change contributing 
2.1% to this growth and efficiency change contributing -1.3%. The decomposition of 
technical efficiency change shows that no improvements occurred in either pure technical 
efficiency or scale efficiency. Hence, the modest annual increase in TFP in Ukrainian 
agriculture is due to technological innovation rather than improvements in technical 
efficiency. 
Of the 25 regions studied the performance of L’viv, Rivne and Ternopil oblasts was 
the poorest with TFP declining annually by an average 8.6%. The decomposition of TFP 
into technological change and technical efficiency reveals the sources of decline in 
productivity. In total, thirteen regions experienced a fall in technical efficiency. The highest 
increase in technical efficiency occurred in Zaporizhya oblast, meanwhile Kirovograd 
enjoyed the highest growth in technology. 
Table 9.4 below reports mean annual changes in TFP and its components. In 1997, 
growth in TFP was composed of an efficiency change of 7.7% combined with deterioration 
in technology of 7.4%. Figure 9.3 illustrates that the decline in output was the greatest in 
1998 over the five-year period. In table 9.4 we see that in this year efficiency decreased 
dramatically by about 20%, and that technological improvement of 2% only partially offset 
this decrease. The fact is that fertilizer use fell dramatically in this year. Thus, the reduction 
in efficiency is likely to have been due to decreased productivity. The year 2000 is 
characterised by high technological progress (20.5%); technical efficiency, however, 
declined by roughly 2%. One explanation for the technological progress in 2000 might be 
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the increase in output prices at the beginning of 2000, which enabled enterprises to earn 
more profits and invest in new technology. 
Table 9.4:  Annual changes in efficiency across all Ukrainian oblasts 
From year t to 
year t+1 
Malmquist 
index 
Efficiency 
change 
Technological 
change 
Pure efficiency 
change 
Scale 
efficiency 
1996-1997 0.998 1.077 0.926 1.038 1.037 
1997-1998 0.821 0.805 1.020 0.872 0.923 
1998-1999 1.062 1.115 0.952 1.074 1.039 
1999-2000 1.184 0.982 1.205 0.987 0.995 
Source:  Own calculations. 
Since the Malmquist index and its components are multiplicative we can calculate 
cumulated effects over the entire period (appendix table 9.3). Over the whole period TFP 
increased by 6%. This increase was due to technological progress (9.2%) moderated by a 
reduction in technical efficiency due to a fall in both pure technical efficiency (-2.8%) and 
scale efficiency (-0.9%). L’viv experienced the largest decline in productivity (-30.5%) and 
technology (-6.6%), while Kirovograd showed the highest growth in productivity (61.6%) 
and technology (39.7%). The last column of appendix table 9.3 contains data on average 
farm size in each of the 25 oblasts. The distinctive feature is that the oblasts in which 
agricultural enterprises are relatively small display the poorest performance. For example, 
the average size of an agricultural enterprise in the Western oblasts that rank the last in 
terms of TFP growth is about 565 hectares, while that of the enterprises in the South-Eastern 
oblasts (Kirovograd, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Zaporizhya) that experienced the highest growth 
in TFP is roughly 2000 hectares. This finding supports large-scale production and it appears 
that the benefits of size such as easier access to credit and modern technology and more 
efficient utilization of resources due to economies of scale outweigh the transaction costs 
that increase with farm size. This contradicts the claim made by some researchers that in 
transition countries small farms are more technically efficient and experience higher 
productivity growth than large farms. 
Summarizing, in general average annual growth in agricultural productivity was only 
modest and was primarily attributed to technological improvements. Technical efficiency as 
well as its components declined from year to year. These findings contradict our a priori 
expectations, but they are consistent with other studies (see MAO & KOO, 1996). 
6 Conclusions and policy implications 
In this paper we measure productivity changes and provide a comprehensive analysis 
of the factors determining the observed development paths in Ukrainian agriculture. The 
Malmquist index, a measure of TFP based on DEA analysis, was used for this purpose. The 
results obtained from this study have important implications for Ukrainian agriculture.  
First, half of the oblasts in Ukraine experienced a decline in TFP between 1996 and 
2000, which was primarily due to a decline in technical efficiency. This indicates that 
Ukraine has a great potential to increase its agricultural output through improving technical 
efficiency. Six Western oblasts (L’viv, Ternopil, Rivne, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi and 
Transkarpathian) experienced technological regress over the entire period. This implies that 
these are low-technology regions and for agricultural production to be fostered they require 
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increased investments in modern technology. Generally, if technological change is largely a 
question of catching up, then one would expect that improving technology is closely related 
to foreign direct investment as a means of transferring innovations and know-how from 
other countries to Ukraine. However, foreign technologies cannot be adopted one to one, but 
rather must be adapted to Ukrainian conditions. So, the government could contribute by 
increasing investment in research and education. Investments especially in education could 
help to ensure that managers make the best possible use of the available technology and 
capital stock2. 
Second, TFP growth is positively related to farm size. Large agricultural enterprises 
appear to experience greater improvements in technical efficiency and technological 
progress. This finding runs counter to other in the literature and suggests that there is no 
justification for a pro-small farm bias in agricultural policy in Ukraine. 
Technical, allocative and economic efficiencies of Ukrainian farms have also been 
estimated. The results reveal that farms have a great potential to expand output by simply 
improving management and choosing more efficient output combinations. Furthermore, 
farms of all forms of ownership appear to succeed more in using resources efficiently than 
in allocating outputs. In this respect a few policy recommendations may be warranted. First, 
a more competitive environment in output markets should be created, since competitive 
markets are the most flexible and efficient mechanism for allocating resources. Second, 
market information systems should be developed. This would help farmers predict market 
conditions and adjust their output mixes accordingly, which would increase average 
allocative efficiency.  
Of the three forms of ownership, agricultural companies are found to be most 
efficient. This, however, may be due to the fact that the most efficient agricultural 
companies are effectively operating as private farms. Nevertheless, the best cooperatives 
perform as well as private farms, which implies that what matters most is management and 
not organizational structure. Agricultural companies are the most heterogeneous category, 
which is explained by the large variation in the number of owners among agricultural 
companies.  
Technical efficiency is positively related to an enterprise’s capital intensity. Farms 
have a huge potential to expand their output by better equipping workers. On the policy 
side, this requires facilitation of farmers’ access to public services and capital markets. 
Furthermore, farm size and specialization have positive and significant impacts on technical 
efficiency. 
A final important point is that our analysis at the farm level considers agricultural 
enterprises in five central Ukrainian oblasts. In Western and Eastern oblasts, climatic and 
soil conditions are different. Therefore, while our inferences about the efficiency of 
enterprises in Central Ukraine are valid, they cannot necessarily be extended to the country 
as a whole. 
                                              
2 See Chapter 11 on Farm Management Challenges in Ukrainian Agriculture for a further 
discussion. 
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8 Appendix 
Appendix Table 9.1: Estimation of production function (dependent variable – 
sales revenue) 
Explanatory variables Private enterprises Agricultural companies Cooperatives 
Constant a11 1.36 (0.32) a21 1.40 (0.19) a31 0.92 (0.34) 
Seeds b11 0.13 (0.04) b21 0.04 (0.02) b31 0.07 (0.06) 
Forage b12 0.01 (0.02) b22 0.04 (0.01) b32 0.04 (0.03) 
Fertilizers b13 0.05 (0.01) b23 0.09 (0.01) b33 0.09 (0.01) 
Energy b14 0.11 (0.03) b24 0.10 (0.02) b34 0.05 (0.03) 
Fuel and repairs b15 0.39 (0.06) b25 0.42 (0.03) b35 0.40 (0.07) 
Land b16 0.00 (0.06) b26 0.02 (0.03) b36 0.07 (0.08) 
Labour b17 0.29 (0.05) b27 0.27 (0.03) b37 0.38 (0.08) 
Ho: a11=a21, b11=b21,b12=b22,b13=b23,b14=b24,b15=b25,b16=b26,b17=b27 0.01 (p-value) 
Ho: a11=a31, b11=b31,b12=b32,b13=b33,b14=b34,b15=b35,b16=b36,b17=b37 0.00 (p-value) 
Ho: a31=a21, b31=b21,b32=b22,b33=b23,b34=b24,b35=b25,b36=b26,b37=b27 0.00 (p-value) 
Note:  All variables are in logarithms; standard errors are in parentheses. 
Source:  Own calculations. 
 
 
Appendix Figure 9.1: Kernel density of 
efficiency scores for private enterprises 
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Appendix Figure 9.2: Kernel density of 
efficiency scores for agricultural companies 
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Appendix Figure 9.3: Kernel density of efficiency scores for 
cooperatives 
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Appendix Figure 9.4: Capital intensity for different 
efficiency categories 
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Appendix Figure 9.5: Returns to capital  
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Appendix Figure 9.6: Returns to labour 
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Appendix Table 9.2: Average annual change in Total Factor Productivity and its 
components 
Region Malmquist index 
Efficiency 
change 
Technical 
change 
Pure efficiency 
change 
Scale 
change 
L'viv 0.914 0.930 0.983 0.933 0.996
Rivne 0.914 0.927 0.987 0.932 0.995
Ternopil 0.914 0.920 0.993 0.921 0.999
Khmelnytskiy 0.925 0.925 1.000 0.931 0.994
Ivano-Frankivsk 0.938 0.951 0.986 0.984 0.966
Chernivtsi 0.961 0.965 0.996 0.988 0.977
Vinnytsya 0.977 0.947 1.032 0.990 0.956
Sumy 0.983 0.965 1.019 0.955 1.011
Volyn 0.986 0.948 1.040 0.924 1.026
Transkarpathian 0.988 1.008 0.981 1.000 1.008
Zhytomyr 0.990 0.972 1.019 0.973 0.999
Kiev 0.999 1.000 0.999 1.000 1.000
Cherkasy 1.001 0.981 1.021 0.983 0.998
Poltava 1.002 1.000 1.002 1.000 1.000
Chernivtsi 1.010 0.972 1.040 0.974 0.998
Donetsk 1.032 1.020 1.013 1.018 1.001
Crimea 1.050 1.044 1.006 1.037 1.007
Mykolaiv 1.058 0.994 1.064 1.000 0.994
Kharkiv 1.063 1.000 1.063 1.000 1.000
Luhansk 1.064 1.005 1.059 1.004 1.001
Dnipropetrovsk 1.069 1.020 1.047 1.021 0.999
Odesa 1.070 1.053 1.016 1.068 0.986
Zaporizhya 1.084 1.064 1.018 1.048 1.016
Kherson 1.114 1.055 1.055 1.051 1.004
Kirovograd 1.128 1.037 1.087 1.029 1.007
Average 1.007 0.987 1.021 0.990 0.997
Source:  Own calculations. 
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Appendix Table 9.3: Cumulative change in Total Factor Productivity and its 
components over 1996-2000 
Region Malmquist index 
Efficiency 
Change 
Technical 
change 
Average farm size, 
ha 
L'viv 0.695 0.746 0.934 414.0 
Ternopil 0.697 0.716 0.975 647.7 
Rivne 0.700 0.738 0.946 767.9 
Khmelnytskiy 0.733 0.733 1.001 983.1 
Ivano-Frankivsk 0.773 0.817 0.947 458.0 
Chernivtsi 0.854 0.868 0.982 668.1 
Vinnytsya 0.912 0.803 1.134 1669.7 
Sumy 0.933 0.869 1.076 1442.1 
Volyn 0.945 0.808 1.170 572.2 
Transkarpathian 0.952 1.031 0.924 425.8 
Zhytomyr 0.959 0.891 1.078 756.9 
Kiev 0.994 1.000 0.994 2639.8 
Chercasy 1.006 0.927 1.086 1564.0 
Poltava 1.008 1.000 1.008 1597.5 
Chernivtsi 1.040 0.891 1.168 955.8 
Donetzk 1.137 1.079 1.051 1620.8 
Crimea 1.216 1.188 1.022 1903.0 
Mykolaiv 1.250 0.975 1.282 1932.7 
Kharkiv 1.275 1.000 1.276 1932.8 
Luhansk 1.283 1.021 1.255 1157.5 
Dnipropetrovsk 1.303 1.084 1.203 2891.4 
Odesa 1.310 1.229 1.065 1645.1 
Zaporizhya 1.379 1.282 1.076 2504.1 
Kherson 1.538 1.241 1.240 1834.6 
Kirovograd 1.616 1.157 1.397 1686.5 
Average 1.060 0.964 1.092 - 
Source: Own calculations. 
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10 The Balanced Scorecard as a New Strategic Management 
Instrument for Ukrainian Agricultural Enterprises 
ALEXEJ LISSITSA 
1 Introduction 
Several empirical studies that analyse agricultural developments in Ukraine highlight 
the drastic reduction in productivity in the sector since independence in 1991 (KOESTER 
1999; LISSITSA 2002; CSAKI et al., 2002; GALUSHKO et al., 2003). The primary cause of this 
reduction in productivity is declining efficiency. Interestingly, research indicates that 
efficiency is positively related to farm size in Ukraine, although heterogeneity is significant 
and the differences between more and less successful large farms have grown. Similar 
results have also been observed in Russia (STANGE & LISSITSA, 2003). These findings are 
partly supported by the current trends particularly in Russia – but also in Ukraine – to 
establish so-called agriholdings or vertically structured agro-industrial corporations with 
tens of thousands hectares of land and hundreds of employees. Comparable tendencies are 
observed not only in transition countries but also in the USA and Australia (PLUMMER & 
ROLFE, 2002; MILLER et al., 1998; BOEHLJE, 2003 & 2004).  
The explanations for the greater efficiency of large farms include, inter alia: ability 
to make better use of new technologies in agriculture; advantages on credit markets and in 
risk diffusion; and many central management aspects such as personnel and strategic 
management which have been and are still ignored on small farms, but which can successful 
implemented on large farms. Especially strategic management can play a noteworthy role in 
efficiency improvements in agribusiness (BOEHLJE, 2003). With continued emergence of 
agro-industrial corporations in Ukraine and Russia, the importance of clear management 
strategies will grow.  
Strategic decisions are associated with such things as an enterprise’s product mix, its 
marketing linkages and its financial structure. For example, the use of contract production 
increases the importance of carefully selecting partners, since payments for products will 
depend on the financial situation of the partner rather than the market. Agricultural 
enterprises in Ukraine could increase their efficiency in the long run if they were better able 
to choose appropriate strategies and organise their structures and operations to these 
strategies. 
In this paper a strategic management tool called the Balanced Scorecard is presented. 
Experience with and the first results of the implementation of this tool in Agro-Soyuz, a 
Ukrainian closed joint-stock agricultural enterprise, are outlined and discussed. 
2 The Balanced Scorecard approach 
The Balanced Scorecard (BSC) was first introduced in the early 1990s through the 
work of ROBERT KAPLAN & DAVID NORTON of the Harvard Business School (KAPLAN & 
NORTON, 1992). Since then, the concept has become well known and its various forms 
widely adopted around the world. Recognising some of the weaknesses and vagueness of 
previous management approaches, the balanced scorecard approach provides a clear 
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prescription of what companies should measure in order to 'balance' the financial 
perspective. The original concept of the BSC was based on the assumption that the efficient 
use of investment capital is no longer the sole determinant of competitive advantage. 
Instead, flexible factors such as intellectual capital, knowledge creation or excellent 
customer orientation have become increasingly important. As a reaction, KAPLAN & 
NORTON suggested a new performance measurement approach that focuses on four 
perspectives of corporate strategy. The BSC aims to make the contribution and the 
transformation of soft factors and intangible assets into long-termed financial success 
explicit and thus controllable. The four perspectives of original BSC can be briefly 
described as follow:  
• The financial perspective indicates whether a strategy leads to improved economic 
success. Typical financial goals are profitability, growth and shareholder value. 
Relevant measures in agricultural sector may include return on investments, sales 
growth, operating income etc.  
• The customer perspective asks the question "How do existing and new customers 
view and value us?" This perspective may not feature prominently in many farm 
business plans, yet it could be a key question to address to ensure that a farm 
business becomes a preferred supplier to its customer(s). The development of quality 
assurance systems on-farm would be a strategy aimed at improving the supplier-
customer relationship. Similarly, the development of some contractual arrangements 
and strategic alliances also addresses this perspective by exploring how a farm can 
develop and improve its relationships with customers.  
• The internal business perspective asks the question “What must we excel at?” It 
focuses on the skills, competence and technology that matter in a particular business, 
and an enterprise’s ability to meet the needs of its customers and its potential to add 
value to customers’ businesses. This area is generally adequately covered in many 
farm business plans. It covers the farm’s ability to deliver and produce to 
specification, thus concentrating on the production process (e.g. feed production for 
livestock, crop production, staffing etc.).  
• Finally, the learning and growth perspective describes the infrastructure that is 
necessary for the achievement of the objectives of the other three perspectives. It 
covers an enterprise’s ability to change, improve and adapt its products and 
processes, as well as the ability to develop and introduce new improved products and 
services (KAPLAN & NORTON 1992). The importance of including goals that fall 
under this heading in a farm’s business plan cannot be overemphasised. The goals in 
this area are non-financial and aimed at ensuring that an enterprise’s greatest assets, 
its people, are being developed and nurtured to deliver the innovations that are 
crucial to success. This is an area that does not always have the prominence it 
deserves in farm business plans. 
A core element of the BSC approach is the “linking together of the measures of the 
four areas in a causal chain which passes through all four perspectives” (NORREKLIT, 
2000, p.67). The causal relationship chain is assumed to commence at the learning and 
growth perspective and flow upwards through the internal business perspective to the 
customer perspective and finally to the financial perspective (KAPLAN & NORTON, 1996). 
The performance measures in one perspective become the drivers of the measures in the 
next perspective in this chain (NORREKLIT, 2000). A good BSC should have a mix of core 
 119 
outcome measures (lag indicators) and performance drivers (leading indicators) (KAPLAN & 
NORTON, 1996a).  
Lag indicators and long-term strategic objectives are formulated for strategic core 
issues for each perspective based on an enterprise’s strategy. Lag indicators signal whether 
the strategic objectives in each perspective have been achieved. In contrast to lag indicators, 
leading indicators tend to be very firm-specific. They express the specific competitive 
advantages of an enterprise (e.g. farm) and establish how the results reflected in the lag 
indicators should be reached. Based on an enterprise’s specific strategy, the key 
performance drivers that have the greatest influence on the achievement of the core strategic 
objectives (measured by lag indicators) are identified for each perspective. The combination 
of the indicators in the four perspectives is achieved by defining goals and appropriate lag 
and leading indicators (KAPLAN & NORTON, 1996a). In this way, a BSC translates strategy 
into objectives, measures and targets in the four perspectives. Rather than representing 
strategy as a loose collection of indicators and measures, these are linked by cause and 
effect relationships. By formulating and defining the strategic targets and measures down to 
the financial perspective through the other perspectives, it becomes clear which influence 
factors have the greatest impact on the lag indicators and, thus, ultimately an enterprise’s 
success. These strategy-specific influence patterns are mirrored through cause-effect chains 
which directly or indirectly link all the targets, indicators, and measures of the BSC 
perspectives hierarchically towards the financial perspective with its long-term financial 
goals. 
It is significant that the causal linking of leading and lag indicators not only occurs 
within individual perspectives, but also by constructing effect chains through the four 
perspectives of the BSC. This means that lag indicators of lower-level BSC perspectives act 
as leading indicators or performance drivers for indicators at higher-level perspectives. 
Proceeding in this way results in a situation in which the lag (financial) indicators are 
combined with the leading indicators/performance drivers through the four perspectives 
leading to a hierarchical cause-effect network which reflects the fundamental assumptions 
for successful translation of the strategy (KAPLAN & NORTON, 1996a, 2001, 2004). This 
strategy-focused hierarchical approach ensures the identification of the major strategic 
issues of a farm business and assigns them their particular strategic relevance – as strategic 
core issue or performance drivers. This enables an orientation of all business resources and 
activities towards the implementation and communication of the strategy.  
To date, thousands of firms around the world have implemented the BSC, and there 
are many case studies describing the BSC as an effective method of strategic management. 
The most famous examples of the successful use of the BSC approach are firms such as 
Mobil, British Airways and Volvo (KAPLAN & NORTON, 2001, 2004; OLVE et al., 2001). In 
the agri-food sector the following companies have successful implemented the BSC: 
Nordzucker in Germany (DEPPE-LEIKEL, 2003); agricultural grain marketing cooperatives 
in Australia (PLUMMER & ROLFE, 2002), Zeneca Ag Products in the USA (KAPLAN & 
NORTON, 2001), and Farm Credit Canada1.  
                                              
1 Farm Credit Canada is a federal Crown Corporation, reporting to Parliament through the Minister 
of Agriculture and Agri-Food (see http://www.fcc-fac.ca)  
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However, the BSC is by far not an easy-to-develop management accounting tool. A 
number of authors and even the originators of the concept have pointed out that successful 
implementation in specific, real settings requires significant adaptations and modifications. 
Frequently repeated points of criticism include the following (NORREKLIT, 2000; NOELL & 
LUND, 2002):  
• The assumption of cause-effect relationships across the four major perspectives is 
problematic. Often the links between the performance variables are ambivalent (e.g. 
the relation between customer satisfaction and financial success), merely statistical 
(covariance, but no clear causality), purely logical (e.g. relationships developed from 
neoclassical reasoning) or simply nonexistent. 
• The assumption of a hierarchical relationship among the four major perspectives is 
also questioned. For example, management development might lead to increased 
profits, but sufficient profits are needed to finance management development. Thus, 
interdependence rather than unidirectional relationships among the measurement 
variables may be the appropriate characterization. 
This list could be continued. For a comprehensive discussion of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the BSC approach, see among others OLVE et al. (2001). Nevertheless it 
should also be mentioned that some criticism of the approach is misleading. First, the 
performance and scope of the original BSC concept are often overtaxed. Second, it is 
sometimes forgotten that any application of the BSC to a real enterprise is part of a 
comprehensive and repeated process of strategy development, implementation and control 
(NOELL & LUND, 2002). The BSC, like any major change, must be constantly nurtured for a 
significant period before it takes root in an enterprise’s culture and ongoing management 
practices. 
As mentioned above, there only few examples of BSC implementation in the agri-
food sector. This could be due to the fact that agriculture in most industrialised countries is 
primarily based on family businesses. However, even though the literature on BSCs focuses 
on the corporate sector, this does not preclude its application to agriculture. Furthermore, 
due to the increasing complexity of the business of farming that is resulting from increasing 
farm sizes and the specialisation of production, the need for strategic management at the 
farm level is increasing. This has led in recent years to an increased interest in the BSB 
approach on the part of agricultural economists, managers and consultants (PLUMMER & 
ROLFE, 2002; NOELL & LUND, 2002; FRITZ, 2003; PIETRZAK, 2003; HERNÁNDEZ et al., 
2003, 2004). However, these applications mostly deal with the theoretical possibilities of 
applying the BSC approach in the agri-food sector. In this paper we present a case study of 
BSC implementation in Ukraine.  
3 The Balanced Scorecard in the closed join-stock company 
Agro-Soyuz 
As mentioned above, the heterogeneity of the efficiency of production on large farms 
in Ukraine has grown considerably in the course of transition. Some farms have survived 
the transition process relatively successfully, although not to the extent expected by many. 
The closed joint-stock company Agro-Soyuz used the reserves initially at its disposal for 
structural adjustments in the first transition phase to establish itself as an agribusiness 
enterprise. The agricultural primary production division of Agro-Soyuz, located in the 
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village Mayskoe, was established on the basis of the former collective agricultural enterprise 
(kolkhoz) ‘Drushba’ in 1997. In contrast to most Ukrainian agricultural enterprises, which 
still concentrate on surviving through low-intensity agricultural production, Agro-Soyuz has 
consequently searched for new technologies and management strategies in order to increase 
efficiency.  
The managers of Agro-Soyuz knew that they needed to transform the way in which 
they strategically thought about, measured, and managed their business. After considerable 
research and also as a result of participation in the EFQM management quality network2, 
they decided that using a Balanced Scorecard approach would be the best way to develop 
and implement their enterprise’s strategy. However, this belief was not founded on 
experience with the BSC approach in other agricultural enterprises in transition countries. 
This lack of experience made the implementation process more difficult than initially 
assumed.  
A BSC project team, comprised of members from key areas of the enterprise, worked 
with consultants to develop a customised BSC for the company to translate its business 
strategy into specific strategic objectives. Agro-Soyuz’s mission has been formulated as 
combining „a constructive influence on society with the satisfaction of the intellectual and 
material needs of its own personnel and partners using implementation and distribution of 
innovations in production, agriculture and service”. Essentially, a BSC strategy map 
provided the management team with a high-level depiction of what needs to be done if the 
corporation is to live up to this mission. The strategy map achieved this by tracing the cause 
and effect relationships between the various strategic objectives contained within the 
scorecard segments. In contrast to KAPLAN & NORTON’s approach, Agro-Soyuz found it 
more appropriate to consider six company-specific perspectives instead of the four 
traditional perspectives: financial; customer; internal business; learning and growth or 
human resources; innovations; and society. The formulation of the two additional 
perspectives ‘innovations’ and ‘society’ was connected with Agro-Soyuz’s specific objective 
of being the most innovative agricultural enterprises in the country. It was also related to the 
fact that agricultural enterprises traditionally play an important role in rural development in 
Ukraine and are expected to provide a variety of services under the heading ‘social sphere’ 
(LISSITSA, 2002; BIESOLD, 2004). With formulation of the ‘society’ perspective, Agro-Soyuz 
underlined its commitment to contributing to the positive development of the sector and 
country as a whole using new technologies. 
Monthly management meetings were organised according to the six BSC 
perspectives. At these meetings the managers discuss written summaries of what has 
happened during the last period, and the progress of each measure is discussed.  
The first results of the implementation of the BSC approach in Agro-Soyuz are: 
• A balanced and more efficient use of available resources. 
• The introducing of a new monitoring and measurement system which helps to control 
and to manage the achievement or objectives. 
• The simplification of management and organisation systems in the enterprises; and, 
                                              
2 For more information see www.efqm.org.  
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• A situation in which every employee understands his/her role in achieving business 
success. 
• Significant insights gained by implementing the BSC approach in Agro-Soyuz 
include: 
• The BSC is used to communicate strategic objectives to employees, not to order them 
what to do. Everyone understands the enterprise’s strategy and helps to achieve its 
strategic objectives. 
• The BSC is a strategic management tool that could not be adopted one-to-one in the 
classical form proposed by KAPLAN & NORTON. Rather it could be adjusted to the 
specific conditions in agriculture in transition countries such as Ukraine; and, 
• The BSC management process is a continuous process. It is not directly concerned 
with an enterprise’s specific mission, but rather with its internal processes and 
external outcomes. This process is based on performance metrics that are tracked 
continuously over time to identify trends, best and worst practices, and areas for 
improvement. It delivers information to managers that can help to guide their 
decisions. 
4 Conclusions and perspectives for the BSC approach in 
Ukrainian agriculture  
The BSC is essentially a ‘network’ of linked indicators that articulates an enterprise’s 
strategy around a set of cause-effect relationships. A well-built scorecard reflects the 
intrinsic connections between each aspect of the strategy and each of the measures chosen to 
assess it. Also, the BSC has the advantage that it provides managers with both leading 
indicators and lag indicators about their companies. Hence the term Balanced Scorecard: it 
balances and links financial and non-financial indicators, tangible and intangible measures, 
internal and external aspects, performance drivers and outcomes.  
The successful development of agricultural enterprises plays a significant role in the 
economic and social stability of rural areas in Ukraine. The combination of financial and 
non-financial indicators in BSCs allows agricultural companies to develop enterprise-
specific strategies that are adjusted to the business environment in Ukrainian agriculture. 
The implementing of the BSC approach can help farms to develop, implement and monitor 
their restructuring strategies. It can also help to increase efficiency, allowing farm 
enterprises to contribute to the positive development of rural areas.  
However, the following points should be considered when implementing the BSC 
approach in Ukrainian agriculture:  
• The BSC approach can help an enterprise to implement its strategy, but is not 
designed to create such strategies. This is the task of the management team. 
Successful BSC implementation is impossible without a well-defined strategy. 
• Many managers in Ukraine will believe that they can reap the benefits of the BSC by 
using a wide range of non-financial measures. However, care should be taken to 
identify not only lag measures that describe past performance, but also leading 
measures that can be used to plan future performance. 
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• Farm accounting practices should be adapted to the needs of strategic management 
and the BSC. 
• It is usually not sufficient simply to copy the measurement system used by other 
successful firms. Each agricultural company should make the effort to identify the 
measures that are appropriate for its own strategy and competitive position; and, 
• The first steps in implementing the BSC approach should be done with a help of a 
consulting firm or research institution.  
The implementation of the BSC approach in many countries has demonstrated that 
competent advisory service is required. Consultants in existing agriculture advisory services 
in Ukraine do not have the necessary competence and methods to provide farmers with 
feedback on their strategies and to help them test the assumptions and expectations that their 
strategy is based on. Another point is that many agricultural enterprises in Ukraine feel that 
they are not able to pay for consulting services. Summarising, the BSC approach can be 
adjusted to the special business environment in Ukrainian agriculture and broadened to 
incorporate a number of factors that go beyond the purely financial.  
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11 Farm Management Challenges in Ukrainian Agriculture 
GOTTFRIED LISCHKA 
1 Introduction 
Ukraine has some of the most fertile agricultural land resources in the world. This 
land is famous worldwide and the foundation of Ukraine’s reputation as Europe’s bread 
basket. However, almost seventy years of Communist rule as well as the ensuing years of 
transition to a modern, market economy have left their marks on Ukraine not only in a 
material sense, but also in the minds of a population that was previously subjected to 
decades of oppression. Ukrainian agriculture suffered together with other sectors and 
activities, of course, and continues to suffer from this legacy today.  
This chapter focuses on the situation in agriculture and especially crop production in 
Ukraine. On the one hand, it describes the economic situation of the production of grain, 
oilseeds and sugar beets as defining agricultural activities in Ukraine. At the same time, it 
discusses the challenges facing farmers and agricultural entrepreneurs in Ukraine, 
challenges that are arising in an increasingly globalised world of exchange in goods, 
services and information.  
This chapter is based on information and impressions gathered by the author during a 
series of short-term consultancies in the years 2001-2004. The aim of these consultancies 
was to provide members of the DUAP (German-Ukrainian Agricultural Project) team in 
Ukraine with advanced training in farm management skills. In the process, the author was 
able to visit a number of farms on a regular basis. Together with the farm extension 
specialists working for the private consulting firm AKT Vinnytsya – a firm that emerged out 
of the DUAP project in 2002 – it was possible to acquire detailed knowledge of agriculture 
in that region. 
2 Initial conditions 
The situation of agriculture in Ukraine is characterized by the following factors:  
• Increasing incidence of abandonment and insolvency of farm enterprises. 
• Insufficient motivation of those employed in agriculture. 
• A difficult legal environment (corruption, frequent breach of contract and legal 
insecurity). 
• Declining yields since Soviet times and soils that have been depleted of organic 
matter and basic nutrients. 
• An increasing proportion of fields are either fallow or weed-infested. 
• Insufficient technical equipment at all stages of the production chain. 
• Insufficient use of biological and technical innovations; and; 
• Insufficient use of available information in all the areas of production, marketing, 
procurement, organization and economic management. 
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This in many regards sobering depiction of the current situation in Ukrainian 
agriculture will be studied in greater detail on the basis of economic calculations in the 
following sections. These calculations are, in turn, based on data collected by the author 
with the intensive and valuable support of the team of extension specialists working for AKT 
Vinnytsya.  
3 The economic situation in crop production in the forest-
steppe zone 
Intensive calculations made by the author in the course of training missions for 
agricultural extension specialists in Ukraine between 2001 and 2004 generated data and 
insights into agricultural enterprises in the country. In-depth analyses of farm operations 
made it possible for Ukrainian and German extension specialists to draw conclusions 
regarding the economic situation of farm enterprises as well as the competitiveness of grain, 
oilseed and sugar beet production in the so-called forest-steppe zone. The forest-steppe zone 
is regarded as the most productive agricultural region in Ukraine. It extends in a broad belt 
from southwest to southeast of Kiev and includes most of the oblasts Cherkasy, Vinnytsya 
and Khmelnytskiy, as well as parts of the oblasts Ternopil and Zhytomyr. The high 
productivity in this region is due to uniform good soils combined with relatively 
advantageous climatic conditions (the volume and seasonal distribution of precipitation and 
low rates of evaporation) in comparison to most other parts of Ukraine. The relative 
proximity to Kiev is also an advantage.  
According to our analysis, crop production in the region can be categorized into four 
distinct levels of intensity. 
Level I Enterprises of highly questionable viability 
1 Machinery up to 80% depreciated, old and in dilapidated condition. 
2 Own production of seed in the second and third generation, no adherence 
to crop rotation, insufficient management of crop and livestock residues, 
no applications of lime. 
3 Soil pH-value less than 5.5, soil organic matter <2%, soil water balance 
and aeration poor. 
4 <20 kg/ha nitrogen, <10 kg/ha phosphorus and 0 kg/ha potassium, only 
sporadic use of pesticides and herbicides. Yields: 25 dt/ha wheat, 
150 dt/ha sugar beet, 2000 kg of milk per cow and year. 
In contrast to the emerging situation in the Russian Federation, where it is estimated 
(and openly admitted) that roughly 30% of the farm enterprises are in danger of bankruptcy, 
it remains politically inopportune to label similar farms in Ukraine as unviable. We estimate 
that up to one half of all the farm enterprises in Ukraine can be classified as belonging to 
Level I and that these farms are severely threatened. 
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Level II Lagging enterprises of questionable viability 
1 Machinery up to 65% depreciated, old but maintained and in reasonably 
good condition. 
2 Own production of seed in the first and second generation. Crop rotations 
planned but not always implemented. Attempts to manage crop and 
livestock residues, insufficient applications of lime. 
3 Soil pH-value >5.6, soil organic matter >2.5%, soil water balance and 
aeration still insufficient.  
4 >40 kg/ha nitrogen, <20 kg/ha phosphorus, <10 kg/ha potassium, 
insufficient applications of pesticides and herbicides. Yields: 30 dt/ha 
wheat, 250 dt/ha sugar beet, >2500 kg of milk per cow and year. 
According to experience and the estimates of the extension specialists working with 
AKT Vinnytsya, roughly 40% of the agricultural enterprises in Ukraine can be categorised as 
belonging to Level II.  
Level III Relatively stable enterprises with future potential 
1 Machinery up to 50% depreciated, quality machinery in a well-
maintained condition with sufficient capacity. 
2 Purchase of elite seed, on-farm reproduction up to the first generation. 
Crop rotations are planned and for the most part implemented. Crop and 
livestock residues are managed, regular applications of lime.  
3 Soil pH-value >5.8, soil organic matter >3%, soil water balance and 
aeration generally acceptable. 
4 >60 kg/ha nitrogen, >30 kg/ha phosphorus, >20 kg/ha potassium, targeted 
applications of pesticides and herbicides. Yields: 40 dt/ha wheat, 
350 dt/ha sugar beet, >3000 kg of milk per cow and year. 
According to the experience and estimates of the extension team with AKT 
Vinnytsya, roughly 10% of the farm enterprises in Ukraine can be categorized as belonging 
to Level III. 
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Level IV Top farms often with an external investor 
1 Regular investment in machinery, top-quality machinery in excellent 
condition and readiness. 
2 Purchase of high-quality seed varieties suited to regional conditions with 
on-farm reproduction. Crop rotations planned and implemented. Optimal 
crop and livestock residue management, regular applications of lime 
according to soil analysis. 
3 Soil pH-value >6, soil organic matter >3.5%, optimal soil water balance 
and aeration.  
4 >80 kg/ha nitrogen, >40 kg/ha phosphorus, >30 kg/ha potassium, precise 
applications of pesticides and herbicides. Yields: >45 dt/ha wheat, 
400 dt/ha sugar beet, >4000 kg of milk per cow and year. 
At most perhaps 2% of the farm enterprises in Ukraine can be classified as belonging 
to Level IV.  
For the ensuing analysis of the economic situation in crop production in Ukraine, a 
typical, hypothetical 1000 has model farm has been conceived. We abstract from livestock 
production to simplify the analysis and discussion. Prices, yields, costs, etc. are taken from 
typical farms in the region around Vinnytsya and are based on observations in the year 
2003. 
Table 11.1 presents information on the long-term average yields that can be attained 
by farms in the four intensity categories presented above. Since sugar beet production plays 
an important role in the region but also places special demands on farm machinery, 
table 11.1 also illustrates the average share of sugar beet in the crop area for each of the four 
categories. The average-share of sugar beets on farm enterprises in Ukraine ranges from 10 
to roughly 25%. Enterprises belonging to categories I and II use low-quality domestic, 
unpelleted seed. The resulting crowding leads to depressed yields of 100 to at most 
150 dt/ha.  
Table 11.1: Crop yields for different levels of intensity 
 Level I Level II Level III Level IV 
 Unit Local management External investor 
Sugar beet share % 10 10 25 25 
Sugar beet yield dt/ha 100 100 250 250 
Wheat yield dt/ha 30 40 50 55 
Summer barley yield dt/ha 25 32.5 45 50 
Winter rape 00 yield dt/ha 9 15 21 27.5 
Sunflower yield dt/ha 12 17 22 30 
Source: Own calculations based on farm enterprise analyses in 2003. 
Wheat yields range from 30 to 55 dt/ha, although in some years top yields of up to 
80 dt/ha can be realized. Summer barley yields (winter barley is a very risky proposition 
under the agro-climatic condition prevailing in Ukraine and therefore almost non-existent) 
range from 25 to 50 dt/ha depending on production intensity. Winter rape can attain yields 
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of between 9 to 27.5 dt/ha, provided that it is not subject to winter kill. Although foreign 
experts agree that increased rapeseed production would make a valuable addition to the crop 
rotation in Ukraine, the share of rape is likely to remain quite low due to the relatively high 
capital requirements associated with this crop. Stable and high yields remain illusive under 
Ukrainian conditions. The sunflower – the traditional oilseed in Ukraine for agronomic 
reasons – will continue to be considerably more important than rapeseed. Sunflower 
production is being increasingly neglected, however, as its high potash requirements are 
increasingly not met ostensibly due to ‘lack of capital’. Sunflower yields range from 12 to 
30 dt/ha. Sufficient levels of potash fertilization are, however, a prerequisite for high yields. 
For the ensuing calculations of profitability, the following crop shares/crop rotations were 
assumed for the four intensity levels (table 11.2). Table 11.2 also lists the prices for each of 
the main crops. 
Table 11.2:  Crop rotation assumption in the forest/steppe zone of Ukraine for each 
intensity level (in ha) 
Crop Level I 
Level 
II 
Level 
III 
Level 
IV 
Price 
(UAH/tonne) 
Price 
(€/tonne) 
Wheat 350 350 350 350 450 75 
Summer barley 250 250 200 200 400 67 
Peas 100 100 100 100 550 92 
Buckwheat 100 100 0 0 1000 167 
Sugar beets 100 100 250 250 150 25 
Sunflowers 100 100 100 100 1000 167 
Source: Own calculations based on farm enterprise analyses in 2003. 
Table 11.3 presents the results of the profitability calculations for the four intensity 
levels. Regarding the method used to calculate profitability, note the following: 
• Sales are calculated using the yields, crop shares and prices listed above. 
• Specific variable costs include seed, fertilizer, pesticides and herbicides. 
• Variable labour and equipment costs include wages (without management), 
machinery rental, repair and depreciation as well as the costs of fuel and oils. 
• Fixed costs include maintenance and depreciation of farm buildings, indirect wages 
for excess labour, the costs of management and extension, insurance, taxes, land rents 
and energy; and, 
• Interest costs are incurred on the loans used to purchase variable production factors 
such as seed and fertilizer. These costs are high because credits are provided for 
interest rates in the neighbourhood of 20% per annum in Ukraine. 
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Table 11.3: Profit/loss calculations for each intensity level (€/ha) 
 Level I Level II Level III Level IV 
 Local management External investor 
Sales 233 326 546 615 
Special variable costs 58 76 163 165 
Variable labour and machinery costs 87 95 129 137 
Fixed costs 74 72 68 59 
Interest costs 17 22 52 81 
Total costs 236 265 411 443 
Profit -3 61 135 172 
New investments 0 50 306 710 
Capital stock 211 229 339 306 
Source:  Own calculations based on farm enterprise analyses in 2003. 
The results in table 11.3 illustrate that farms operating at intensity level I generate net 
losses even though their total costs are the lowest of all four groups at 236 €/ha. The 
corresponding farms will remain unviable as long as they continue to operate without using 
certified seed, fail to compensate for the nutrients that are extracted from the soil with each 
year’s harvest, fail to apply appropriate herbicides and pesticides, and fail to carry out 
important steps in crop production at the appropriate times.  
The farms operating at the second level of intensity generate moderate profits and 
also earn enough to cover the depreciation costs associated with their low level of 
investment. The higher levels of intensity vis-à-vis the farms in level I lead to a 
disproportionate increase in yields for the farms operating at the level II. Compared to 
level II, costs per ha on the farms at level III are 55% higher. As a result, profits increase by 
roughly 120%. To attain these profits, investments of 645 €/ha are required. On the farms 
operating at level IV, total costs increase by a further 8% while profits are 27% higher than 
at level III. However, attaining this level of profitability requires 132% more investment in 
modern, primarily western, technology than at level III.  
Table 11.4 presents more information on the results that are calculated for the four 
groups of farms. The farms operating at intensity level I are characterized by a high labour 
intensity of 11.5 labour equivalents per 100 has, and the other indicators for this category of 
farms are all negative, which underlines the fact that these farms are not viable.  
Although the labour intensity is only slightly lower on the farms operating at level II, 
the indicators in table 11.4 are considerably better than for level I. The high rate of return on 
equity of 44% should, however, be interpreted with caution as it is based on an overall low 
level of capital intensity which makes it ‘easier’ to attain high rates of return. As the results 
for level III illustrate, sustainable competitiveness requires higher levels of investment and 
capital intensity. The rate of return on equity, at 42%, is only slightly lower than at level II. 
At 24%, the ratio of labour and variable machinery costs to sales, which provides a good 
indicator of labour productivity, is, however, considerably better than at level II (29%).  
Farms operating at the highest level of intensity (IV) realize a slightly higher rate of 
profitability (28 as opposed to 25%). However, the rate of return on equity is somewhat 
lower at 34 as opposed to 42%. The ratio of labour and variable machinery costs to sales 
falls only slightly to 22 as opposed to 24% at level III. Hence, the significant reduction in 
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labour intensity to roughly two full-time labour equivalents per 100 has only results in small 
increases in productivity.  
Table 11.4: Crop production indicators for each level of intensity 
 Level I Level II Level III Level IV 
 Unit Local management External investor 
Share of farms in 
category  % 50 38 10 2 
Labour intensity 
Labour 
equivalent/
100 ha 
11.5 10.3 8.7 2 
Profit per ha €/ha -3 61 135 172 
Profitability % -1 19 25 28 
Ratio of profits to total 
cost % -1 23 33 39 
Rate of return on 
equity  % -3 44 42 34 
Ratio of labour and 
variable machinery 
costs to sales 
% 37 29 24 22 
Source: Own calculations based on farm enterprise analyses in 2003. 
In summary we can draw the following conclusions:  
1. Without a significant increase in the intensity of crop production, Ukrainian 
agriculture cannot be sustainably competitive. 
2. Increases in the use of variable inputs and capital are required. 
3. Capital can take the form of local machinery and equipment or western machinery 
and equipment that is in good repair. 
4. The various stages of production should be organized as efficiently as possible, i.e. 
with as little use of labour and machinery as possible so as to reduce the risks 
associated with breakdowns and the complexity of management. 
5. While it is not necessary to attain the highest levels of capital intensity, modern 
technology must be applied in core areas such as seedbed preparation, seeding, the 
application of fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides as well as in harvesting; and, 
6. The highest levels of capital intensity are not necessarily profitable as illustrated by a 
comparison of the results for farms at intensity levels III and IV above. 
4 Unit cost calculations 
The following unit cost calculations for selected crop products cast light on the 
international competitiveness of Ukrainian agriculture. These calculations are based on a 
comprehensive consideration of all costs including a 16% interest rate allowance for the 
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capital used in production. The results in table 11.5 confirm the main results of the 
profitability analysis carried out above.  
Table 11.5: Unit costs at different levels of intensity (€/tonne) 
 Level I Level II Level III IV 
 
Market 
price Local management External investor 
Winter wheat 75 79 64 67 71 
Sugar beet 25 17 13 15 13 
Sunflower 167 177 147 140 119 
Winter rape 00 117 217 247 201 180 
Summer barley 67 88 74 67 70 
Source:  Own calculations based on farm enterprise analyses in 2003. 
Winter rape is included in table 11.5 to complete the presentation and to illustrate 
first, that market prices for rape remain unattractive in Ukraine, and second that unit costs 
lie considerably higher than market prices regardless of the level of intensity.  
At the average market prices listed in table 11.5, farms operating at the lowest level 
of intensity are only able to produce sugar beets at a unit cost that lies below the market 
price. The quality of the sugar beets on these farms is so low, however, and the amount of 
labour required for thinning out the beet plants so high, that sugar beet production cannot be 
increased. Crop rotation requirements and the timing of key stages in field work reinforce 
this limitation. The other crops such as grain and sunflower can only be produced at unit 
costs that lie above the average attainable market prices. Hence, the production of these 
crops leads to financial losses even in the short run. 
Enterprises operating at intensity level II achieve somewhat better results. However, 
these farms are also not in a position to make necessary long-term investments in important 
soil nutrients and modern technology. Hence, the fact that these firms are able to produce 
winter wheat, sugar beets and sunflowers at unit costs that are slightly lower than the 
prevailing market prices simply implies that they are faced with protracted economic 
decline and loss of equity, unless they quickly adopt more sustainable strategies.  
At intensity level III, all products with the exception of summer barley and rapeseed 
can be produced at unit costs that are lower than the prevailing market prices. On farms 
operating at intensity level IV, unit costs increase somewhat vis-à-vis intensity level III 
except for sugar beets and sunflower seeds. This is due to the increased use of more 
expensive modern technology. Unit costs for sugar beet are somewhat lower than at 
intensity level III as the use of modern technology makes it possible to reduce labour costs 
for thinning and weeding considerably. Unit costs for sunflower seeds are lower in 
particular due to improved seeding technology that leads to better spacing and 
correspondingly higher yields.  
The unit costs presented in table 11.5 clearly demonstrate that Ukrainian farmers are 
able to produce at costs that are quite low in international comparison and, hence, that 
Ukrainian agriculture does indeed have a significant potential for the profitable production 
of agricultural commodities.  
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5 Opportunities and challenges for international investors 
The analysis presented above would appear to make Ukrainian agriculture a very 
interesting object for international investors. Since early 2000, the climate for foreign 
investment in Ukraine has improved slowly but noticeably.  
Generally it is recommended that potential investors plan and implement their 
investments with the aid of an experienced, local farm consultant firm. Realistically, 
roughly one year can be expected to elapse between the initial conception of an investment 
and the first practical farming activities. Given enough time and a competent partner, the 
following steps can be taken in a constructive and dependable manner: 
• Establishing an enterprise in the form of a limited company under Ukrainian law can 
take place quickly and without difficulty with the help of a local consultant. 
• With the help of a competent local consultant it is generally also not difficult to seek 
and find suitable land for long-term lease. The sale and purchase of land is not 
permitted under Ukrainian law at the moment. Land lease contracts with the many 
shareowners of formally collectivized enterprises – or in some cases with limited 
companies that they have established – require painstaking negotiations based on 
personal contacts and presentations made by the investor with the aid of the local 
consultant. Regional (oblast) and county (rayon) administrations are generally willing 
to cooperate in this regard. Importing and implementing Western technology is much 
easier nowadays than it was prior to 2000. 
• Land lease prices including land taxes amount to roughly 30 €/ha and year. However, 
investments in basic soil fertility and combating accumulated weed infestations are 
often required in the first 2-3 years of an investment project. 
• As illustrated in table 11.3, establishing and operating a crop production enterprise in 
Ukraine requires initial investments of roughly 700 to over 1000 €/ha. Loans can be 
secured provided the investor is able to present a convincing business plan as well as 
30 to 40% equity capital. A number of foreign banks such as the German Hypo-
Vereinsbank have opened branches in Ukraine. 
• Taking legal action in the event of conflicts over contracts such as land lease 
agreements generally remains a not very promising proposition. The civil courts in 
Ukraine do not function effectively, making it difficult to secure and enforce claims. 
• When selecting workers it is important quickly secure a core group of competent 
individuals. These must be paid well to ensure that they are properly motivated from 
the outset.  
• As a rule, investors will not, for social reasons, be able to avoid employing additional 
workers for more simple tasks. To pay these workers it is imperative that the 
enterprise based on the core staff begin to generate profits within at most 2 to 3 years. 
• In the past it has often proven very beneficial when investors provide some financial 
support for local, village projects (renovation of the church or the fire hall).  
Pioneers – the word pioneer is very appropriate in this context – who are committed 
to an investment in Ukraine, who seek the aid and advice of a competent local consulting 
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firm, and who come to terms with the local authorities and population, will find that they are 
able to realize the corresponding Schumpeterian pioneer profits. 
6 Challenges facing Ukrainian farm managers 
Many of the problems that currently characterize Ukrainian agriculture and that were 
described above in section 2 can be traced back to insufficient training and management 
skills on the part of farm managers. When farm managers in Ukraine are asked to list the 
most pressing problems facing their enterprises, most will mention a lack of capital. It is 
true that Ukrainian agriculture is extremely undercapitalized. However, the following 2 
examples illustrate that typical responses to this lack of capital are generally inappropriate 
and counterproductive.  
• Even taking into account the fact that soil preparation for the seeding of winter grains 
takes place with old and outdated machinery, insufficient care and diligence when 
ploughing has led to many fields becoming more and more uneven as time goes by. 
This makes the ensuing seedbed preparation difficult and expensive. On top of this, 
managers insist on excessive seeding densities of up to 500 seeds/m², which increase 
costs further. Seeding does not take place at an even depth, and this increases the risk 
of winter kill. The resulting problems become apparent when the crops re-emerge 
after the winter. Either extremely dense, sod-like stands of grain emerge that cannot 
be raised to generate anything close to the economic optimum. Or a severe winter has 
wreaked havoc on the unevenly sown seed, leading to significant yield losses and in 
some cases necessitating complete re-seeding. In this way, poor management 
exacerbates the prevailing shortage of capital. 
• Feed production for dairy cows on Ukrainian farms generally takes place on a very 
extensive basis, ostensibly due to shortage of capital. As a result of this extensive 
production, land requirements of 0.8 to 1.0 ha per animal equivalent are common. 
Since optimising feed production for dairy cows could reduce the corresponding land 
requirements by 30 to over 50%, and since the land unnecessarily bound in this 
manner is taken out of potential cash crop production, the opportunity costs of this 
poor management in feed production are high. The result, again, is to exacerbate the 
shortage of capital. Many farms continue to use the old, one-dimensional communist 
full cost accounting system. This obscures the sort of hidden cross-subsidization of 
farm activities within enterprises described above (i.e. as milk production that takes 
place at the expense of crop production). As a result, necessary decisions are not 
taken that would be indicated by modern methods of farm accounting that are 
standard in western countries.  
Both of these examples illustrate that the main challenge facing Ukrainian farm 
managers is to adapt their production and management methods to the new conditions 
prevailing in Ukraine. If farm managers resist modern methods and their implementation, 
Ukrainian agriculture will only be able to make very slow progress and it will take 15 to 
20 years before it is able to play the role on international commodity markets that it could 
given its natural endowments.  
Ukrainian farm managers must reconcile themselves to the fact that they will only 
have access to long-term loans if they are able to demonstrate at least 2 years of 
significantly improved results in terms of profitability, liquidity and stability. No bank will 
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be interested in providing long-term credits to farms that have consistently underperformed 
and are manifestly poorly managed. This also means that Ukrainian farm managers will 
have to make increased use of external consultancy and farm extension services to help 
them define strategic goals, develop plans for attaining these goals, and compare goals with 
actual results to identify remedial actions on a regular basis. Only when farm managers in 
Ukraine accept that they can and must benefit from this sort of assistance will Ukrainian 
agriculture be able to take off and experience truly sustainable growth.  
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Part III: 
Developments on Key Agricultural Markets in 
Ukraine 
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12 A Market for Risk and not for Grain: An Introduction to 
Futures Markets for Agricultural Products in Ukraine 
ARNIM KUHN & STEPHAN VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL 
1 Introduction 
Futures markets can provide an efficient tool for farmers, traders and processing 
companies to reduce the price risk associated with the trade of agricultural commodities. 
Even more important, a well functioning futures market increases the price transparency on 
agricultural commodity markets and provides valuable and inexpensive information for all 
market participants, including those who do not trade on the commodity exchange. Futures 
markets for agricultural products have gained considerably in importance over the last 20 
years, and have been established in an increasing number of countries – for example 
Hungary and Germany in the 1990s, and China in recent years. This paper provides an 
introduction to the functioning of futures markets for those who are not familiar with this 
risk-management tool. It is structured as follows: section 2 explains the nature of futures 
markets, and in section 3 an overview is given on how futures markets are organised. How 
farmers can profit from the existence of futures markets is discussed in section 4. Section 5 
specifies the policy requirements for a functioning futures market in Ukraine. 
2 The nature of a futures market: Trading risk – not grain 
When the idea of establishing an agricultural commodity exchange for the trade of 
agricultural futures contracts was discussed in Germany in the early 1990s1, many farmers, 
journalists and even scientists had a wrong perception: 
1. A first concern was that the establishment of a futures exchange might have a 
negative impact on small producers. In fact, many people believed that futures only 
benefit big players, and that these markets can worsen the situation of farmers. 
2. Second, many people believed that futures markets provide for another marketing 
channel, i.e. that the existence of a futures market means that farmers can sell their 
products not only to the local elevator or processor, but also at the futures exchange.  
Both assessments are wrong. In fact, futures markets provide valuable and 
inexpensive information for everybody in the market, especially for farmers, who are 
normally not able to maintain their own market information systems. This means that they 
especially improve the information available to farmers, thus strengthening their 
competitive position relative to big players. Second, futures markets do not provide a new 
marketing channel. In fact, the basic idea is that of trading risk, not agricultural commodities 
such as grain. The scepticism futures markets are viewed with is probably due to the fact 
                                              
1  Futures markets for agricultural commodities have existed since 1860 in the US. For a variety of 
historical reasons, commodities futures were forbidden in Germany for many decades, and it was 
not until the early 1990s that policy makers decided to legalise them again. 
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that they are complex and their functioning requires some explanation. This is provided in 
the following:  
2.1 The forward contract 
The nature of a futures contract can probably best be explained by its historical 
development out of forward contracts, which are widely used also in Ukraine. In such a 
contract, two partners typically agree on the future delivery of a certain amount of a 
commodity: for example, in March a farmer signs a contract in which he promises to deliver 
100 tonnes of 3rd class wheat to a trader in August of the same year. This is a private 
contract and the contract partners have to agree on many details individually, including 
among others the quality of the grain, the delivery date and location, and appropriate 
sanctions in case one of the parties does not fulfil the contract. Such a contract is concluded 
voluntarily and has many advantages for the contractors. Both of them know about the price 
and the quantity delivered in advance. This enables farmers to plan their production and 
processors to use their storage and processing facilities more efficiently, and can, therefore, 
reduce their costs (processors have to provide less storage facility due to in-time delivery of 
the grain, etc.).  
On the other hand, once such a contract has been signed, it is difficult to step back 
from it even if the farmer cannot deliver (for example due to crop failure). This has to be 
distinguished from the enforceability of forward contracts. Often a situation arises in which 
the price has dropped compared to the expected price. In this case the buyer has an incentive 
not to take delivery of the commodity under the terms of the forward contract but rather to 
buy it on the market at the prevailing (lower) spot price. The seller, on the other hand, has 
an incentive to breach the forward contract if the market price has increased. If one contract 
partner breaches the contract, the other can take legal action. But this costs time and money 
for lawyers for example, and there is no guarantee that the legal action will be successful. 
Even if it is, the losses incurred (for example due to a production standstill etc. caused by 
the breach of contract) may not be fully compensated.  
2.2 Contract enforcement 
This is the reason why a system was developed in the 1860s in Chicago that ensures 
contract enforcement in a simple way. Actually, this so-called clearing system is at the core 
of any exchange world-wide. If two partners have signed a contract in March for the 
delivery of 100 tonnes of grain in August for the price of 500 UAH/tonne they employ a 
third and independent party. This party, called the clearinghouse, ensures contract 
enforcement. When the contract is signed, both contractors make a deposit – the so-called 
margin – with the clearinghouse. If the margin is for example 10% of the contract volume2, 
it amounts to 5 000 UAH for the contract outlined above (10% of 100 tonne * 
500 UAH/tonne).  
When the contract is due in August, several situations can arise (table 12.1): 
The market price is 500 UAH/tonne (see the third to last row in table 12.1). This 
means that neither the buyer nor the seller have lost any money in comparison to the market 
                                              
2  How the margin is set is explained in greater detail below. 
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price they expected. The clearinghouse transfers the initial margin back to the two 
contractors after the contract is fulfilled.  
If the price has risen – for example to 550 UAH/tonne – the buyer is better off (see 
the second to last row in table 12.1). According to the contract he pays 500 UAH/tonne for 
grain that is worth 550 UAH/tonne on the spot market. Hence, he pays 50 000 UAH instead 
of 55 000 UAH, which is to his advantage. But the seller is disappointed. He is obliged by 
the contract to deliver grain for 500 UAH/tonne that he could sell for 550 UAH /tonne. So 
the seller has an incentive to breach the contract. However, if he does so, the clearinghouse 
will not return his 5 000 UAH margin but transferred to the buyer. Hence, the buyer gets his 
margin back (5 000 UAH), plus the seller’s margin (5 000 UAH). Even though he is forced 
by the seller’s breach of contract to purchase his grain on the spot market for 55 000 UAH, 
the receipt of the seller’s margin leaves him with a net payment of 50 000 UAH; as if the 
contract had been fulfilled. Similarly, the seller receives 55 000 UAH for his grain on the 
spot market, but he forfeits his 5 000 UAH margin. In the end he too is faced with the same 
conditions as stated in the original contract. 
Table 12.1:  How the margin system functions 
Date Price in UAH/tonne Sellers position Buyers position Clearinghouse accounts 
    Seller Buyer 
March Seller and buyer conclude on a contract, delivery August 
500 UAH/tonne 
The total contract volume amounts to 50000 UAH 
Contractors deposit 10% of the contract volume at the clearinghouse
5000 5000 
August 500 0 0 5000 5000 
August 550  5000 5000 0 10000 
August 450 5000 5000 10000 0 
The opposite holds if the price has dropped. In the last row of table 12.1, it is 
assumed that the price has fallen to 450 UAH/tonne. In this situation the buyer has an 
incentive to breach the contract, but since he forfeits his margin as a result, at the end of the 
day both he and the seller face an effective price of 500 UAH/tonne. The function of the 
clearinghouse is thus to compensate the parties for the losses and profits that have occurred. 
And if each contract partner deposits a certain percentage of the total contract volume at the 
clearinghouse, contract enforcement is ensured as long as the price does not change by more 
than this percentage. A margin of 10% (20%) enables the clearinghouse to level out profits 
and losses up to a price change of 10% (20%). 
Of course, prices can change by more than 10% or even 20%. So it might appear 
reasonable for the clearinghouse to demand a much higher margin. However, it would be 
quite expensive for the contract partners to deposit 50% or even more at the clearinghouse. 
Therefore, over time exchanges developed the so-called margin-call system. If the price on 
the market drops (rises) by more than 10% during the contract span, the clearinghouse asks 
the buyer (seller) for an additional margin. This so-called margin call ensures that at any 
time the clearinghouse can compensate the other party if one party breaches the contract. 
Changing market prices automatically trigger margin calls, and therefore profits and losses 
are levelled out during the contract span. This is a major difference to forward contracts, 
where profits and losses are levelled out on the date of delivery3. 
                                              
3  In practice, the collection and management of margin calls is more complicated. For an overview 
see for example Chicago Board of Trade (1997). 
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2.3 The standardisation of futures contracts 
A second important feature of a futures market is the standardisation of contracts. 
The specification of a futures contract is not individually negotiated by the contract partners. 
Instead, the partners purchase contracts that have been standardised by the exchange. A 
typical contract at the Chicago Board of Trade (CBoT)4 is the wheat contract. The so-called 
contract specifications are the size (5000 bushel of wheat, where one bushel of wheat is 
27.216 kg), the deliverable grades (No. 2 Soft Red, No. 2 Hard Red Winter and other 
varieties), the delivery location (for example one or more ports on the Mississippi river) and 
the delivery month (July, September, December, March and May). The latter means that 
different contracts for the same commodity are traded at futures exchanges; these contracts 
are identical in all but one respect, the delivery date. Hence, somebody who wishes to use 
futures contracts has to decide on the delivery month and then buy or sell a contract at the 
exchange at the prevailing price.  
2.4 Actual delivery: The exception, not the rule 
The future contract certifies a commitment to deliver (seller) or to accept (the buyer) 
a certain amount of a certain product at a certain place and point in time (the delivery 
month). One can easily imagine that this commitment can be traded. It does not matter for 
the buyer A whether seller B or C is the contract partner. And for the seller D of a contract, 
it does not matter whether buyer E or F promises to take delivery. Hence, once concluded, 
futures contracts can be traded.  
Furthermore, buyers and sellers are seldom interested in actually fulfilling their 
contracts; they rarely use futures markets as a means of trading physical commodities. 
Instead, they use futures markets as a risk management tool5. A farmer who in the month of 
March sells a September wheat contract for 500 UAH/tonne knows that he will end up 
receiving 500 UAH/tonne for his wheat, regardless of how the spot price develops in the 
interim. Even if the spot price has fallen and he only receives 450 UAH/tonne, he will be 
reimbursed by the mechanism described above for the difference of 50 UAH/tonne. So 
selling a futures contract is a means of ‘locking in’ a price. This reduces risk and allows the 
farmer to concentrate on doing what he does best (farming), rather than worrying about 
prices. The same holds true for the buyer, and thus the demand side of the market such as 
compound feed producers or flour mills.  
Note that both the buyer and the seller will end up trading the actual physical grain 
on the spot market. To cancel their respective commitments to sell on the futures market, a 
farmer will buy the offsetting futures contracts at the same time as he sells his grain on the 
spot market. The farmer will thus hold two contracts at the exchange, one in which he 
promises to deliver, and another one in which he promises to take delivery. These 
commitments offset one another, leaving the farmer with no net commitment or ‘open 
position’ on the futures market. The buyer will do the opposite to cancel his commitment. 
Actually, on most futures exchanges world-wide less than 2% of all the contracts are 
concluded with physical delivery. Hence, the futures exchange is not a new marketing 
                                              
4  See www.cbot.com. 
5  This process is called ‘hedging’ and explained in detail in section 4. 
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channel for commodities but rather a place where the risk of falling or rising prices is 
traded.  
2.5 Summary: The difference between a forward and a futures contract 
The differences between forward contract and futures contracts are summarised in 
table 12.2. They include standardisation, tradability, integrity (how contract enforcement is 
ensured), payment, fulfilment, transaction costs (all costs that are accompanied with the 
search for a contract partner, negotiations, concluding a contract and contract enforcement), 
and risk.  
Table 12.2: Characteristics of forward and futures contracts 
Characteristic Forward contract Futures contract 
Standardisation  Not necessarily standardised, but 
mostly concluded among the 
contractors 
Quantity, quality, place and time of delivery are 
standardised 
Tradability  Almost no tradability, i.e. contracts can 
not be traded on the market 
Contracts can be traded. Tradability depends of 
the trade volume at any exchange 
Integrity (contract 
enforcement) 
The same as in any other trade contract Is guaranteed by the exchange, i.e. the 
clearinghouse 
Payment Normally with delivery During the duration of the contract via the margin 
mechanism 
Fulfilment Physical  Settlement, i.e. taking out an off-setting position 
Transaction costs Individually negotiated Brokerage fee and interest rates on margins  
Risk Contract fulfilment  The so-called basis risk and some others 
Source:  NELSON (1985, p. 17) 
Nevertheless, futures contracts are not perfect substitutes for forward contracts. 
Instead, a functioning futures market can complement the forward market. A trader, for 
example, might be reluctant to offer a forward contract to a farmer for the purchase of a 
certain amount of grain after the harvest, because he does not know what the price will be 
following the harvest. He is confronted with a price risk. If the price after the harvest is 
lower than was concluded in the forward contract, the trader will incur a loss. A functioning 
futures market enables him to reduce this price risk, as outlined above, and this will make 
him less reluctant to offer forward contracts to farmers, other things being equal. Hence, 
offering forward contracts to farmers is less risky with a functioning futures market than 
without.  
3 Futures markets organisation  
An exchange where futures contracts are traded is essentially organised like any other 
exchange. Its heart is the trading place where offers are made by so-called brokers6. A 
contractor (for example farmer, food processor or trader) who wants to conclude a contract 
at the exchange first has to approach a registered broker. The broker is responsible for the 
contractor’s margin and has to ensure vis-à-vis the clearinghouse that all margins and 
margin calls are paid in time. The broker then enters a corresponding offer on the exchange. 
A typical order is, for example, that the farmer asks the broker to sell a contract (e.g. wheat, 
                                              
6  Brokers are sometimes called traders. The word ‘trader’ used in this sense should not be confused 
with trader in the sense of a commodity trader such as Cargill or Nibolon. 
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delivery March) within a certain price range – e.g. from 480 UAH/tonne to 500 UAH/tonne 
– or not to sell at a price lower than 500 UAH/tonne. The broker then looks for another 
broker who wants to buy a March wheat contract within the same price range. The brokers 
meet and trade contracts in a so-called ‘pit’ at the CBoT. In Hannover in Germany, on the 
other hand, a computerised trading platform was established. The computer system matches 
two offers if the brokers have put the same price or price range into the system. If so, a 
contract is automatically concluded.  
Figure 12.1:  How a futures exchange is organised 
Clearinghouse Clearingbank
Trading Place
Hedger (Trader or mill)
Trader/Broker
Hedger (Farmer)
Trader/Broker
Supervision
Exchange
Margin M argin
Speculator  
 
Those who trade on an exchange can be divided into two major groups: 
• Hedgers, as discussed above, are those market participants who have the physical 
agricultural commodity at some future date and who are interested in reducing the 
associated price risk (hedging). Their aim to buy or sell futures contracts to offset the 
risk of changing prices on the spot market. In agriculture, farmers, traders and 
processors use futures to protect themselves from changing spot market prices.  
• Speculators take on the risk that hedgers wish to avoid. Speculators buy or sell 
contracts based on their beliefs that prices will either rise or fall; speculators believe 
that they know ‘where the market is going’. Driven by potential profits, speculators 
provide the marketplace with an essential element – liquidity – enabling hedgers to 
buy or to sell contracts whenever they wish. This liquidity is important because it 
guarantees that hedgers will always be able to buy or sell offsetting contracts and 
thus close any open position on the futures market. Furthermore, to make sound 
forecasts of future price developments, speculators have an incentive to collect as 
much information as possible on the agricultural market in question.  
This behaviour is very important, because whenever a speculator manages to find a 
new piece of information, his subsequent trading activity on the futures market effectively 
makes this information public. If, for example, speculators receive plausible new 
information that the next wheat harvest in China will be smaller than anticipated, they will 
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expect world market prices to increase. Hence, they will buy futures contracts today in the 
hope of selling them later at higher prices. These purchases, however, will drive up the 
prices of those futures contracts. In effect, therefore, the speculators’ information will be 
incorporated into prices on the futures market, making it accessible to all. The price of a 
futures contract can therefore be seen as a sort of forecast that at any given point in time 
incorporates all the relevant information available on the market in question. 
Trading on futures exchanges is not free of charge. First, the broker and the exchange 
have to be reimbursed for their services. They change fees that generally amount to some 
0.5% of the contract volume, but can differ depending on the size of the orders and the 
market structure. Furthermore, the hedgers and speculators have to deposit the margin. As a 
rule, this deposit does not bear any interest payments. Hence, the margin and margin calls 
reduce liquidity and profitability in form of the foregone interest payments. At some 
exchanges the clearinghouse accepts bank or other securities such as shares as deposits.  
4 Futures markets – a useful tool for farmers and others 
4.1 Futures markets increase market transparency 
Futures markets are efficient tools for all market participants that increase market 
transparency and provide price forecasts that would not otherwise be available in this form. 
EU farmers, for example, who sell rapeseed to a Co-operative or private trade, often use the 
price quotation at the MATIF, the exchange in Paris. The MATIF quotation is readily 
available via telephone or internet, and the availability of this information to all participants 
reduces the information advantage that larger companies would otherwise have vis-à-vis 
small farmers. Futures markets also help farmers to make better price forecasts. Farmers can 
use this information to plan their production. Brazilian farmers, for example, have any 
incentive to increase their soybean acreage when prices for future contracts at harvest time 
in Brazil quote high, and vice versa. In general, such information enables farmers to make 
more efficient decisions on input use and, therefore, the amount of grain to produce. It helps 
mills and other processing companies in their price negotiations with traders and farmers, 
and provides banks with useful information on the revenue farms can earn and, therefore, on 
their creditworthiness. Indeed, in some cases in Western countries, banks will insist that a 
farmer hedge his crop on a futures market as a precondition for providing this farmer with 
credit.  
However, it is important to consider:  
• Futures markets do not have a systematic impact on the price volatility on 
agricultural commodity markets. By improving the information basis available to all 
market participants they can lead to more efficient production, storage and marketing 
decisions. While this might have the effect of levelling out some price peaks, the 
extent of this effect is difficult to assess. But the existence of futures markets 
definitely does not change key market fundamentals that determine spot prices such 
as Ukraine’s net trade position, the size of the crop, or the level of world market 
prices.  
• Futures markets do not provide anything resembling an intervention price system. 
The situation on the grain market in 2004 is a good example. A futures market would 
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probably have ‘predicted’ the price decrease after the 2004 crop earlier, but it would 
have done nothing to stop this collapse. 
4.2 Hedging or how to reduce price risk from the farmers perspective 
As outlined above, hedging is the most important motive for using futures markets. A 
typical hedge will be explained in the following using a simple example. Assume that after 
the harvest in October 2004, prices for wheat are rather low at 545 UAH/tonne. A Ukrainian 
farmer therefore decides not to sell but rather to store 100 tonne of wheat until next year, in 
the hope that prices will climb. Of course, in October 2004 he does not know what price 
will prevail next March, for example. Hence, by deciding to store his wheat the farmer is 
actually speculating. Since storage is costly, the farmer will incur a profit only if the price 
increase between October and March is higher than his costs of storing, the opportunity cost 
of the capital that is tied up in the stored wheat, and the risk that pests etc. might damage 
this wheat. Since there is no way of knowing for certain that prices will increase by at least 
this amount, storage is risky.  
One option that the farmer could use to reduce this risk is to conclude a forward 
contract, delivery March 2005, with all the accompanying advantages and disadvantages. 
Another option would be to sell a futures contract. Assume that a well functioning futures 
exchange exists in Ukraine. This exchange offers a contract for 100 tonnes of 3rd class 
wheat, delivery date March 2005. At the end of October 2004, the domestic milling wheat 
price in Ukraine was quoted at 545 UAH/tonne. Assume that the price quoted at the end of 
October for the March contract is higher – 650 UAH/tonne. According to the farmer’s 
calculations, this price is high enough to cover all his storage costs and provide him with a 
reasonable profit. Hence, via his broker he sells a March futures contract on October 25. Of 
course, the farmer has to deposit a margin. For simplicity the margin is assumed to equal 
10% of the contract volume. Hence, the farmer deposits 6 500 UAH with the clearinghouse.  
Time goes by and prices change. At first, in November and December, prices 
increase, reaching 700 UAH/tonne. This means that the spot price (700 UAH/tonne) has 
increased to a level that exceeds the price at which the farmer has committed himself to 
deliver in March (650 UAH/tonne). However, since the difference between these two prices 
(50 UAH/tonne) is less than 10% of the futures price (50 equals only 7.7% of 650 UAH), it 
is covered by margin.  
In January the government decides to cancel the import duty on grain due to an 
emerging shortage of milling wheat. As a result, the domestic wheat price falls back to 
600 UAH/tonne where it remains for the next few months. At the end of February the 
farmer decides to sell the wheat he has stored. At the prevailing spot price of 
600 UAH/tonne, his revenue amounts to 60 000 UAH. However, he still owns the March 
2005 futures contract; this contract commits him to delivering 100 tonnes of wheat in March 
for a price of 650 UAH/tonne. To cancel this commitment he now buys an offsetting 
contract. This contract now costs 600 UAH/tonne, the prevailing spot price of wheat7. Since 
he originally sold for 650 UAH/tonne and now buys for 600 UAH/tonne, the farmer realises 
a profit of 50 UAH/tonne on the futures market. This translates into an additional 
5 000 UAH of revenue, leaving him with total revenue of 65 000 UAH (60 000 from the 
                                              
7  We explain why this is the case below. 
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sale of grain and 5 000 from the clearinghouse). This is exactly what the farmer expected 
when he ‘locked in’ the price of 650 UAH/tonne on the futures market in October. Of 
course, since he has no open commitment on the futures market, the exchange returns the 
margin of 6 500 UAH originally deposited in October. Table 12.3 provides an overview of 
the transactions associated with the hedge. 
Table 12.3:  A typical hedge transaction using futures 
Month Transaction Price on 
the spot 
market 
Price of the 
March 2005 
futures contract 
Futures price 
minus spot 
price (basis) 
Revenue (costs) in UAH 
Oct. 2004 Sell futures 
contract 
545 650 105 (6500) margin deposit 
Mar. 2005 1) Buy futures   
contract 
2) Sell wheat on 
spot market 
600 600 0 1) 5000 futures price  
difference  
  6500 margin is returned 
2) 60000 sales revenue 
Source:  Own presentation. 
In this example we have assumed that as the expiry date of the futures contract 
approaches (in other words, as this contract approaches so-called ‘maturity’), the price of 
this contract will equal the prevailing spot price (600 UAH/tonne). The difference between 
the price of a futures contract on its date of maturity and the spot price on this date is 
referred to as the maturity basis (see table 12.3). The maturity basis will tend to equal 0 
because if it does not, market participants will either buy or sell futures contracts with a 
view to delivering them with physical commodities that have been sold or bought on the 
spot market, respectively. For example, if the spot price equals 600 UAH/tonne and the 
futures price equals 650 UAH/tonne shortly prior to maturity, a trader can sell futures 
contracts and deliver them with wheat purchased on the spot market, making a profit of 
50 UAH/tonne (minus transaction costs). Since many traders will want to take advantage of 
this risk-free opportunity to make profits (this is referred to as arbitrage), the demand for 
grain on the spot market and the supply of futures contracts will both increase. This will 
drive the spot price up and the futures price down until, in equilibrium, these prices are 
equal and the maturity basis is 0.  
If the spot price had risen to 700 UAH/tonne (i.e. a level above the futures price he 
‘locked in’ in October), the farmer would have had to buy his offsetting contract for 
700 UAH/tonne (based on a maturity basis of 0). He would have thus realised a loss of 
50 UAH/tonne (= 700 – 650) or 5 000 UAH on the futures market. However, he would have 
received 70 000 UAH on the spot market. Again, he would have ended up with net revenue 
of 65 000 UAH from selling 100 tonnes of wheat. Regardless of how the spot price 
develops, by hedging his wheat on the futures market in October, the farmer is able to 
guarantee himself the price of 650 UAH/tonne. In retrospect he might regret having hedged, 
because the spot price is higher than 650 UAH/tonne, but ex ante (i.e. in October 2004) it is 
just as likely that the price might fall below 650 UAH/tonne, leaving him with a loss. If he 
does not wish to speculate, hedging provides a rational and efficient alternative. 
5 Preconditions for functioning futures markets in Ukraine 
The previous sections have explained the functioning of a futures exchange in 
general and how traders, processors and farmers can use it to hedge their price risks on the 
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spot market. The basic mechanism is that gains and losses on the spot and futures market 
cancel out each other. However, this mechanism function only works adequately under 
certain conditions, which are currently not fulfilled in Ukraine. 
5.1 The role of basis risk and domestic price formation 
Perfect hedging has been demonstrated in table 12.3 above. This example is repeated 
in table 12.4 below in the first scenario. In the first scenario the hedge functions perfectly 
because the price difference between the spot and the futures market (generally called the 
basis; and maturity basis at the moment of contract fulfilment) is equal to zero. If this is not 
the case, hedging will not work perfectly. Let’s assume that the farmer who wishes to hedge 
a grain sale lives in Sumy, while the futures market is located in Kiev. Kiev is a deficit 
region where prices are usually higher than in regions with surpluses such as Sumy. This 
price difference is not a problem per se, as scenario 2 demonstrates. The hedge works 
perfectly despite the price difference of 30 UAH/tonne. The decisive factor is that the basis 
has not changed over the duration of the futures contract. 
Table 12.4:  Hedging price risks at a hypothetical Ukrainian futures exchange under 
various scenarios of price formation on domestic agricultural markets  
Month Transaction I: Price on 
local spot 
market 
II: Price on 
futures 
market 
II - I 
(Basis) 
Revenues on futures 
and spot market 
1. Scenario: Hedging with no price difference between spot (Sumy) and futures market (Kiev) 
Oct. 2004 1. Sale of futures contract 545 650 105 -6500 Margin  
March 2005 1. Purchase of futures contract 
2. Sale of wheat on spot market 600 600 0 
1. +5000 futures 
2. +60000  
spot market 
= 65000 UAH 
2. Scenario: Hedging with a stable basis (= price difference) between Sumy and Kiev 
Oct. 2004 1. Sale of futures contract 515 650 135 -6500 Margin  
March 2005 1. Purchase of futures contract 
2. Sale of wheat on spot market 570 600 30 
1. +5000 futures 
2. +57000  
spot market 
= 62000 UAH 
3. Scenario: Hedging with a volatile and unpredictable basis between Sumy and Kiev 
Oct. 2004 1. Sale of futures contract 515 650 135 -6.500 Margin  
March 2005 1. Purchase of futures contract 
2. Sale of wheat on spot market 520 600 60 
1. +5000 futures 
2. +52000  
spot market 
= 57000 UAH 
Source:  Own presentation.  
Scenario 3, however, demonstrates that hedging becomes less effective the more the 
difference between the spot and futures markets becomes unpredictable. This phenomenon 
is called basis risk. We assume that the initial price difference is 30 UAH/tonne, but that this 
may change over the duration of the futures contract. If, for instance, the Sumy oblast 
administration decides (as has often been the case in Ukraine) to ban all grain shipments 
beyond the oblast border in February, the prices in Sumy will be lower than expected, and 
the price difference to Kiev will widen, in scenario 3 to 60 UAH/ tonne. As a result, hedging 
does not work perfectly any more, as the farmer does not realise the expected combined 
revenue of 62 000 UAH (650 UAH – 30 UAH * 100 tonnes) as in scenario 2, but only 
57 000 UAH.  
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Nevertheless, the farmer is still better off with hedging as long as the spot market 
price fluctuations are larger and move in the same direction as the changes of the basis. The 
degree up to which hedging in Ukraine may be efficient therefore hinges upon the degree to 
which regional prices within Ukraine are integrated, i.e. move in the same direction. The 
frequent barriers to domestic trade in agricultural commodities in Ukraine therefore 
constitute a serious obstacle to the development of a futures exchange.  
5.2 Political obstacles to a Ukrainian futures exchange 
From the above considerations substantial consequences for Ukrainian agricultural 
policy can be derived. Generally, a futures market cannot function in a country where the 
state actively tries to influence market outcomes, as this creates a policy risk which is 
difficult to estimate, particularly for small futures market participants. More specifically: 
• Any plans for the creation of a market intervention system with minimum prices 
are fundamentally at odds with a functioning commodity exchange. The two 
systems cannot properly co-exist. European experience shows that futures contracts 
are only successful for commodities that are not subject to active price and market 
interference (pigs, potatoes, and rapeseed). Futures contracts for products subject to 
the intervention system have not been successful so far, e.g. the wheat contract in 
Hanover or at the MATIF in Paris. 
• Granting import quotas on a discretionary basis, as has happened in the area of raw 
sugar, offer the importers the opportunity to influence domestic prices and thus 
realise risk-free rents at the futures exchange. More generally, this triggers the 
question whether the Ukrainian market is not too small to avoid the influencing of 
market prices by big public or well-connected private actors. 
• Generally, the frequent discretionary interference on markets by regional or 
national policy is a serious obstacle to functioning futures contracts. For instance, 
Ukrainian policymakers are often not happy with price changes for food products as 
a consequence of low harvests, and react by imposing maximum prices and trade 
margins, as for instance in the aftermath of the failed wheat harvest in 2003.  
• A strong and completely independent legal system is a prerequisite for avoiding 
insider trading that would quickly discredit and cripple any futures market in 
Ukraine. As long as the legal instruments and independence needed to punish such 
behaviour – regardless of who is the perpetrator – are not developed, Ukraine should 
not pursue the development of a futures market. 
A fundamental and open question is whether Ukraine needs its own futures 
exchange in the first place, or whether contracts which are specified for Ukraine could be 
traded at larger and better established exchanges in Europe. There are indications that 
international grain markets are becoming increasingly complex and diversified. The existing 
exchange in Hungary is now inside the EU, where agricultural markets remain insulated 
from some world market influences. Hence, there may be too much basis risk associated 
with contracts on the Budapest Exchange from a Ukrainian market perspective. In recent 
years, US markets have repeatedly ‘disconnected’ from the rest of the world, and Chicago 
futures have therefore lost some of their power as a hedging tool in international agricultural 
trade. At the same time, the Black Sea region is emerging as a major ‘driver’ of 
international grain markets in its own right. Hence, establishing future contracts with Black 
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Sea region specifications on established exchanges elsewhere in the world or perhaps even 
on a new exchange in Ukraine deserves careful consideration in the coming years. 
6 Summary 
As in other countries where futures markets were unknown until recently – Germany 
is a good example – the nature and the functioning of future markets are often not well 
understood in Ukraine. In this paper we have presented a brief overview of how futures 
markets work and what they can and cannot be expected to provide. The most important 
points are summarised in the following: 
1. Futures markets do not provide a new marketing channel. In fact, the basic idea 
behind the use of futures markets is that of trading risk, not physical agricultural 
commodities. On futures markets risk is transferred from those who are not willing to 
bear it, such as farmers, processors or traders, to speculators who are.  
2. Futures exchanges provide farmers, traders and processors with a tool for reducing 
the price risk associated with dealing in agricultural commodities. This 
mechanism is called hedging. Hedging on futures markets costs some 0.2 to 0.5% of 
the contract volume. Furthermore, since hedgers are required to deposit margins, 
hedging does reduce their liquidity. 
3. Futures markets provide valuable and inexpensive information for everybody in 
the market – especially for farmers, who are normally not able to maintain their own 
market information systems. Futures markets therefore tend to improve the relative 
competitive position of farmers and other ‘small players’ on agricultural markets, 
even if these small players do not actively use the futures market for hedging 
themselves. 
4. Futures markets do not systematically reduce price volatility on agricultural 
commodity markets. They also cannot provide anything resembling an intervention 
price system. Hence, the existence of a futures market in Ukraine would not have 
prevented any of the major price fluctuations that have occurred on Ukrainian grain 
markets due to harvest fluctuations in recent years, for example.  
5. Establishing a futures exchange in Ukraine would require a lot of time and careful 
planning. Any mistake made during this process has the potential to endanger the 
viability of this project.  
6. Well-integrated commodity markets are a very important prerequisite to make 
Ukraine an attractive location for a futures exchange. The question is whether the 
government is ready to abstain from political interventions which hamper the 
formation of well-interlinked markets, both within Ukraine and between Ukraine and 
the rest of the world.  
7. An open question is whether Ukraine needs its own futures exchange, or whether 
contracts which are specified for Ukraine could be traded at larger and better-
established exchanges in Europe. There are increasing indications, however, that 
international grain markets are becoming increasingly complex and diversified. The 
Black Sea region is emerging as a major ‘driver’ of international grain markets in its 
own right, and this suggests that the possibility of establishing a futures exchange in 
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the region (or at least trading contracts with Black Sea region specifications on other 
exchanges) deserves careful consideration. 
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13 The Oilseed Export Tax Revisited 
ARNIM KUHN & OLEG NIVYEVSKIY 
1 Introduction 
Sunflower seed (sunseed) is a crop for which Ukraine definitely has a comparative 
advantage. Over the last decade Ukraine has accounted for 10-16% of the total world 
production of sunseed and for 5-39% of the total world trade in this product. Sunseed is also 
the basis for the country’s vegetable oil industry, which had a market share of about 16% on 
the world sunflower oil (sunoil) market in 1999-2000. Of course, while producers are 
interested in higher domestic sunseed prices, sunoil producers (crushers) prefer lower prices 
and sufficient supply of cheap raw materials. As a consequence, it is no wonder that 
Ukrainian policy makers have repeatedly been confronted with the issue of export taxes for 
oilseeds. In October 1999, a 23% export tax was introduced. In July 2001 this tax was cut to 
17%. A further cut has been proposed, but this proposal has encountered fierce resistance 
from the sunseed crushing lobby which has proposed instead the introduction of a 
production subsidy for farmers that would compensate for the losses caused by depressed 
domestic prices for sunseed.  
The aim of this paper is to first give an overview of recent developments in the 
sunseed sector in Ukraine, and then to empirically analyse policy options regarding the 
export tax. Our analysis uses employs the recently devised partial equilibrium ‘Regionalised 
Agriculture Sector Model for Ukraine’ (RASMU). Our main finding is that the proposed 
production subsidy for sunseed producers would compensate them for the losses they incur 
as a result of the export tax, but at a considerable cost. It would also perpetuate the rents 
received by sunseed crushers.  
2 The sunseed sector in Ukraine 
2.1 Sunseed production 
Sunseed is one of the major crops produced in Ukraine, and among the world’s 
largest producers Ukraine is ranked third, after Argentina and Russia (figure 13.1). World 
sunseed production has been increasing over the last decade, from 23.5 mill. tonnes on 
average in the mid-1990s to 26.26 mill. tonnes in 2003/2004. Ukraine has followed this 
trend as, over the period 1990-2003, its sunseed production grew modestly. The volume of 
production increased from 2.72 mill. tonnes in 1990 to 4.25 mill. tonnes in 2003, but for the 
remaining years was comparable to 1990.  
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Figure 13.1: Production of the main sunflower seeds producers 
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Source: PS&D, www.fas.usda.gov/psd/psdselection.asp. 
The best growing conditions can be found in the steppe climatic zone, and almost 
90% of Ukrainian sunseed production is concentrated in the eastern and southern oblasts 
and on large farms. Sunseed accounted for only about 15% of the total harvested area in 
Ukraine in 2003. However, in the main producing regions this share is much higher (e.g. 
32% Dnipropetrovsk and 42% in Donetsk) and clearly higher than the recommended 
maximum share in crop rotations (20-25%). Indeed, many producers grow sunseed every 
two years on the same plot. If this practice continues, declining yields will probably 
constrain further production growth. The 1990s have already witnessed a decline in average 
yields.  
Although sunseed yields less gross revenue per hectare than winter wheat or barley, it 
is still said to be more profitable than competing crops. According to FAO estimates, 
average gross revenue for sunseed in 2001 and 2002 was 173 US$/ha, compared with 
187 US$/ha for winter wheat. After subtracting average variable costs, gross profits were 
101 US$/ha for sunseed and 82 US$/ha for winter wheat. The difference is mostly to the 
lower seed costs for sunflower (26 US$/ha for sunseed versus 55 and 50 US$/ha for winter 
wheat and barley, respectively). Net profits for sunflower seed and winter wheat were 46 
and 9.1 US$/ha, respectively1.  
While Ukraine is one of the three largest sunseed exporters, Ukraine’s world market 
share is not stable due to widely fluctuating harvests at home and abroad (figure 13.2).  
                                              
1 Actual revenues, costs and profits will vary across regions, farms and time. In Chapter 10 on Farm 
Management Challenges in Ukrainian Agriculture data on the profitability of different crops in 
Ukraine is also presented. 
 155 
Figure 13.2: Export by the main sunseed exporters 
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Source: PS&D; www.fas.usda.gov/psd/psdselection.asp. 
Figure 13.3 provides a monthly retrospective on Ukrainian exports and prices of 
sunseed between 1998 and 2003. After the introduction of the 23% tax, a differential 
between domestic and world market prices emerged in late 1999-2000 (16% on average) 
which, however, faded in the course of 2001 due to loopholes in the administration of the 
tax. The lowering of the tax rate to 17% in 2001 was accompanied by the closing of these 
loopholes, and a gap between domestic and international prices (13% on average) emerged 
in 2002.  
Table 13.1 summarises sunseed commodity balances over the period during which 
the oilseed export tax was in force. It is characterised by two developments. First, despite 
the introduction of the export tax, sunseed production tended to increase throughout the 
period, probably because of the bullish world market trend. Second, while production grew, 
exports fluctuated around a more or less constant trend as domestic crushing of sunseed 
expanded. This may be interpreted as a result of the export tax which helped the crushing 
industry to acquire raw materials for lower prices than would have prevailed without the tax. 
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Figure 13.3: Ukrainian sunseed exports and price development 
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Table 13.1: Sunseed balances in Ukraine (1998-2004) 
Sunflower Seed  
(thd. tonnes) 
1998/ 
1999 
1999/ 
2000 
2000/ 
2001 
2001/ 
2002 
2002/ 
2003 
2003/ 
2004 
Beginning Stocks  8 10 87 15 5 25 
Production  2266 2794 3457 2251 3270 4252 
Imports 2 2 1 1 1 1 
Total Supply  2276 2806 3545 2267 3276 4278 
Exports  876 450 1020 82 331 900 
Processing 1300 2100 2330 2070 2800 3200 
Food Use 25 29 30 30 30 30 
Other use 65 140 150 80 90 120 
Total Domestic Consumption  1390 2269 2510 2180 2920 3350 
Ending Stocks  10 87 15 5 25 28 
Source: PS&D, www.fas.usda.gov/psd/psdselection.asp. 
2.2 Overview of the crushing industry development 
The volume of sunseed processing in Ukraine has followed a U-shaped trend with 
little net change over the last decade. The volume of sunoil produced dropped from 
0.92 mill. tonnes in 1992/93 to 0.45 mill. tonnes in 1996/97, and then recovered to 
1.2 mill. tonnes in 2002/03. In the mid-1990’s, producers and traders found exporting more 
lucrative than selling sunseed to domestic crushers, who could simply not compete with 
foreign rivals. Low processing efficiency was a key feature of domestic crushers at this time 
(VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL, 1999), as due to outdated technology and high energy 
consumption processing costs varied between 29 and 60 US$/tonne, compared with 
27 US$/tonne in Western Europe. Due to a lack of liquidity, 80% of sunseed processing was 
conducted under tolling schemes, according to which crushers took 20% of the sunoil yield 
as their processing charge. Crushers only paid cash for 16% of the sunseed they procured, 
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and the rest was bartered. Hence, producers and traders preferred to sell abroad for cash. 
However, sunseed processing and production of sunoil increased significantly after the 
export tax on oilseeds was introduced.  
Table 13.2 shows that production of sunoil gradually increased from 1998/99 
onwards, 2001/02 was an exception due to the bad harvest in 2001. About 50% of Ukrainian 
sunoil is consumed domestically, and the rest is exported. According to FAO estimates, 
bottled sunoil accounts for about ¾ of total domestic vegetable oil consumption.  
Table 13.2: Sunoil balances in Ukraine (1998-2004) 
Sunflower Oil  
(thd. tonnes) 
1998/ 
1999 
1999/ 
2000 
2000/ 
2001 
2001/ 
2002 
2002/ 
2003 
2003/ 
2004 
Crush  1300 2100 2330 2070 2800 3200 
Beginning Stocks  9 7 12 15 10 19 
Production  530 840 970 850 1200 1300 
Imports  30 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Supply  569 847 982 865 1210 1319 
Exports  205 430 550 423 911 950 
Industrial Use  10 10 10 10 10 10 
Food  345 380 400 417 270 339 
Other uses 2 15 7 5 0 0 
Total Domestic Consumption  357 405 417 432 280 349 
Ending Stocks  7 12 15 10 19 20 
Source: PS&D, www.fas.usda.gov/psd/psdselection.asp. 
Figure 13.4 shows that before the 23% export tax was implemented, the domestic 
sunoil price was significantly higher than the world price. Since implementation of the 
export tax, domestic sunoil prices have fluctuated in line with world market prices. Some 
imports occurred in 1998/99, but Ukraine was a net exporter over the entire period in 
question (see table 13.2). As figure 13.4 shows, sunoil production peaks in September-May, 
i.e. during and after the harvest period. Currently, crushers sign contracts with producers 
and purchase most sunseed from October till January. Independent traders also participate 
on the market, purchasing sunseed from producers or through elevators and then selling it to 
crushers. 
The total oilseed crushing capacity in Ukraine is currently estimated at 
3.9 mill. tonnes. Sunseed is processed by more than 200 enterprises in Ukraine, but 19 large 
sunseed processors united in the Association of Ukrainian Sunflower Seed Crushers 
UkrOliyaProm account for 85% of total vegetable oil production. The remaining 15% is 
produced by small-scale processing enterprises with low capacities and outputs.  
Although crushing costs in Ukraine were very high in international comparison in the 
1990s (see above), they have since fallen. For 2001/02, the FAO reports average costs of 
20-40 US$/tonne, which is approaching Western European levels of efficiency. Of course, if 
(at least some and particular the largest) crushers have became cost-competitive, the 
rationale for the export tax becomes questionable. In this case the tax simply provides 
efficient domestic crushers with windfall profits, in economic terms ‘rents’. 
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Figure 13.4: Ukrainian sunoil production and price development 
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A by-product of sunoil production is sunflower meal (sunmeal), a livestock feed. 
Production of sunmeal has also increased over the years (table 13.3). The protein content of 
sunmeal is 35-37%, but sunmeal is not considered as good a source of protein for livestock 
as, for example, soybean meal. The development of the poultry meat industry in Ukraine 
may lead to an increase in domestic demand for sunmeal. 
Table 13.3: Sunmeal balances in Ukraine 
Sunflower Meal 
(thd. tonnes) 
1998/ 
1999 
1999/ 
2000 
2000/ 
2001 
2001/ 
2002 
2002/ 
2003 
2003/ 
2004 
Crush  1300 2100 2330 2070 2800 3200 
Beginning Stocks  0 0 2 2 2 4 
Production  520 850 950 820 1150 1300 
Total Supply  520 850 952 822 1152 1304 
Exports  190 338 600 597 848 950 
Feed use 330 510 350 223 300 350 
Total Domestic Consumption  330 510 350 223 300 350 
Source: PS&D, www.fas.usda.gov/psd/psdselection.asp. 
3 Possible justifications for the oilseed export tax 
The aim of this chapter is to scrutinise the plausibility of several arguments in favour 
of the oilseed export tax. We first consider the so-called infant industry argument, whereby 
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the Ukrainian crushing industry needs temporary help so that it can attract investment and 
become competitive. We then analyse the claim that Ukraine has market power in the world 
market for sunseed, which opens the possibility of an optimal export tax. 
A last argument should not go unmentioned. Some advocates of the export tax claim 
that many regions in Ukraine already produce too much sunseed from an agronomic 
perspective, which has detrimental effects on soil fertility and long-term productivity. 
According to this argument, the tax may hurt farmers, but it is for their own good. Aside 
from the fact that this is a rather paternalistic argument, it certainly does not justify taxing 
all sunseed farmers in the country, regardless of their crop management skills. Furthermore, 
policy makers should ask themselves whether the excessive production of sunseed is not 
due to excessive direct and indirect taxation of other crops, which forces farmers to 
(over)produce the only crop that is a reasonably dependable and intervention-free source of 
cash revenues. 
3.1 The infant-industry argument 
The so-called infant industry argument claims that an industry needs certain duration 
of public support in order to become internationally competitive. It has been used to justify 
industrial protectionism in the 19th century in the USA and Germany, and more recently 
import-substitution policies in developing countries. The subsidisation of the European 
aircraft industry (Airbus) is another example of subsidisation which is designed to help an 
industry to emerge and become competitive. The core of the infant industry argument is that 
a domestic industry cannot become competitive because its costs are too high initially, even 
though they could be lower and competitive in the long run. This may be due to economies 
of scale or other barriers to market entry (e.g. know-how or monopoly power of 
competitors). Potential competitiveness is seen as justifying initial protection of the 
domestic industry to help it ‘over the hump’ until it can withstand competition on its own. 
The initial protection may lead to welfare losses in the short run, but it is assumed that these 
are outweighed by the long run benefits generated by the competitive industry later on. 
In our context the sunseed crushing industry is the ‘infant’, and support is provided in 
the form of low-priced raw materials (sunseed) due to the 17% export tax on oilseeds. 
Oilseed crushers in Ukraine were inefficient and operating under capacity in the 1990s, 
while huge amounts of sunseed were exported to be crushed abroad. Under these 
circumstances, the justification for an export tax sounds compelling: the state supports a 
struggling industry, helps to maintain jobs and keep value added in Ukraine, and attracts 
FDI, and all this at virtually no cost to the national economy. 
While these arguments do sound compelling, the following points should not be 
overlooked: 
• First, the oilseed export tax does create very real costs in the form of significantly 
reduced revenues for domestic sunseed producers. Given a world price of 
250 US$/tonne, the 17% export tax on oilseeds means that producers get 
42.5 US$/tonne less than they otherwise would. Sunseed production averaged 
3.05 mill. tonnes between 1998 and 2004 (table 13.1), so a simple ‘back of the 
envelope’ calculation shows that total annual losses to sunseed producers due to the 
tax amount to roughly 130 mUS$ or 700 mUAH (see the detailed simulation results 
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in section 4). Policy makers in Ukraine constantly stress that they are committed to 
supporting farmers, but the oilseed export tax tells a very different story. 
• Second, it was pointed out above that as early as 2001/02, domestic crushing costs 
had fallen considerably compared with the mid-1990s. As investment has continued, 
the current competitiveness of the crushing industry in Ukraine will be even stronger. 
The ‘infant’ has grown up and should stand on its own feet now. Hence, if there ever 
was a justification for infant industry support, that justification is no longer valid.  
Indeed, the fact that the oilseed export tax continues to be applied is a classic 
example of what economists call ‘rent-seeking’. Firms that receive infant industry support 
get accustomed to this support and work to maintain it long after they stop needing it. The 
irony of the situation is that the support that they receive – the so-called rents – are a very 
convenient source of money that can be used to legally – and perhaps even illegally – 
persuade policy makers to maintain the flow of support. This is perhaps the most important 
reason why many economists are so sceptical of the infant industry argument; even in cases 
where it does seem economically plausible, it is likely that it will be misused. 
3.2 The market-power argument 
Import tariffs tax the consumer to the benefit of producers and the budget, and export 
taxes burden producers and benefit consumers and the budget. What both have in common 
is that the losses outweigh the benefits, leading to a net welfare loss for the country as a 
whole. According to the theory of optimal tariff setting, however, a country with a large 
share in world trade can increase its welfare by setting import or export taxes (CORDEN, 
1997). When an importer imposes an import tariff, domestic prices will rise and domestic 
demand will fall. If the importer is large, the fact that it demands less from the world market 
will depress the world market price. The resulting reduction in the price of its imports can 
outweigh the welfare losses induced by the tariff, provided that the tariff is set at a rate 
equal to the inverse of the world supply elasticity. In the case of a large exporter, this 
mechanism works in the opposite direction, and overall welfare is maximised at an export 
tax rate te (ad-valorem of the f.o.b. price) that is given by: 
EXPw ste ⋅−= η
1
 (13.1)
where ηw is the price elasticity of world import demand, and sEXP is the exporter’s 
world market share.  
If we apply this to Ukraine’s sunseed exports, sEXP, according to FAO figures, 
averaged 16.6% between 1995 and 2002. Assuming that the price elasticity of world import 
demand equals -1.5, Ukraine’s optimal export tax would equal 11.1%. However, the 
instability of Ukrainian sunseed yields caused sEXP to range from 2.5% in 1995 to 25.7% in 
1997. In the former year the optimal export tax would have been 1.7%, in the latter 17.1%. 
Obviously, a tax that is calculated using the average market share will be too low in years of 
large export surpluses, and too large in years of small export surpluses.  
The problem, as WARR (2001) demonstrates, is that the welfare losses that result 
from setting an ‘optimal’ tax too high by far outweigh the welfare gains that are realised 
when the tax is set too low. In other words, ‘getting it right’ on average is not good enough 
and will lead to net welfare losses. Since Ukraine’s sunseed production fluctuates 
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considerably and cannot estimated with any accuracy until well after the harvest and exports 
have begun, determining a truly optimal export tax is next to impossible (even if we make 
the very heroic assumption that it is possible to obtain perfectly accurate forecasts of the 
other critical ingredients in equation (13.1), namely the elasticity of world import demand 
and the levels of competitors’ exports2). Therefore, attempts to apply an optimal export tax 
on Ukraine’s sunseed exports will most likely lead to net welfare losses rather than gains, 
and the optimal export tax argument is not a convincing justification for Ukraine’s current 
oilseed policy. This is especially true given that Ukraine appears destined to become a net 
importer of sunseed in the 2004/05 marketing year. In a net import situation, consideration 
of optimal export taxes is a purely academic exercise. 
4 Empirical assessment of the oilseed export tax 
4.1 A simulation of policy options 
Cutting or abolishing the oilseed export tax is currently being debated in agricultural 
policy circles in Ukraine. The Association of Ukrainian Sunflower Seed Crushers 
UkrOliyaProm has instead proposed the introduction of a production subsidy for farmers 
that would compensate them for the losses that they incur as a result of the export tax3. 
According to this proposal, crushers would continue to benefit from low priced sunseed due 
to the export tax, while production subsidies would ensure that farmers continue to produce 
enough sunseed to keep crushers operating at capacity4. As crushing capacities have grown 
in recent years (presumably due to the protection afforded by the export tax), ensuring 
sufficient supply of sunseed has become a concern. After all, if Ukraine had to become a net 
importer to satisfy capacities in the crushing industry, sunseed prices would jump 
considerably from FOB to CIF levels.  
In this section we use an agricultural sector model (RASMU, Regional Agricultural 
sector Model for Ukraine, see KUHN, 2004) to assess the economic costs and benefits of 
these policy alternatives. The following scenarios have been simulated using RASMU: 
• The base (status quo) scenario with the 17% export tax; 
• Scenario I without the 17% export tax; and 
• Scenario II with the 17% export tax and compensation of farmers with a production 
subsidy. 
The simulation results are displayed in table 13.4. For reasons of the availability of 
regional statistical information, RASMU has been calibrated to reflect an average of the 
situations in the years 2001 and 2002. 
                                              
2  Information on competitors’ exports is required to calculate sEXP. 
3  See e.g. UKRAGROCONSULT, Agrinews No. 40 (2004). 
4 Curiously, it would appear that the proponents of the oilseed export tax have forgotten their old 
argument that production of sunseed should be reduced for agronomic reasons! 
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Table 13.4: Simulation results for the sunseed and sunoil sectors 
 Base 
 
Scenario I 
 
Change from I 
to Base (%) 
Scenario II 
 
Change from 
II to Base 
(%) 
 17% export 
tax 
No export tax  17% export 
tax plus prod. 
subsidy 
 
Sunseed 
Area in 1000 ha 2613 3000 14.8 3015 15.4 
Production, thd. tonnes 2961 3399 14.8 3416 15.4 
Processing, thd. tonnes 2014 1536 -23.8 2014 0.0 
Net trade (export), thd. tonnes 840 1772 111.0 1291 53.7 
Producer price, US$/tonne a 192 235 22.6 237 23.6 
Market price, US$/tonne 192 235 22.6 192 0.0 
Producer surplus, mUS$  138  144  
Sunoil 
Production, thd. tonnes 951 725 -23.8 951 0.0 
Dom. consumption, thd. tonnes 472 472 0.0 472 0.0 
Net trade (export), thd. tonnes 479 253 -47.2 479 0.0 
Producer margin, US$/tonne 155 63 -59.4 155 0.0 
Domestic price, US$/tonne 468 468 0.0 468 0.0 
Producer surplus in mUS$   -77  0  
Note: a including subsidy payments in scenario II. 
Source: RASMU simulations. 
When the export tax is abolished (scenario I), area and output of sunseed increase 
due to higher producer prices, while production of sunoil falls due to the reduction in the 
processing margin. As long as sunoil is exported, its domestic price remains tied to the 
world market price and, thus, unchanged. This is why consumers are not directly affected by 
the elimination of the export tax. As domestic processing of sunseed falls, exports of 
sunseed increase and exports of sunoil decrease. However, the latter remain significantly 
positive.  
If the export tax is maintained but farmers receive a production subsidy per tonne of 
sunseed (scenario II), sunseed area and output react more or less as in scenario I; 
eliminating the export tax or compensating for it have the same basic impact on farmers. 
The difference between scenarios I and II, of course, is that in the latter the crushing 
industry continues to benefit from artificially inexpensive sunseed, and there are no changes 
in sunoil production and exports, etc., compared with the status quo. 
Comparing the results of the two policy alternatives, one might conclude that 
scenario II is superior to scenario I, as it makes farmers better off while leaving crushers 
unaffected. However, so far our calculations have ignored the taxpayer, i.e. the rest of the 
national economy. In table 13.5 we see that budget expenditures increase in scenario I as 
export tax revenues are lost. But they increase much more in scenario II to cover the costs 
of the production subsidy. This increase more than compensates for increased export tax 
revenues in scenario II (due to increased sunseed exports). Altogether, eliminating the 
export tax produces an annual net welfare gain of roughly 24 mUS$, with sunseed 
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producers gaining 138 mUS$, crushers losing 77 mUS$ and taxpayers losing roughly 
36 mUS$5. 
Table 13.5: Overall welfare changes compared with the base scenario (mUS$) 
 Scenario I 
(abolishing the export tax)  
versus  
base 
Scenario II 
(17% export tax plus production 
subsidy for farmers)  
versus base 
Feed users -9.89 -9.75 
All producers and processors 70.22 156.22 
Consumers -10.05 -11.52 
Taxpayers (budget) -36.34 -134.85 
Total national welfare 23.82 9.86 
Northern regions -5.76 -24.28 
Western regions -7.74 -26.49 
Central regions 13.36 18.23 
Southern regions 23.96 42.40 
Source: RASMU simulations. 
In the final analysis, simply abolishing the export tax and paying a subsidy per tonne 
of sunseed directly to the crushers would have the same impact as maintaining the tax and 
paying a subsidy per tonne of sunseed to farmers. Of course, crushers have proposed the 
latter option and not the former, because a subsidy to crushers that is disguised as support to 
farmers is much easier to sell politically.  
RASMU also offers a view on the regional distribution of welfare changes. Table 13.5 
demonstrates that the Centre and South of Ukraine would gain most from either policy 
change. North and West – where neither sunflower seed nor oil is produced in major 
volumes – are hardly affected directly. However, the North and West lose indirectly when 
we consider the reduction in export tax income for the public purse on a per capita basis. 
However, losses in these regions are more pronounced if the production subsidy is 
introduced, as the budget cost of this subsidy must also be distributed on a per capita basis, 
and this amounts to more than the export tax revenues.  
Note that these calculations do not consider the administrative costs of collecting 
taxes and paying subsidies, etc. The combined export tax/producer subsidy proposal made 
by UkrOliyaProm would involve the most administration and, hence, the highest costs of all 
the scenarios considered above, especially since the producer subsidy would have to be 
applied at the farm level which would involve a great deal of bureaucracy (and presumable 
give the authorities yet another lever and excuse for interfering in farm management 
decisions) 
                                              
5  Introducing the compensating subsidy also leads to a welfare gain (almost 10 mUS$ compared to 
the current situation). This is due to the fact that the distortion on the sunseed supply side is 
eliminated by compensation payments, while sunseed crushing remains distorted. In a sense, the 
compensation payments act as a sort of second-best correction of a small part of the distortions 
caused by the export tax.  
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4.2 Impact on international trade relations 
As swift accession to the WTO is a broadly accepted policy goal in Ukraine, the 
question arises as to whether Ukraine’s trade regime is broadly in line with WTO rules. 
Surprisingly, export taxes are not explicitly ruled out by the WTO, as the disciplines on this 
instrument are not clearly defined (OECD, 2003; PIERMARTINI, 2004). There are several 
explanations for this: 
• Most industrialised countries have bilateral or regional agreements with each other 
which ban the use of export taxes. Therefore there has been no pressing need to take 
this issue before the WTO so far. 
• Industrialised countries rarely have dominant positions on world markets for raw 
products that could be taxed in a reasonable way. Moreover, the farm lobbies in the 
OECD countries would not tolerate export taxes on agricultural commodities. 
• Many developing countries rely to a considerable extent on export taxes applied to 
raw commodities such as cocoa, etc., because their fiscal systems are too weak to 
allow proper taxation of incomes or sales, etc. As developing countries are granted 
many exceptions under the WTO, there is no formal pressure on them to abandon 
their export taxes. 
Hence, if Ukraine were a member of the WTO already, it would probably not 
encounter problems related to its oilseed export tax. However, matters are different for 
countries that apply for WTO membership. As pointed out in a report by the OECD (2003), 
Russia is currently under pressure to either schedule or eliminate export taxes on various 
raw materials. Similar disciplines were imposed on China as a precondition for accession. 
Ukraine’s WTO accession would thus probably require a plan to phase out its export taxes. 
5 Conclusions 
In the five years that the oilseeds export tax has been in force in Ukraine, significant 
investment into oilseed processing (crushing) capacities has taken place. In effect, farmers 
have paid for a considerable share of these investments, as they have received lower prices 
for their sunseed, leading to roughly 130 mUS$/year in reduced revenues. Only the lucky 
coincidence of rising world market prices for sunseed has prevented this policy from turning 
into a disaster. Nevertheless, the oilseed export tax is a tax on agricultural production and, 
as such, contradicts the repeated claims by policy makers in Ukraine that their top priority is 
helping farmers. 
We therefore recommend that the oilseed export tax be phased out over a period of at 
very most three years. The crushing industry’s proposal to maintain the export tax and 
subsidise sunseed producers is not a reasonable alternative. Indeed, it would actually 
represent a continuation of the current subsidy to crushers, disguised as support for farmers 
and paid for by taxpayers. Many crushers in Ukraine, especially the ‘big players’, have 
heavily invested in new capacities and more efficient technologies in recent years. They are 
internationally competitive and ideally located in one of the world’s major sunseed 
production regions and close to important import markets. Hence, they should be able to 
stand on their own and no longer need support from farmers and/or taxpayers in Ukraine. 
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14 The 2003 Wheat Crisis and Food Security 
VIKTORIYA GALUSHKO, ARNIM KUHN & OLEG NIVYEVSKIY 
1 Introduction 
While Ukraine harvested roughly 20 mill. tonnes of wheat in both 2001 and 2002, the 
harvest in 2003 yielded only about 5 mill. tonnes. Assuming that the average production of 
wheat is 16 mill. tonnes and the average wheat price in Ukraine is about 105 US$/tonne 
(derived from a world market price of 155 US$/tonne), this was equivalent to an economic 
loss of 1.16 bUS$ (6.16 bUAH), or approximately 2.5% of Ukrainian GDP1. 
There is no way to make such a loss simply ‘disappear’. It was not the fault of 
bureaucrats, politicians, grain traders, farmers, consumers, or evil foreign powers, but rather 
solely attributable to bad weather conditions during the 2002/2003 winter. What matters in 
such a situation is how the economic damage is distributed, and what groups of the society 
should be protected from excessively severe consequences, since bread made from wheat is 
an important staple food for poor people in Ukraine. 
In times of food shortfalls and escalating food prices, food relief for vulnerable 
groups is especially important. Competitive well-functioning markets are the most efficient 
mechanism for ensuring food availability and protecting low-income consumers during 
periods of food crisis. However, many policy makers in Ukraine seem to be convinced that 
markets alone do not react appropriately, or react too slowly, and that administrative 
intervention is therefore necessary. Even though government interference on Ukrainian food 
markets was reduced during the initial reform period in 1999-2000, the government remains 
an important player on food markets in times of ‘crisis’. 
To guarantee low prices and the availability of staple foods to consumers following 
the bad harvest in 2003, the Ukrainian government intervened directly by setting price 
ceilings for staple foods, by regulating the profitability of food-producing enterprises and 
the mark-ups of retail stores, and by providing subsidies to bread producers. Unfortunately, 
these policies are inefficient and often even ineffective in protecting poor consumers, and 
they undermine important market mechanisms that would otherwise contribute to improving 
the situation. What use is it to a poor consumer that bread prices are kept low when the size 
of the bread loaves sold in the shops shrinks, or private bakeries close down because they 
cannot operate profitably any more, leading to supply shortages reminiscent of the times of 
the planned economy? 
Instead, three things had to happen in response to such a shortfall in domestic wheat 
production: 
1. Enough wheat had to be imported in order to meet at least food wheat demand. 
2. Wheat prices had to increase in order to make imports profitable; and, 
                                              
1  Even worse, the imports necessary to cover the domestic food wheat deficit are estimated at 
4 mill. tonnes of wheat at import parity prices of at least 190 US$/tonne EXW. This sums up to 
760 mUS$ or 4.05 bUAH, which was equal to 7% of the Ukrainian state budget for 2004. 
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3. Poor consumers should have been compensated for higher prices to a certain extent 
and in a targeted manner. 
In this chapter we discuss these issues and the question of food security in Ukraine. 
The chapter is organised as follows. First, we discuss the probability of a deficit situation in 
Ukraine such as the one experienced in 2003. Then, the risk profiles of groups exposed to 
under-nutrition in Ukraine are presented. In section 4 we provide some evidence on the 
effectiveness of public food security measures, and evaluate Ukrainian food policy against 
this background. In the final section we discuss alternatives to the policies that were pursued 
following the bad harvest in 2003. The chapter closes with concrete recommendations and a 
brief epilogue on how the wheat crisis ended in 2004. 
2 How likely is a food wheat deficit in Ukraine? 
There can be no doubt that the wheat production shortfall caused by winterkill in 
early 2003 followed by drought in many regions of the country was serious, and it is natural 
to think about measures to ease the economic impact of such a shortfall. The ensuing grain 
deficit was absolute in a sense that production plus stocks could not even cover human 
consumption needs, let alone feed and other uses. When considering policy responses to 
such a situation its frequency or likelihood should be taken into account. If similar deficits 
could be expected to occur every three years, a permanent intervention mechanism to 
stabilise markets could be more easily justified economically (given that market participants 
are risk-averse) than if they could be expected to occur only two or three times in a century.  
Figures 14.1 and 14.2 put things into perspective for grain in general and wheat, the 
most important staple crop for human consumption, respectively. Figure 14.1 shows that 
Ukraine experienced an overall grain deficit in seven out of the 42 years under 
consideration. On average, the deficit was 2.2 mill. tonnes; one each occurred in the 1960s, 
the 1990s, and in 2003; and four occurred between 1979 and 1983. 
The following conclusions can be drawn: 
• The probability of a deficit is one in six years during the observed period. 
• There is no indication that the probability of grain deficits is increasing, despite the 
overall reduction in production that has accompanied transition. 
• The average size of a deficit is such that public emergency reserves of roughly 
2 mill. tonnes could (at least theoretically) prevent serious overall grain shortages; 
and, 
• The elastic component of grain demand is presumably feed demand, through which 
consumption adapts to production. 
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Figure 14.1: Total grain production, total grain consumption, and resulting surpluses 
and deficits in Ukraine 1961-2003, in mill. tonnes 
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Source:  MINISTRY OF AGRARIAN POLICY OF UKRAINE and FAO. 
For wheat in particular (figure 14.2), the number of deficits is lower over the period 
in question if we define a food wheat deficit as a situation in which wheat production falls 
short of wheat consumption for food purposes, i.e. total consumption minus feed use. Two 
wheat deficits between 1961 and 2003 made imports of food wheat into Ukraine absolutely 
necessary; in 1963 and 2003. The conclusions are as follows: 
• True food wheat deficits are relatively seldom. 
• Grain and wheat demand adjust to changing conditions through decreased feed use of 
grains and wheat in particular. Feed use therefore acts as a ‘hidden grain silo’. 
• To the extent that a wheat deficit can be offset by a reduction in feed use and the 
substitution of feed wheat by other feedstuffs, food wheat imports are not necessary. 
• Prices for food wheat need not increase to the import parity price level (world market 
price plus tariff, transport costs from port to elevator, etc.) in the event of a poor 
harvest as long as feed wheat is available to be substituted. 
• Public wheat storage is not necessary to keep prices within a tolerable range as long 
as production plus existing private stocks are higher than food consumption; and, 
• Major public stocks of food wheat would be useful only once every 25 years on 
average. It is questionable under these circumstances whether the costs of extensive 
public storage are justified, given the long average periods over which grain would 
have to be stored for no use. 
In summary, there would appear to be more justification for feed grain storage than 
for food grain storage in Ukraine. 
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Figure 14.2: Wheat production and consumption (not including feed use) 1961-2003, in 
tonnes per capita 
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3 Food security: The identification of vulnerable groups 
Food security cannot be measured in a meaningful way at the national or regional 
level. Even if a country is a net exporter of food, some vulnerable low-income groups within 
the population might still suffer from malnutrition. Thus, adequate grain production in a 
certain region is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for the food security of all 
households and individuals in that region. The food security of an individual crucially 
depends on his or her endowments, working capacity and other production factors, and his 
or her exchange entitlements2, i.e. the ability to exchange these endowments for food. 
Hence, food security can be endangered by a decrease in a person's endowment (e.g. loss of 
access to land, or loss of ability to work due to health problems), or due to an unfavourable 
shift in exchange entitlements caused by a loss of employment, a fall in wages, a rise in 
food prices – for which a bad harvest is just one possible reason –, a drop in the price of 
                                              
2  It was the pioneering work of Indian Nobel Laureate AMARTYA SEN in his book “Poverty and 
Famines – An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation” (1981) that gave us a different and much 
broader view of the notion of food security. SEN introduced the so-called entitlement approach. 
According to this approach the food consumption of individuals, families or social groups 
depends on what they are able to acquire by whatever legal ways. Although this seems to be 
rather obvious, it had in the past all too often been forgotten in the analysis of the causes of under-
nutrition. SEN demonstrated that some of the worst famines in history occurred in the midst of 
plentiful or at least sufficient production, and could not be attributed to production shortfalls at all. 
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goods or services the person sells, or a decline in self-production. The failure of any of these 
entitlements can threaten the food security of an individual or household3.  
What might characterise a vulnerable household in the Ukrainian context? It is 
obvious that poor people are more vulnerable to under-nutrition. But official poverty lines 
are mostly based on the concept of relative poverty. A household which is officially poor in 
Germany has still a real income that is far above the Ukrainian average4. But what, then, are 
the characteristics of an absolute poverty level which makes household members vulnerable 
to under-nutrition? The following factors contribute to risk:  
• Dependence on low wages or pension earnings: According to the Ukrainian law, 
there is both a minimum wage and a minimum pension. But it cannot be taken for 
granted that employees or pensioners always manage to really receive this amount. 
The results of the household surveys on which official statistics are based suggest 
that the lower income strata receive wages below the official minimum level. 
• Members of households with only one earner: As a legacy of its socialist past, 
Ukraine has a high share of labour market participation. However, increasing 
unemployment and women ‘returning to the kitchen’ mean that an increasing number 
of households depend on single incomes. Single parent households are a related 
problem, because good nutrition and health also depend on care, especially for 
children. 
• Children or elderly people without pensions in low-income households: The lowest 
income group in rural areas according to national expenditure statistics has the 
highest average number of household members (4.7). Most likely, these are 
households with children. Families with many children (or with elderly members 
who are not entitled for a pension for whatever reasons) thus face an increased 
poverty risk. 
• Members of a household where the earner is jobless, or suffers from wage arrears: 
The level of unemployment in Ukraine is modest by international standards, which 
may be due to the low levels of unemployment benefits. Nevertheless, poor families 
with unemployed earners will tend to have difficulties mobilising the monetary 
resources for sufficient food. The same holds true for employees faced with wage 
arrears. 
• Households in remote areas: Given that a production shortfall in a remote region 
makes imports of food necessary, the cost of shipping food to these areas may 
increase prices tremendously compared with a situation in which the region produces 
                                              
3  See STRIEWE et al. (2001). 
4  The most common definition of a poor household in Germany is a household with an income 
level of less than one-half the average national monetary household income. This is far above the 
average income of a Ukrainian household. Social welfare programmes in Germany prevent net 
household incomes from falling below a certain level (roughly 1500 € per month). Hence, 
according to Ukrainian standards, there should be only rich households in Germany. Only a very 
small share of individuals earns less, particularly homeless people with mental disorders who 
simply do not manage to comply with the bureaucratic procedures of the existing social welfare 
system. 
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staple foods in sufficient quantities. Moreover, the transport of self-produced non-
staples to the next market (where they can be turned into cash which then can be used 
to buy staples) is more costly. 
• Rural households without land titles among the members: Lease payments from land 
shares of former collective or state farms constitute an important source of income 
for rural households. These lease payments are either paid in cash or in-kind, for 
example wheat5. 
• Households which have no access to a garden plot or dacha: There are two major 
staple crops in Ukraine, wheat and potatoes. While wheat is produced predominantly 
on large farms, potatoes are typically produced in private gardens. The same is true 
for fruits, vegetables, and small livestock. The access to such a production resource 
still represents the most important insurance against food shortages that exists in 
Ukraine today6. Generally, it can be expected that it is the urban poor who are at a 
higher risk to have poor access to food, while the rural poor suffer more from lacking 
access to health service and education. 
• Individuals with low incomes and no support from relatives: The family is still an 
important safety net for elderly or disabled persons. Grandparents often receive 
support from their working children or grandchildren, especially when their pensions 
are low of late. Pensioners without children or with disrupted family ties are at high 
risk. The typical beggar on Ukrainian streets is a female pensioner. 
• Poor households in poor regions with an under-developed system of social welfare: It 
is obvious that poor households in poor regions run a higher risk of significantly 
depressed purchasing power for food. Moreover, poor regions often cannot afford 
sufficient welfare programs to protect the poor. 
This list could be continued. The more of these characteristics an individual or a 
household combines, the more this household will be prone to nutritional problems. It is 
important to recognise that this is not only the case when there is a grain shortage in the 
region. According to official Ukrainian statistics for the year 2002 (a year with abundant 
grain and very low grain prices), individuals in the lowest income category (average 
expenditure per household member lower than 60 UAH per month) consumed only 
1530 calories per day. Even if we account for the probability that there are small children 
among the members of these households, this nutritional level is insufficient. This is 
surprising, since chronic hunger does not seem to be an obvious problem in Ukraine. Only 
biometric measurements among the members of vulnerable groups can determine whether 
under-nutrition is a widespread fact and not simply a statistical artefact due to under-
reporting of food intake during household surveys. 
                                              
5 In the case of a food shortage, payments in the form of wheat have the advantage that they are not 
dependent on the wheat price. However, it is likely that the tenant will try to reduce his lease 
payment obligations in the event of a harvest shortfall. Hence, the food security enhancing 
function of wage payments in kind may be less than expected. 
6 THO SEETH et al. (1998) find that the access to a garden plot tremendously decreases the risk of 
extreme poverty for households in Russia.  
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Biometric studies that have been carried out in Ukraine in 1999 by UNICEF have 
shown that the most widespread malnutrition indicator among children was stunting, which 
means a reduced height for age. 15.4 percent of the children were classified as stunted by 
this study. But the reason for this is generally not a caloric deficiency, but rather weaknesses 
in feeding practices in young children. Ukraine still follows Soviet recommendations which 
underestimate the importance of breastfeeding in the early months of a child’s live (SEDIK et 
al., 2003). According to these authors, there are no further indications of widespread under-
nutrition in Ukraine. Only 5% of the population have inadequate diets due to deficient 
calorie intake.  
From a political perspective, this finding is fundamental because it refutes the 
common notion that half of the population are so poor that they need low bread prices for 
survival. It is only a relatively small fraction of the population that is at risk, and this group 
also suffers when bread prices are low, and not just in years of shortage such as 2003. 
4 Do existing policies help the poor? 
The large share of food in total per capita expenditures in Ukraine engenders 
vulnerability not only in terms of ability to purchase food when it is available in the market, 
but also to price shocks and temporary downturns in income. In times of food shortfalls and 
escalating food prices, food relief is especially important for the most vulnerable 
households. To achieve its food security goals, the Ukrainian government has adopted a 
highly interventionist approach to grain markets and undertakes the following activities: 
releasing grain and staple food products from the State Reserve at subsidised prices, 
administering farm-gate and retail prices, fixing maximum profitability rates and maximum 
mark-ups for food-processing enterprises. Theses policies are all intended to ensure low 
food prices. However, given their economic costs, this set of policies is an extremely 
ineffective means of reaching and helping the poor. Because these policies ensure low food 
prices for all, and since the rich consume more of all food products than the poor, these 
policies yield more benefits to high-income population groups, while often providing an 
insignificant food relief to the poorest. This argument is briefly discussed in Box 1 below. 
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Box 1: Brazil’s experience with staple food subsidies 
Between 1966 and 1982 the government of Brazil attempted to achieve self-
sufficiency in wheat production and at the same time provide cheap wheat to its 
consumers. As part of its attempt to achieve these goals, the government became the sole 
seller and buyer of both domestically produced and imported wheat. The prices of wheat 
were rigidly controlled throughout the economy. Farmers were encouraged to increase 
wheat production through a price-support subsidy, and millers were provided with wheat 
at a price substantially below that paid to producers, with the government paying the 
difference out of the general budget. 
In their study of the Brazilian wheat policy, CALEGAR & SCHUH (1988, p. 9-10 & 
p. 43-45) determined that 86% of the subsidy went to consumers, while 14% went to 
administration or were lost through slippages such as manipulations by the millers. Only 
19% of the total subsidy went to the target group, the low-income consumers. 
Furthermore, gains in consumer welfare were slightly biased toward high-income 
consumers because they buy more bread per capita than low-income consumers. 
Source: FOSTER (1992, p.268). 
 
4.1 Subsidising food through administered prices, profitability and 
mark-up controls 
Policies such as explicit or implicit food subsidisation through government 
procurement (sales) programs and ceiling prices generally result in significant losses in 
economic efficiency and tend to be poorly targeted. Following the 2003 harvest, the 
government of Ukraine claimed that under the given fiscal constraints these policies were 
the only way to help the needy. But were these policies effective? 
Figure 14.3 presents information on the correlation between the share of poor people 
in an oblast in Ukraine (we identify the poor as those living on less than 1 US$ a day) and 
the level of bread prices in that oblast, the latter often lowered by administrative orders. The 
positive value of the correlation coefficients between these two variables (r = 0.24) implies 
that, on average, bread prices were higher in those regions with a high poverty share in 
2003. This is the exact opposite of what a rational policy aimed at helping the poor should 
achieve, and provides evidence that price control measures are an extremely poorly targeted 
food security policy7.  
                                              
7  An especially bizarre case is the city of Kiev, where bread prices are among the lowest in the 
country, even though the share of poor people is only roughly 10%. 
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Figure 14.3: Correlation between the regional share of individuals living on less than 
1 US$ per day and the regional bread price (in UAH/kg) in 2003 
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Source:  STATE STATISTICS COMMITTEE OF UKRAINE. 
Implicit subsidisation of food through administered staple food and grain prices does 
not meet the objective of providing relief to the vulnerable groups. In table 14.1 below we 
provide estimates of bread, meat and milk consumption for different income strata in 
Ukraine. 
Table 14.1: Bread, meat and milk* consumption by the poor and the non-poor in 
2002 
 
Consumers living on 
less than 1 US$ per day 
Consumers living on 
more than 1 US$ per day 
Number of consumers, mill. 9.2 39.1 
Per capita bread consumption, 
kg/month 8.5 11.3 
Bread consumption by the income 
stratum, tonnes/month 77951 442609 
Per capita meat consumption, kg/month 1.4 2.9 
Meat consumption by the income 
stratum, tonnes/month 13172 111746 
Per capita milk consumption, kg/month 11.3 18.5 
Milk consumption by the income 
stratum, tonnes/month 103063 721157 
Note:  * Bread includes rice, bread, bakery products, flour and cereals; milk includes fluid milk, cheese and 
butter measured in milk equivalents. 
Source: Own calculations on the basis of STATE STATISTICS COMMITTEE OF UKRAINE.  
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As can be seen from the table, consumption of bread, meat and dairy products 
increases with income. The poor account for 19% of the total population, but 15% of total 
bread consumption, and only 11% and 13% of meat and milk consumption, respectively. 
This means that keeping prices for bread, flour and cereals low yields much larger benefits 
to high-income population groups, and that only a small share of the total food subsidy 
generated by price controls goes to the poor. Furthermore, the benefits of cheap feed grain 
largely end up with the wealthy who consume most of the livestock products.  
Restricting mark-ups in rural stores can be especially harmful for the rural poor. Due 
to poor infrastructure, the cost of transporting products is rather high, which is translated 
into higher retail mark-ups. Limiting the mark-up to a level that makes transportation 
unprofitable cuts rural residents off from food supplies and forces them to incur additional 
costs by travelling to neighbouring centres for bread, pasta and other foods or by buying 
products on informal markets at much higher prices. Thus, the rural poor can end up paying 
more than they would without the government policy. Further, to ensure that profitability or 
a mark-up does not exceed the legislatively set level, the government is obliged to organise 
permanent inspections, which means that the government bureaucracy controlling prices 
tends to get bigger, more intrusive and more expensive. 
Another question that arises is: Were administrative controls over bread, cereals and 
grain prices really necessary following the poor harvest in 2003? The situation in 2003 and 
early 2004 can be compared with the situation that occurred in 2000, when the harvest was 
poor and milling wheat prices increased by 2.1 times . In response to the grain price increase 
in 2001, retail prices for bread, meat and dairy products increased by 67%, 45% and 35%, 
respectively. Nevertheless, there was no threat of food insecurity and significant 
impoverishment of the population. Assuming an increase of bread prices by 67%, and given 
the share of bread in total consumer expenditures, we can estimate that total consumer 
expenditures must have increased by roughly 6.6%, which is not negligible, but also not 
drastic (table 14.2). Price controls can reduce this increase, but in an un-targeted manner as 
demonstrated above, and only at the cost of creating a dual market for grain and increased 
incentives for shadow market activity. 
Table 14.2: The increase in consumer expenditures due to a 67% bread price increase 
Impact on consumers Average consumer Poor consumer (less than 1 US$/day) 
Share of food expenditures in total expenditures 65.0% 70.0% 
Share of bread in total food expenditures 8.8% 14.0% 
Increase in food expenditures 5.9% 9.4% 
Increase in total expenditures 3.9% 6.6% 
Source:  Own calculations. 
4.2 Subsidising food through non-competitive procurement of grain 
from farmers 
In addition to direct price controls the Ukrainian government undertook a number of 
measures following the harvest in 2003, including non-competitive procurement of grain 
from farmers to replenish regional reserves and restrictions on interregional grain 
shipments. Enforced procurement of grain from farmers at below-market prices represents 
an implicit taxation of farming that reduces the incentives to produce grain. It also renews 
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mistrust in grain interventions by the government so that other policy instruments such the 
pledge price system have even less chance of being accepted by farmers. Policy-makers 
would be well advised to bear in mind that “the price paid for cheap food today is a 
lethargic agricultural performance tomorrow”8. 
4.3 The role of interregional barriers to grain movements 
Placing controls on interregional grain shipments has become a common practice to 
increase a region’s self-sufficiency and control over grain movements and use. However, 
such controls create wedges between regional grain prices by increasing prices in importing 
regions and reducing prices in exporting regions. In Ukraine, for example, the Western 
regions are the poorest and they are net importers of grain. This means that by restricting 
interregional grain movements the government effectively increases grain prices in the 
Western regions, thus making food less affordable to the poor. The costs of interregional 
trade barriers can run very high as illustrated in box 2. 
Box 2: Inter-provincial barriers to trade in Canada 
There are many barriers to agricultural and non-agricultural trade between the 
provinces in Canada. Due to the Canadian Agricultural Product Standards Act, for 
example, Alberta-based fruit and vegetable companies could not make bulk shipments of 
carrots for processing in British Columbia, Saskatchewan and Manitoba. Under the 
National Farm Products Marketing Agencies Act, inter-provincial movements of chicken, 
turkeys, eggs and milk were regulated through quota systems. Inspection regulations and 
enforcement practices also served as impediments to inter-provincial trade. The costs of 
such impediments are magnified beyond the farm gate. For example, barriers to the free 
movement of raw commodities require the processing sector to operate smaller, less 
efficient plants, which is translated into higher prices to consumers. By contrast, a policy of 
maintaining an open common market would strengthen competition between regional 
agricultural and food producers, which would manifest itself in lower food prices and 
higher per capita incomes. It has been estimated that inter-provincial barriers overall cost 
Canadians at least 6.5 bill. Canadian dollars in lost income annually, while the potential 
gains from freeing internal trade in Canada are estimated to be equivalent to a permanent 
increase in income of 1.5%. 
Source: PALDA (1994). 
5 Public action to protect vulnerable groups: What can be 
done? 
In the following we discuss a set of more effective and more efficient policies for 
relieving the hardship of the poor in years of bad harvest. One has to distinguish between 
short run, emergency measures, and long run measures.  
                                              
8 FOSTER (1992, p.306). 
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5.1 Short run measures 
5.1.1 Food subsidies for poor people 
One of the common means to provide immediate relief to the most vulnerable groups 
in times of food shortfalls is a subsidised food-rationing system or food stamps that allow a 
consumer to purchase a specific amount of specified food at a below-market price. Since in 
urban areas it is mostly pensioners who are poor, pension payments could be supplemented 
with discount coupons. In rural areas identification of the poor is more difficult and would 
require greater effort on the part of the authorities.  
How costly would such a policy be? According to official statistics, calorie intakes 
are below the norm in households with less than 120 UAH per capita monthly income. 
These are the households that should therefore be targeted. Given that there are 
4.6 mill. people belonging to the 30-120 UAH income group, and assuming that the 
government subsidises the bread price by 0.3 UAH/kg (with a monthly bread consumption 
of 8.1 kg per capita), government expenditure on food stamps would be about 11.2 mUAH 
per month [4.6*0.3*8.1]. If administrative costs added 10% to these costs, the food stamp 
program would cost Ukrainian taxpayers about 12.3 mUAH per month altogether. Is this 
cost too high? Let us compare it with an alternative means of keeping bread prices low that 
was considered by the government in 2003: the elimination of VAT on bread. The 
elimination of VAT would have reduced bread prices by 0.08 UAH/kg. Assuming a total 
monthly bread consumption of 286 thd. tonnes (each Ukrainian consumes daily 200 grams 
of bread on average), the budget would have foregone VAT revenues of approximately 
23 mUAH per month [286*0.08]. Thus, targeted food relief would have cost the 
government only half as much as a policy of ensuring low bread prices for all by eliminating 
VAT on bread. Even though the elimination of VAT may have appeared to be a reasonable 
policy to keep bread prices low because it does not involve explicit payments from the 
budget as the food stamp program does, in reality it costs considerably more. 
5.1.2 Subsidies to inferior staple foods 
Another way to reach the target group is to use what is referred to as a self-targeting 
policy. An example of such a policy is the subsidisation of foods that are characterised by a 
negative income elasticity of demand. For example, the government could subsidise the 
kinds of bread (low-quality bread) that tend to be consumed only by the poorest and are not 
consumed by consumers in higher income categories.  
5.1.3 Food-for-work programmes 
To alleviate the hardship of the bad harvest and escalating prices for the unemployed, 
employment schemes such as food-for-work where workers are paid most of their wages in 
kind could be launched. Food-for-work measures tend to involve considerable 
administrative costs, however. 
5.2 Long run strategies 
To be effective, food rationing and food stamp programmes must be well 
administrated, which can be costly. Thus, even though these programmes can succeed in 
providing rapid relief to vulnerable groups, they should be considered short run measures, 
and priority should be given to other policies that contribute to food security in the long run. 
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5.2.1 Improving productivity in crop production 
Looking at figure 14.2 it is evident that there have been large fluctuations in 
Ukrainian wheat production over the previous decades. A long-term goal should be to 
reduce such fluctuations, thus avoiding switches from an import to an export situation and 
vice versa. Since domestic production plays a major role in the food security of rural 
households, efforts to improve agricultural technology could have a significant positive 
impact on food security Drought-resistant and high-yielding crop varieties could 
significantly reduce production variability, as could the use of low-tillage methods and other 
innovations9. Investment in research and extension could help diversify production, which 
would reduce vulnerability to price shocks.  
5.2.2 Improvement of rural infrastructure 
Food grain price stabilisation policies should be implemented through marketing 
support services and infrastructure. Investments in transport infrastructure should be the 
most important component of price stabilisation policies, since improved transportation 
networks increase farm-gate prices (thus increasing farmers’ incomes), lower input costs 
(which is manifested in lower prices for consumers) and significantly contribute to a 
reduction of price fluctuations (which reduces the probability that low-income households 
will suffer from food insecurity following bad harvests). Furthermore, improved 
infrastructure increases off-farm employment opportunities, which translates into higher 
rural incomes, thus improving access to food by rural households.  
5.2.3 Public reserves 
Trade should be recognised as a potential instrument for increasing food security. At 
a first glance, holding reserves with a view to stabilising prices in lean years might appear to 
be a good solution. However, stock-outs in importing periods are unlikely to have a major 
impact on prices. Instead, they will simply substitute for commercial imports10. Furthermore, 
releasing grains and food from the state reserve at below-market prices will discourage 
private traders’ and stockholders’ activities.  
Instead of trying to play a major role in the grain marketing system the government 
should boost confidence and encourage the private sector to make the necessary efficiency 
enhancing investments in the marketing system. Ad hoc government intervention and 
uncertainty regarding its timing and impact discourage involvement by the private sector, 
thus contributing to market inefficiency and fragmentation. A government competition 
policy would also be critical to ensure fair trading practices by the private sector. 
Competition among domestic producers would stimulate the introduction of cost-reducing 
technologies, which would inevitably lead to increased supplies and reduced food prices. 
                                              
9  Chapter 11 Farm Management Challenges in Ukrainian Agriculture discusses how poor 
management such as excessively dense rates of seeding in crop production and poor seedbed 
preparation depress yields and profitability in good years and bad. 
10  MARTINEZ et al. (2002). 
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6 Epilogue: How the wheat crisis ended in 2004 
When the government in Ukraine became aware of the impending shortage of food 
grain, it promised to supply more than 2 mill. tonnes of low-cost wheat from 
intergovernmental agreements with Russia and Kazakhstan. When the promised quantities 
of (and prices for) this grain did not materialise, the government conceded that commercial 
imports would be necessary. In order to make these imports economically feasible, the 
government temporarily abolished the import duties on wheat and rye. As a result, Ukraine 
managed to import about 3.4 mill. tonnes of wheat, 0.15-0.2 mill. tonnes of flour, and 
0.13 mill. tonnes of rye in the 2003/04 marketing year. Major suppliers of wheat into 
Ukraine were Kazakhstan (51%), Russia (26%), and Lithuania (8%).  
In addition to various market interventions (e.g. fixed bread prices, maximal trade 
margins (5%) for bakeries, subsidised flour procurement etc.) the government of Ukraine 
also made an attempt to target its policy at the poor population. Under the recommendations 
of the Cabinet Ministers of Ukraine, direct income transfer programs were launched in some 
regions. The average amount of money transferred was about 6 UAH. For example, local 
authorities in Kharkiv allocated 1.5 mUAH for this purpose, which corresponded to 
4.76 UAH per person and month. If we define all people living on less than 1 US$/day 
(160 UAH/month) as poor, we can easily calculate whether 6 UAH is enough to compensate 
for the bread price increase. As demonstrated in table 14.2, a 67% bread price increase 
translates into a 6.6% increase in total expenditures by the poor. Hence, to counteract this 
increase and maintain poor consumers’ real income, 10.4 UAH would be required. So the 
average of 6 UAH that was supplied was probably too little. Nevertheless, it is very positive 
that – after an initial phase of rather uncoordinated ‘actionism’ that involved much 
ineffective and even counterproductive market intervention11 – the government did begin to 
employ more efficient and targeted policies to cushion the poor and reduce the impact of the 
2003 grain harvest on food security. 
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15 The 2003 Wheat Harvest: Crisis! What Crisis? 
STEPHAN VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL 
1 Introduction 
In early 2003 severe winterkill took its toll on grain crops. When this was followed 
by a prolonged drought in the late spring and early summer of that year, it became apparent 
that Ukraine was likely to become a net importer of food grain in 2003/04. Concern and 
alarm deepened when harvest data indicated that a total grain crop of perhaps 
20 mill. tonnes had been harvested, down from about 36 mill. tonnes in 20021. 
The situation was especially critical for wheat, with roughly 5 mill. tonnes harvested 
in 2003 as opposed to some 20 mill. tonnes in both 2001 and 2002. After exporting roughly 
5.5 and 6.5 mill. tonnes of wheat in the 2001/02 and 2002/03 marketing years, respectively, 
it was estimated that Ukraine would have to import between 2.8 mill. tonnes (Ukrainian 
Grain Association) and 3.7 mill. tonnes (UKRAGROCONSULT) of food wheat in 2003/042. As 
a result, prices for food wheat in Ukraine exploded in mid-2003, surpassing world market 
prices as they had in 2000 and early 2001 when Ukraine was last a net importer (see 
figure 15.1). 
How did policy makers responded to this situation? The Cabinet of Ministers of 
Ukraine issued Decree #1150 on July 24, 2003. This decree contained a variety of 
provisions including personal consequences (several policy makers were relieved of their 
duties or subject to investigations) as well as a call for a detailed inquiry by the Anti-
Monopoly commission. It also empowered regional authorities to “thoroughly monitor food 
grain movements and prices on regional markets” and “to pay a closer attention to 
monitoring of staple food prices, mark-ups [and] profitability rates, and undertake measures 
to keep them from rising if there are no reasons for price increases” (Articles 28 and 33 
respectively). Finally, it contained provisions for intervention purchases by the State 
Reserve Committee. 
                                              
1 There is considerable disagreement about grain harvest figures in Ukraine, past and present. 
Figures from UKRAGROCONSULT are used throughout this paper. 
2  Today, we know that a total of 3.4 mill. tonnes of wheat was imported in the 2003/04 marketing 
year. 
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Figure 15.1 Prices for food wheat in Ukraine and on world markets (1999 to mid-
2003) 
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Source:  UKRAGROCONSULT (Weekly Report, diff. issues) and USDA/ERS (Wheat Market Outlook, diff. 
issues). 
Decree #1150 was accompanied by the announcement of agreements to purchase 
grain from Kazakhstan and Russia as well as plans to introduce an export tax for feed 
grains. Traders reported that they were subject to intense scrutiny, and the press was full of 
rumours about new and intensified regulation of grain markets in Ukraine, including reports 
that the government intended to reintroduce the state order system3. 
In the following we evaluate these measures with respect to two important criteria: 
1) whether they were well-suited to relieve the current tensions on Ukrainian grain markets; 
and, 2) what impact they had on the overall direction of agricultural policy making in 
Ukraine. 
2 Crisis! What crisis? 
It was a fact that weather conditions devastated the 2003 harvest. Whether or not this 
amounted to a ‘crisis’ is a matter of semantics. For historical reasons, Ukrainians are 
understandably very attuned and sensitive to conditions in agriculture and especially grain 
production. On the other hand, food security in Ukraine was not fundamentally threatened in 
2003. Despite what some saw as the worst crop weather of the last century, Ukraine’s 
                                              
3 See the Friday September 12, 2003 issue of Kiev Post Daily (p. 2), in which Agriculture Minister 
Serhiy Ryzhuk is cited as announcing government plans to “return to its previous system of crop 
management, whereby it instructs farmers to produce specific quantities of each agricultural 
commodity” 
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farmers succeeded in producing at least 20 mill. tonnes of grain. Furthermore, the current 
situation in Ukraine was not unique. The grain crop in Australia, for example, fell to 
14.9 mill. tonnes in 2002/03 from 37.5 mill. tonnes in 2001/02, a reduction of just over 60%  
It is not our intention to downplay the gravity of the situation in 2003. However, 
given agro-climatic conditions in the country, it is clear that Ukrainian grain production 
was, is and will always be subject to fluctuations. When these occur, policy makers can help 
most by displaying a steady hand and not unsettling markets further. Unfortunately, the 
policy response to the 2003 grain harvest heightened the sense of crisis rather than lowering 
it. Some elements of this response contributed to an atmosphere in which rumours 
multiplied and individual policy makers and their institutions appeared to be trying to outdo 
each other in ‘crisis management’. Of particular concern is that this sense of crisis provided 
anti-reform forces with a pretext for the re-introduction of interventionist measures. As a 
result, it may be more appropriate to speak of a crisis in agricultural policy making in 2003 
than of a ‘crisis’ in Ukrainian agriculture.  
3 Evaluating the response so far 
A recurring theme in the policy response to the 2003 harvest was that of individual 
responsibility. Policy makers at various levels were dismissed, and some were subject to 
criminal investigation. While there is no question that individuals should be held 
accountable for negligence and wrongdoing, the emphasis on individual responsibility with 
respect to the situation on Ukrainian grain markets in 2003 did considerable damage in two 
respects. First, it helped to sustain the myth that people can fine-tune markets. It suggested, 
falsely, that the right group of individuals pushing the right policy ‘buttons’ could have 
avoided the situation in 2003. In fact, there is nothing any individual or institution could 
have done to change weather conditions and significantly increase the 2003 harvest.  
Second, the emphasis on personal accountability created an atmosphere in which 
bureaucrats, especially at the regional level, were very eager to appear ‘active’. Consider 
Article 28 of Decree #1150, which called on regional authorities to both “thoroughly 
monitor food grain movements and prices” and at the same time to “eliminate any 
administrative intervention impeding free grain movement…” Clearly, these instructions 
were contradictory. With the fate of their former colleagues who had been accused of failing 
to take appropriate steps in mind, most regional authorities who still had a job emphasised 
the first instruction and ignored the second. They monitored and controlled very closely, 
and in the process they did not eliminated but rather expanded and strengthened 
administrative intervention on grain markets4.  
As a result, the Ukrainian grain market was effectively fragmented into a collection 
of regional grain markets. In effect, by giving regional authorities both the power and the 
incentives to interfere, Decree #1150 effectively eliminated one of the most important 
mechanisms by which markets can help to absorb or dampen shocks such as a poor harvest. 
This mechanism is market integration, by which trade and arbitrage between regions can 
spread the impact of a shock evenly, ensuring that each regional market bears its share of 
the burden. It is somewhat ironic that Ukrainian policy makers were negotiating a common 
                                              
4  See Decree of the Cabinet of Ministry #475 on August 6, 2003 “On creation of the government 
working group for controlling of the situation on the food market” 
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market arrangement with other states of the Former Soviet Union in 2003, at a time when 
Ukraine was taking a big step away from being a common market itself, at least as regards 
grain. 
The only direct policy intervention that might have helped to relieve pressure on food 
grain markets in Ukraine in 2003 would have been the accumulation of public or private 
stocks in 2001 and/or 2002. The fact that public stocks were not accumulated in these years 
is certainly not the fault of any of the individuals who were reprimanded or relieved of their 
positions. Stocking 2 mill. tonnes of milling wheat – enough to significantly relieve markets 
in 2003 – would have cost somewhere between 0.8 and 1.0 bUAH in the summer and fall of 
2002 when prices ranged between 400 and 500 UAH/tonne. Handling as well as storage 
costs and losses would have added to this bill. However, despite repeated announcements 
made in 2001 and 2002 that the Strategic Reserve or other public institutions would 
accumulate stocks; the required funding was never made available. This was policy failure, 
not market failure. 
The fact that private individuals and firms did not stock enough in the past to relieve 
markets 2003 also comes as no surprise. Farmers in Ukraine are generally cash-strapped and 
obliged to sell their crops as soon as possible after the harvest for liquidity reasons. So even 
if they had the required storage facilities, which they generally do not, they could not be 
expected to store large amounts of grain. As it is, private individuals or firms generally have 
no alternative to using public (Khlib Ukrainy) storage facilities, and these are known to be 
prohibitively expensive. Hence, failure to privatise Khlib Ukrainy and foster competition on 
the market for grain storage services in the past reduced the ability of market mechanisms to 
absorb the shock of the bad harvest in 2003. Again, this was a case of policy failure, not 
market failure.  
Since important reforms in late 1999 and 2000, private traders have begun to invest 
in grain storage and handling capacity in Ukraine. However, many actions by policy makers 
in response to the ‘crisis’ in 2003 unsettled traders considerably. Traders were subject to 
intense scrutiny and threats. For example, they were threatened with a punitive tax of 10% 
on the previous year’s profits if they did not supply food wheat for 900 UAH/tonne, a price 
which was certainly unrealistic in late 2003 (see figure 15.1). Some traders were told that 
their shipments of feed grain exports (for example barley) would only be cleared to leave 
Ukrainian harbours if the same ships return loaded with wheat within a certain period of 
time. Added to these specific forms of intervention, traders were confronted with rumours 
that the government intended to establish a Ukrainian monopoly grain trader. These panic 
reactions by policy makers threatened to undo the progress that had been made over the 
previous 3 years and scare off the most important source of new capital and know-how in 
the Ukrainian grain sector. 
These considerations are pertinent to the unfounded allegations that ‘too much’ grain 
was exported ‘too quickly’ following the 2002 harvest. With no realistic option for storing 
their grain, farmers were happy to sell it as quickly as possible. The best prices were being 
paid by traders. The state could have purchased grain for storage itself, but as outlined 
above it routinely failed to fulfil its announced targets. The pledge price system introduced 
in 2002 could have helped some farmers withstand the pressure to sell their grain to traders 
right after the harvest, but this system, too, was under-funded. Moreover, it was also new 
and untested. After years of experience with confiscatory state orders, many farmers would 
rather not transact with state agents; they were sceptical that they will have a meaningful 
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option to reclaim pledged grain at a later date and, hence, they were (and remain) reluctant 
to pledge their grain to the authorities. With hindsight in 2003 it may seem obvious that less 
of the 2002 harvest should have been exported and more stored, but hindsight is always 
perfect. The underlying problem is that Ukrainian agricultural policy had not succeeded in 
creating an environment that is conducive to public and private grain storage, and this 
problem remains despite the experience of 2003. 
Decree #1150 also called for the purchase of grain by state authorities. It was clear 
from the outset that this would not help relieve the situation on grain markets in Ukraine in 
2003. First, state purchases do not add a single kilogram to grain supply in Ukraine. Instead, 
they reduce supply in the short run, thus increasing tensions and prices. The argument that 
these purchases were necessary to correct imbalances in grain supply across regions and 
time was not convincing; if the authorities had not interfered in regional movements and 
storage of grain, the market mechanism would have done a much more efficient job of 
correcting these imbalances than bureaucrats can.  
Second, state grain purchases in Ukraine have a history of being unreliable (see 
above) and opaque. Many announcements are made, but it is never clear to market 
participants how much really has been and will be purchased, and under what conditions 
this grain will be released. Hence, state grain purchases have always had the effect of 
increasing uncertainty rather than stabilising markets. Grain market stabilisation policy 
should not be seen as something that is ‘strategic’ and therefore secretive, but should rather 
be carried out in a transparent manner. This means that policy targets (i.e. at what prices 
purchases will take place and up to what amounts, and at what prices these amounts will be 
released) should be clearly stated, and the (single!) institution responsible for public 
stockholding should be obliged to regularly disclose what stocks it is holding. In this way 
market participants can concentrate on ‘normal’ sources of risk (which are bad enough in 
agriculture), and do not have to worry about additional risk in the form of erratic policies. 
Policy makers who would like to try their hands at controlling or out-guessing grain markets 
(in other words speculation) should apply for jobs as grain traders with Cargill or some 
other grain trading firm at home or abroad and not play traders with public money. This is a 
lesson that appears to have been learned as a result of the 2003 ‘crisis’: public stockholding 
has been carried out in a much more transparent manner in 2004, and while targets have not 
always been met 100%, execution has been much higher than in earlier years. 
The same transparency imperative applies to import and export regimes as well. On 
the import side, efforts to secure grain supplies from Kazakhstan and Russia could have had 
the effect of stabilising Ukrainian grain markets. But initial announcements that these 
countries would supply a combined 2.2 mill. tonnes did not have this effect because they 
were vague and the stated price (550 UAH/tonne) was quite obviously unrealistic. Why 
should Russia and Kazakhstan provide Ukraine with food wheat at this price, when world 
markets were tight and prices correspondingly high (135-140 US$/tonne or roughly 
750 UAH/tonne)? Was this essentially a ‘present’ from old friends, or would Ukraine 
somehow repay the difference between 550 UAH/tonne and the true value of the grain in 
question. Or would, in the end, less Kazakh and Russian grain than announced be delivered 
at higher prices? Without clear answers to these questions, the announcement of the deals 
with Kazakhstan and Russia actually added to uncertainty. Traders were afraid to arrange 
necessary commercial imports because they were worried that they might have to compete 
in Ukraine with 2.2 mill. tonnes of inexpensive preferential imports from Kazakhstan and 
Russia. World market prices continued to increase in the meantime, and in the end Ukraine 
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had to pay more to satisfy its demand than would have been the case if imports had been 
arranged sooner.  
This situation was exacerbated by the delay in removing import duties for food 
grain5. Indeed, one must question why Ukraine needs such duties in the first place. In an 
export situation they are certainly not necessary because export parity prices in Ukraine are 
so much lower than world market prices (see for example the year 2002 in figure 15.1) that 
no trader would want to import in the first place. And in an import situation when imports 
are desperately needed, import restrictions make grain more expensive, which is simply 
counterproductive. Furthermore, the political procedure of removing import restrictions 
takes time which, as outlined above, had the effect of increasing the cost of Ukraine’s food 
grain imports. Import restrictions also bind policy making capacity as individuals and firms 
with influence try to benefit from the rents associated with a partial removal of import 
restrictions (tariff rate quotas, for example).  
4 What should have been done? 
By mid-2003 the fact that Ukraine would have to import food grain in the 2003/04 
season was inescapable. How much it would have to import was not clear; many different 
figures were being bandied about, but all were based on a series of unknowns such as the 
exact size of the 2003 harvest, the exact composition of this harvest (qualities), the qualities 
and prices of available imports (which influence blending possibilities in Ukraine’s flour 
mills) and, of course, domestic demand (which is not, contrary to what some experts would 
have us believe, a universal constant!).  
There was no need for policy makers to determine the exact amount of required 
imports or to somehow manage and control these imports. Their first responsibility was to 
ensure that imports would be subject to as little friction as possible (no restrictions, no need 
for approval or the collection of rubber stamps, as little registration and bureaucracy as 
possible). The only interference that was required was the observation and publication of 
data on individual transactions (a simple weekly published list of what qualities and 
quantities or grain arrived at what harbours from what sources, including complete 
disclosure of any government or inter-government transactions) and, of course, 
internationally accepted phytosanitary testing at the border. The publication of data on 
import flows would have helped the market find the right dosage that brings supply and 
demand in line with one another, and elimination of unnecessary frictions would have 
ensured that prices in Ukraine increase no more than is absolutely necessary. 
Policy makers should have been more candid about the implications of the 2003 
harvest for grain prices and, hence, consumers and producers. By the end of 2003, milling 
wheat cost between 900 and 1 000 UAH/tonne (see figure 15.1). This export parity price 
made sense, given contemporaneous world market quotes of 140-150 US$/tonne and 
fobbing and handling costs of roughly 25-30 US$/tonne. Announcements that the domestic 
price could be stabilised at 750 or 800 UAH/tonne were counterproductive in the sense that 
they created expectations that could not possibly be fulfilled. 
                                              
5  While wheat imports were freed of import VAT in July 2003, a law providing for duty free wheat 
imports was not passed until November 23, 2003. 
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The situation in 2003 called for a targeted rather than a blanket approach to 
protecting consumers6. Artificially capping wheat, flour and bread prices benefits all 
consumers, including the relatively well to do. These consumers can afford to pay higher 
prices for bread without any threat to their food security. This means that in terms of social 
justice, blanket controls on grain and bread prices result in considerable waste. Policy 
should instead have focused on identifying and helping those poor consumers for whom the 
situation in 2003 really did represent a crisis at the household level, for example via a food 
stamp program for pensioners, the unemployed and those on social security. 
Blanket controls on grain and food prices also have the effect of reducing farm 
earnings. From a Ukrainian farmer’s point of view, grain markets have a built in stabiliser; 
when the crop is low, prices are higher, and vice versa. Of course, this stabiliser is not 
perfect and for those farms that had next to nothing to sell in 2003, the prevailing high 
prices provided little comfort. But why should farmers who have already been extremely 
burdened by higher costs (reseeding, wasted inputs etc.) and a lower harvest this year, be 
burdened even more by indirect taxes in the form of price controls or export restrictions for 
feed grains? In late 2003 it was obviously imperative that the next harvest in 2004 be better. 
While weather conditions remain beyond human control, and the government did not have 
the financial resources to provide significant direct financial support, it should at least 
avoided unnecessarily adding to the farm sector’s problems by taxing farmers to provide 
untargeted support to consumers. 
Government purchases of grain could not help to improve the situation following the 
2003 harvest. If there had been a time to store grain it was 2002, when prices were much 
lower. Government purchases after the bad harvest could only add to the demand for grain 
at a time when it was already too high with respect to supply.  
5 Conclusions 
In essence, the events that unfolded in 2003 provide much support for the 
prescription that policy makers should adopt the maxim ‘less is more’. Hectic and often 
counterproductive activity in 2003 did nothing to correct the fundamental problem that 
Ukraine had brought in a bad harvest, that it must therefore import grain and that this grain 
was currently expensive on world markets. Indeed, there was nothing that any policy maker 
or any number of emergency meetings could do to change any of these basic facts. The food 
grain prices facing Ukraine on world markets were (and still are) beyond its control. Hence, 
all that agricultural policy could do was to ensure that prices in Ukraine did not increase any 
more than necessary, and to ensure that as much help as possible was channelled towards 
those individuals and households for whom exploding prices created true hardship. 
By middle of 2003, the impression both within Ukraine and abroad was that 
Ukrainian agricultural policy making was as much in crisis as Ukrainian agriculture itself. 
Many of the measures announced and/or implemented cast doubt on Ukraine’s continued 
commitment to market-driven agricultural reform and restructuring, and many observers 
were concerned that Ukraine’s agricultural policy makers were beginning to backtrack and 
re-introduce some of the controls and mechanisms that did such damage in the 1990s.  
                                              
6 See chapter 14 The 2003 Wheat Crisis and Food Security for a more detailed discussion of the 
food security implications of the 2003 wheat crisis in Ukraine. 
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Luckily, the worst excesses were corrected in the ensuing months, as commercial 
imports finally began to arrive and the government began to target aid to needy consumers. 
When the harvest rebounded in 2004, prices fell back to export parity levels (see 
figure 15.2), and the 2003 ‘crisis’ became a thing of the past. 
Figure 15.2 Prices for food wheat in Ukraine and on world markets (1999 to late 
2004) 
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Source:  See figure 15.1. 
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Appendix: Statistical Data 
 
Table 1:  Agricultural production in Ukraine (mill. tonnes) 
 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Crop products                  
Grains and pulses, of which: 37.9 51.0 38.7 38.5 45.6 35.5 33.9 24.6 35.5 26.5 24.6 24.4 39.7 38.8 20.2 35.3 
Wheat 18.1 30.4 21.2 19.5 21.8 13.9 16.3 13.5 18.4 14.9 13.6 10.2 21.3 20.5 3.6 16.5 
Corn 6.5 4.7 4.7 2.9 3.8 1.6 3.4 1.8 5.3 2.3 1.7 3.8 3.7 4.2 6.9 4.2 
Barley 7.7 9.2 8.1 10.1 13.6 14.5 9.6 5.7 7.4 5.9 6.4 6.9 10.2 10.4 6.8 10.6 
Sugar beet 39.0 44.3 36.2 28.8 33.7 28.1 29.7 23.0 17.7 15.5 14.1 13.2 15.5 14.4 13.4 15.5 
Sunflower 2.3 2.6 2.3 2.1 2.1 1.6 2.9 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.8 3.5 2.3 3.3 4.3 3.4 
Potatoes 20.0 16.7 15.6 20.3 21.0 16.1 14.7 18.4 16.7 15.3 12.7 20.2 17.3 16.6 18.5 na 
Vegetables 7.4 6.7 5.9 5.3 6.1 5.1 5.9 5.0 5.2 5.5 5.3 5.7 5.9 5.8 6.5 na 
Fruits and berries na 2.9 1.5 2.1 2.8 1.2 1.9 1.9 2.8 1.1 0.8 2.0 1.1 1.2 1.7 na 
Animal products                 
Meat, of which: 3.7 4.4 4.0 3.4 2.8 2.7 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.7 na 
Beef and veal 1.6 2.0 1.9 na na na 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.7 na 
Pork 1.4 1.6 1.4 na na na 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 na 
Poultry 0.6 0.7 0.7 na na na 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 na 
Milk 23.0 24.5 22.4 19.1 18.4 18.1 17.3 15.8 13.8 13.7 13.4 13.4 13.4 14.1 13.7 na 
Eggs (bill.) 16.6 16.3 15.2 13.5 11.8 10.2 9.4 8.8 8.2 8.3 8.7 8.7 9.4 11.3 11.5 na 
Note: na – data is not available. 
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Table 2:  The structure of the agricultural sector in Ukraine until 1999 
 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
 Number of farms 
Agricultural enterprises*: 13 004 13 345 14 010 14 293 15 081 15 462 15 609 15 739 15 984 16 012 16 010 
Collective farms 7 363 8 820 9 351 9 575 9 722 9 977 10 356 11 299 12 019 12 401 12 426 
State farms 2 237 4 525 4 659 4 718 5 359 5 485 5 253 4 440 3 965 3 525 3 500 
Household plots (1 000) 3 4 9 2 9 763 10 679 10 861 11 057 11 249 11 433 11 547 11 560 11 555 
Private farms - 332 2 687 17 474 30 344 34 692 37 133 38 988 39 880 35 485 36 123 
 Agricultural land (1 000 ha) 
Agricultural enterprises: 38 900 38 701 36 235 33 642 34 795 34 684 34 362 34 110 33 827 33 900 32 901 
Collective farms 29 300 28 774 26 922 25 069 26 046 26 323 27 246 29 726 31 126 31 250 30 900 
State farms 9 600 9 927 9 313 8 574 8 749 8 361 7 116 4 384 2 701 2 302 2 001 
Household plots 3 400 2 669 3 864 4 607 5 011 5 357 5 589 5 694 5 789 5 890 6 204 
Private farms - 4 49 350 619 742 822 906 1 037 1 029 1 205 
 Number of cattle at year end (1 000) 
Agricultural enterprises: 22 200 21 083 20 186 17 800 17 717 15 742 13 674 11 545 8 950 7 825 6 681 
Collective farms 17 200 16 211 15 583 14 518 13 701 12 387 11 260 10 364 7 968 7 025 - 
State farms 5 000 4 872 4 602 4 282 4 016 3 355 2 415 1 181 982 800 - 
Household plots 4 900 3 540 3 537 3 643 3 869 3 856 3 856 3 742 3 764 3 843 3 921 
Private farms - 0,2 5 14 22 27 27 25 28 28 24 
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Table 2 (continued): The structure of the agricultural sector in Ukraine until 1999 
 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
 Number of dairy cows at year end (1 000) 
Agricultural enterprises: 6 500 6 192 5 986 5 623 5 439 5 005 4 579 4 039 3 322 2 883 2 465 
Collective farms 4 900 4 686 4 548 4 278 4 150 3 895 3 752 3 640 2 965 2 583 - 
State farms 1 600 1 506 1 438 1 345 1 289 1 109 826 400 357 300 - 
Household plots 2 250 2 187 2 275 2 429 2 628 2 799 2 936 2 917 2 921 2 927 2 955 
Private farms - 0.1 1.4 5.6 10.8 14.9 16.4 16.0 16.7 17.0 11.2 
 Number of pigs at year end (1 000) 
Agricultural enterprises: 14 200 14 071 12 557 10 913 9 724 8 044 7 112 5 496 3 979 4 216 4 081 
Collective farms 10 800 9 708 8 452 7 089 6 370 5 460 5 094 4 464 3 107 3 516 - 
State farms 3 400 4 363 4 105 3 824 3 354 2 584 2 019 1 032 872 700 - 
Household plots 5 720 5 356 5 276 5 245 5 549 5 864 5 992 5 699 5 456 5 651 5 960 
Private farms - 0.3 6.2 16.9 25.0 37.8 40.3 40.9 37.1 40.2 32.0 
 Number of poultry at year end (1 000) 
Agricultural enterprises: - 133 000 127 900 105 000 84 000 65 000 53 800 34 000 30 000 30 700 27 700 
Collective farms - 32 000 26 000 16 000 13 000 13 000 21 000 27 000 23 000 23 000 - 
State farms - 101 000 102 000 89 000 71 000 52 000 33 000 7 000 7 000 7 000 - 
Household plots - 113 100 115 200 110 000 106 000 100 000 95 700 95 100 93 000 98 400 98 200 
Private farms - - - 100 200 200 200 300 300 400 200 
Note:  * The number of public sector farms exceeds the sum of collective and state farms as it also includes the so-called inter-farms, which are not listed here. 
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Table 3: The structure of the agricultural sector in Ukraine in 2003 
Types of farms Number of agricultural enterprises (1 000) 
Agricultural producers, including:  59923 
Agricultural enterprises 10256 
Private farmers 43016 
 Agricultural land (1 000 ha) 
Agricultural producers, including:  39354 
Agricultural enterprises 26086 
Private households  8168 
Private farms 3095 
 Number of cattle at year end (1 000) 
Agricultural producers, including:  7712 
Agricultural enterprises 3165 
Private households  4547 
Private farms 106 
 Number of pigs at year end (1 000) 
Agricultural producers, including:  7321 
Agricultural enterprises 2273 
Private households  5049 
Private farms 36 
 Number of poultry at year end (1 000) 
Agricultural producers, including:  142374 
Agricultural enterprises 42263 
Private households  100000 
Private farms 270 
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Table 4: Main macroeconomic indicators  
 
1985 1990 1991 1992/1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Population (mill.) 51.0 51.7 51.8 51.6 50.6 50.2 49.9 49.5 49.4 49.0 48.2 47.8 
Rural population (mill.) 18.0 16.9 16.8 16.7 16.4 16.3 16.1 16.0 16.0 15.8 15.9 15.8 
Actual GDP of Ukraine in bUS$ na na na na 44.6 50.2 41.9 31.6 31.2 37.8 42.6 49.5 
Growth of real GDP (% per annum) na na -8.4 -14.7 -10.0 -3.0 -1.9 -0.4 6.0 9.2 5.2 9.4 
Growth of gross agricultural output (% per annum) na na -13.4 -7.4 -6.5 -1.7 -8.3 -7.4 9.8 10.2 1.2 -10.2 
Share of agriculture in GDP (%) na 25.2 22.7 18.0 13.1 12.1 11.2 11.4 14.0 16.3 14.6 12.2 
Share of households and private farms in gross agricultural output 
(%) na 29.4 32.8 42.4 54.6 55.7 58.3 59.9 64.7 61.5 59.9 66.7 
Share of livestock products in agricultural output (%)  na 49.9 52.0 43.5 42.8 38.2 42.7 45.5 39.5 40.0 40.1 43.3 
Labour force in agriculture (mill.)  4.92 4.96 4.77 4.97 4.97 4.99 5.03 4.93 4.93 5.22 5.39 4.96 
Share of labour force in total employment (%) 21.1 20.5 20.2 20.8 21.4 22.1 22.5 22.6 23.2 24.8 25.2 23.1 
Share of labour force employed by agricultural enterprises in total 
employment (%) na na 17.1 15.5 15.1 13.1 13.2 12.8 12.9 11.5 8.3 6.7 
Source:  INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH AND POLICY CONSULTING OF UKRAINE, STATE STATISTICS COMMITTEE OF UKRAINE and UKRAGROCONSULT.  
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